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Abstract
The dissertation concerns Thomas Reid’s philosophy of language. In the first three chapters,
I discuss his philosophy of language in relation to his developmental psychology. More
specifically, I discuss his answers to two questions: (i) what does the ability to understand
artificial linguistic signs make possible? and (ii) what makes the ability to understand
artificial linguistic signs possible? The focus is on Reid’s claim that the mind’s ability to
understand artificial linguistic signs makes it possible for it to acquire a number of distinct
mental abilities, such as to conceive universals, to judge, and to reason. I argue this claim
commits him to the further claim that artificial language makes it possible for the mind to
acquire moral liberty. The focus is also on Reid’s claim that it was possible for humans to
first invent artificial linguistic signs, and, subsequently, for children to be taught artificial
linguistic signs, only if they possess an innate faculty by the exercise of which they can
understand natural linguistic signs that express social operations of the mind. I explain that
claim, reconstruct Reid’s arguments for it, and argue that the account of artificial linguistic
signs presupposed by said arguments is prima facie incompatible with his claim that artificial
language makes moral liberty possible. In the fourth chapter, I discuss Reid’s accounts of
perception, memory, and imagination. I argue he holds that we perceive, remember, and
imagine before learning artificial language, and, consequently, is committed to the view that
such acts do not essentially involve the exercise of those abilities that artificial language
makes possible. I argue that it follows from this that Reid’s commentators have not fully
understood his accounts of the conceptual content in perception, memory, and imagination;
the processes through which said acts come to involve distinct conceptual content; and the
distinction between acquired perceptions and habitual judgments.

Keywords
Thomas Reid; language; mind; moral liberty; social operations; promising; perception;
memory; imagination.
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Summary for Lay Audience
Thomas Reid (1710-1796) was a prominent Scottish philosopher. This dissertation is a study
of Reid’s philosophy of language and his philosophy of mind. This research belongs to a
tradition in which historians of philosophy aim to get as clear as possible on details of the
views of historical philosophers; the aim is neither to evaluate the truth of said views nor to
take stock of their historical significance.
The dissertation focuses on Reid’s views on developmental psychology - which is to
say, his views on how the mind develops from infancy to maturity. On the reading of Reid
defended here, Reid holds that human infants come into the world possessing a set of innate
abilities, and that they then interact with their physical and social environment so as to
acquire additional abilities. Reid holds, moreover, that one of these innate abilities is the
ability to understand natural linguistic signs - i.e., features of the face, modulations of the
voice, and bodily gestures - that signify people’s thoughts, and, in particular, special sorts of
thoughts that Reid calls “social operations of the mind”. It is in virtue of this innate ability,
he holds, that it was possible for humans to invent artificial languages - i.e., languages such
as English, Chinese, Swahili, and so on - and is currently possible for infants to be taught to
understand already invented artificial languages. Reid holds, moreover, that it is in virtue of
children understanding artificial languages that it is possible for them to acquire the ability to
conceive objects as belonging to distinct types, to be rational, and to perform acts for which
one can be held morally responsible. The dissertation aims to understand all these views and
to draw further consequences from them that concern how to best understand related aspects
of Reid’s accounts of perception, memory, and imagination.
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Preface
The main topic of this dissertation is Thomas Reid’s philosophy of language. This topic has
not received much attention in the secondary literature - at least, that is, as compared to
topics such as Reid’s philosophy of mind and epistemology. Reid’s philosophy of language,
however, is novel in several respects, requires detailed study to understand, and is deeply
intertwined with the rest of his philosophical system: his philosophy of language, then,
deserves more attention than it has received. One aim in this dissertation is to partly rectify
this situation in the literature, by carrying out a detailed study of several aspects of Reid’s
philosophy of language; a second aim, moreover, is to use the results of that study to
contribute to the more developed literature on his philosophy of mind. Reid’s views about
language and mind are intertwined such that, by better understanding the former, we can
better understand the latter - or so I hope to show in what follows. What follows is a detailed
summary of each of the chapters of the dissertation and then an explanation of the project’s
aims and methods.
In chapter one, I present an overview of the basics of Reid’s philosophy of language and, specifically, of his account of linguistic signs. I first present the basics of Reid’s general
notion of a sign, before going on to present the basics of Reid’s accounts of natural linguistic
signs and artificial linguistic signs. In chapter one, I do not aim to defend novel exegetical
claims, but instead merely to present those aspects of Reid’s account of natural and artificial
linguistic signs that need to be understood, if the reader is to both follow and critically
engage the discussions that follow in chapters two, three, and four.
In chapters two and three, I discuss Reid’s philosophy of language specifically in
relation to his developmental psychology. I discuss Reid’s answers to two questions: (i) what
does the ability to understand artificial linguistic signs make possible? and (ii) what makes
the ability to understand artificial linguistic signs possible?
In chapter two, I consider (i). My focus, there, is Reid’s claim that the mind’s ability
to understand artificial linguistic signs makes it possible for it to acquire a number of distinct
mental abilities, such as the abilities to conceive and remember universals, to judge, and to
reason. Reid makes these claims in manuscripts which have not yet received attention in the
literature, and the bulk of the work, in chapter two, consists of presenting a detailed exegesis
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of the relevant aspects of those manuscripts. I then go on to argue that those claims, in
conjunction with some of Reid’s other commitments, commit him to the further claim that
artificial language makes it possible for the mind to acquire moral liberty.
In chapter three, I consider (ii). My focus is Reid’s claim that it was possible for
humans to first invent artificial linguistic signs and, subsequently, for infants to be taught to
understand already invented artificial linguistic signs, only if humans possess an innate
mental faculty by the exercise of which they understand natural linguistic signs that express
what Reid calls “social operations of the mind”. To get clear on this key claim - as well as on
Reid’s arguments for it - I argue for novel solutions to several interrelated exegetical issues
that concern the details of Reid’s accounts of these social operations and natural linguistic
signs. I then go on to reconstruct Reid’s arguments for the noted claim, and argue that the
account of the invention of artificial linguistic signs presupposed by one of his arguments is
prima facie incompatible with his claim that artificial language makes moral liberty possible.
I consider three ways in which we might be able to absolve Reid of responsibility for these
prima facie incompatibilities. The first two ways are suggestions for how we might be able to
read Reid differently, and I conclude that neither of these suggestions are up to the task. The
last way is the suggestion that Reid’s commitment to a creationist account of human origins
can provide him a way to sidestep these difficulties, and I conclude that although this
suggestion might work, Reid himself would be hesitant to embrace it as a complete and
satisfactory solution to his problems.
In chapter four, I go on to discuss consequences that my conclusions in part two namely, the conclusion that Reid holds that artificial language makes conceptions of
universals possible - have for how we ought to understand the details of Reid’s accounts of
perception, memory, and imagination. I argue Reid holds that we perform acts of perception,
memory, and imagination before we ever learn artificial language, and, consequently, that he
holds that said acts do not essentially involve the exercise of those abilities that artificial
language makes possible. I note that Reid’s other commentators have not fully appreciated
that first point, and then argue that this has led them to misinterpret the details of his accounts
of perception, memory, and imagination in several ways: namely, I argue that they have
misinterpreted (i) Reid’s account of the types of conceptual content essentially involved in
original perception, acquired perception, memory, and imagination; (ii) Reid’s account of the
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processes through which such mental operations come to involve distinct conceptual content;
and (iii) Reid’s distinction between acquired perceptions and judgments made habitually on
the occasion of our original and acquired perceptions.
The aim throughout is exegetical - i.e., to get clear on the details of Reid’s claims and
arguments. The aim is not, then, to evaluate the truth of his views or to take stock of their
historical significance. I discuss objections to Reid’s views, but always do so to better
understand how he would or could respond to such objections, and thereby to better
understand his views themselves. My main method for getting clear on Reid’s views
involves, first, simply giving close attention to what he says in his texts and manuscripts.
Where the meaning of some key passage is either prima facie ambiguous or otherwise
unclear, I aim to resolve said ambiguity by getting clear on Reid’s views on appropriately
related topics, and then proceeding to work out what the details of the unclear passage must
be - or, at least, what they most likely are - given the working assumption that Reid’s views
possess an appropriately charitable degree of internal coherence. There is, of course, a risk in
adopting such methods that one might cross the line between arriving at an historically
accurate understanding of Reid’s views and arriving at some ahistorical reconstruction of a
“Reidian” view - i.e., of what Reid either could or should have believed, rather than what he
did believe. I suggest that it is appropriately charitable, when first setting out, to interpret a
philosopher’s views as maximally internally coherent. But I also suggest that that principle of
charity can be taken too far: if one’s aim is to understand what a philosopher thought, one
must always remain open to the possibility that at least some of that philosopher’s views
were in conflict with each other. There are, inevitably, judgment calls that need to be made
concerning how to balance the aim of interpreting a philosopher charitably and that of
reading their texts in as straightforward a manner as possible. I make such judgments as best
I can. To mitigate the possibility of arriving at ahistorical reconstructions of Reid’s views, I
always ground my claims about what Reid believed on the historical evidence: every claim
that I attribute to Reid is either one that he explicitly makes; one entailed or implied by
claims that he explicitly makes; one that he must have held implicitly, insofar as his views
are to possess an appropriately charitable degree of internal coherence; or one that we have
sufficient reason to attribute to him, given what we know about the broader historical context
within which he lived, thought, and wrote.
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Why address these issues all together in a single study? Reid’s commentators have
written on many issues I address, but they have often failed to fully address them, I suggest,
at least in part because they have looked to tackle them piecemeal - i.e., one or two at a time rather than together in a single study. My project is not, then, one in which I tackle some
loosely related set of exegetical issues, but rather one in which I follow lines of thought that
run throughout Reid’s work, by which I am able to clarify details of claims and arguments
that have, until now, been at least partly misunderstood.
Why pursue this detailed sort of historical work? Why not, instead, aim to understand
Reid’s views in the sense of understanding how they fit within the broader landscape of the
history of ideas? Different sorts of projects are worth pursuing for their own sake, and,
further, the detailed sort of historical work that I and others pursue is one such project. I
suggest, moreover, this detailed historical work often functions as helpful preliminary for
those projects that aim to tell broader historical stories and narratives and place philosophers’
views within them. Archaeologists often tell the story of the rise and fall of a given
civilization and look to understand historical events by placing them within such a narrative.
But that sort of historical work can only count as good work, I suggest, insofar as it is
informed by the work of those apparent dregs who spend all their time meticulously combing
through the seemingly mundane details of the archaeological record. The work that I aim to
do is analogous: so count me as one of the apparent dregs.
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Chapter One: Reid on Linguistic Signs
In this short chapter, I outline the basics of Reid’s account of linguistic signs. I do not
aim to defend any novel exegetical claims, but instead to provide readers who lack
familiarity with Reid’s texts with the background on Reid’s account of linguistic signs
required for them to follow and critically engage the discussions in parts two, three, and
four.1 In what follows here, I first present Reid’s general account of signs, before going
on to present his more specific account of linguistic signs.
To begin: what is a Reidian sign? It is a particular sort of object of thought. We
can take a first pass at grasping Reid’s notion of a sign by considering the following
definition: object of thought X is a sign of object of thought Y, for subject Z, just when, if
Z conceives X, then Z immediately conceives Y. His signification relation is a three part
psychological relation that holds between signs, things they signify, and minds to whom
signs signify said things. To clarify, note Reid uses the phrase ‘to conceive’ as a rough
synonym for ‘to think about’, where ‘to think about’ is itself used in a very broad sense.
An act of conceiving, on his account, does not necessarily involve subsuming the object
under a general concept or category - although it may, in some instances, involve
something much like that. A Reidian sign, simply put, is a thing that, when thought about,
prompts the mind to think about another thing. To be precise, however, this first pass
explication of Reid’s notion of a sign needs to be refined in several respects; I aim to do
so in what immediately follows.
First, consider signs in relation to the type/token distinction. All signs, according
to Reid, are tokens; more specifically, they are individual substances or parts of such
substances. Each sign, however, signifies what it does because it is a token of some type.
Signs operate, that is, in accordance with general rules: signs of type X signify things of
type Y. Consider the following example: Jane smiles; I perceive her smile and am thus
prompted to think of her mental state of happiness. Here, the sign is a part of Jane’s face
1

There is literature that covers the same ground. For reference, note that good discussions of
Reid’s account of linguistic signs are Henning (1979), Henle (1983), Todd (1987), Somerville
(1989), Harre and Robinson (1997), Jacquette (2003), Rysiew (2015), and Powell (2017). I
engage the two most recent of these articles - i.e., by Rysiew and Powell - on related topics in part
three of the dissertation.
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and the thing signified by it is a mental state in her mind. The sign signifies Jane’s
happiness, moreover, because it is a token of a type - i.e., because it is a smile, rather than
some other type of thing. Consider two more examples: a token instance of the word
‘dog’ and a token instance of the word ‘Jane’. The former, according to Reid, is an
individual sound that signifies a universal, and the latter is an individual sound that
signifies an individual named ‘Jane’. Each sign signifies the object that it does, however,
because - among other things, of course - it is a token of some type.
Second, note that, in the definition given above, the conception of the sign is said
to lead the subject to immediately conceive the thing signified. What does ‘immediately’
mean? It means two distinct things here. It means, first, that there is no mediate sign or
thing signified. To clarify: if a sign A signifies an object B, which in turn signifies an
object C, Reid would not say that A signifies C; there is no such thing, for Reid, as what
one might call “mediate signification” in that first sense. It means, second, that there is no
reasoning involved on the part of the subject when making the mental move from
conception of the sign to conception of the thing signified. Reasoning, on Reid’s account,
is a mental act in which one judges that an abstract proposition is true in virtue of having
grasped that the truth of some distinct proposition makes the truth of the former
proposition evident - i.e., one infers the truth of one proposition from that of another. On
Reid’s account, understanding a sign does not involve the subject making judgments
about the truth of propositions or about the evidential/logical relations that hold between
them. The fact that signification is immediate in this second sense means that, on Reid’s
account, any object of thought can, at least in principle, be a sign that signifies any other.
Third, note Reid often uses ‘X signifies Y’ in a modified sense. Sometimes Reid
uses ‘X signifies Y’ to say, simply, that a conception of the sign is followed by a
conception of the thing signified; sometimes, however, Reid uses it to say a conception of
and belief in the existence of the sign is followed by conception of and belief in the
existence of the thing signified. The difference, here, is just the addition of the belief
component. To clarify, consider two more examples: I hear the word ‘dog’ and
immediately conceive the universal DOG; I perceive a plume of smoke and immediately
conceive fire and believe that fire exists. In the former, the conception of the word is
followed by a conception of the universal. Universals, according to Reid, do not exist and
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are not believed to exist - except by some rather confused philosophers - but universals
are nonetheless things conceived. In the latter, the perception of smoke - which involves a
conception of smoke and a belief in its existence - is followed by a conception of fire and
a belief in its existence. It is usually clear, when one attends to the particular sign and
thing signified, as well as to the broader context in which Reid uses the term, whether he
means to use ‘signify’ in this modified sense that includes belief.
Fourth, note Reid uses three terms when talking about what signs do. Sometimes
he says that signs signify, sometimes that they suggest, and sometimes that they express.
Reid uses the word ‘suggest’ in his earlier work Inquiry in the Human Mind as a rough
synonym for ‘signify’, and uses it most often, there, in the aforementioned modified
sense that includes belief. Reid sometimes uses ‘express’ as a synonym for ‘signify’
throughout his works in the aforementioned non-modified sense; in most cases, however,
he uses it in the modified sense, and, further, uses it specifically to refer to a
sign/signified relation between a sign and a mental state or mental act that it signifies.
Reid typically says, e.g., that ‘dog’ signifies the universal DOG, and not that it expresses
that universal; Reid typically says, moreover, that Jane’s smile expresses her happiness.
Reid’s use of ‘signify’, ‘suggest’, and ‘express’ throughout his works, however, are not
always perfectly consistent. I suggest it is most prudent to interpret Reid’s use of these
three terms on a case by case basis, rather than by looking to articulate some general rule
that purports to perfectly capture or describe his each and every use of those terms. When
expositing Reid’s views, however, I consistently use ‘signify’ to refer to the most generic
sort of sign/signified relation and ‘express’ to refer to a sign/signified relation that holds
between a sign and a mental state or mental act that is signified by it.
That’s all for Reid’s general notion of a sign; what, then, is Reid’s notion of a
linguistic sign? His distinction between signs and linguistic signs concerns what the signs
are used to do: linguistic signs are signs that are used by speakers to communicate their
thoughts - i.e., to make their thoughts known to other people. A language, on Reid’s
account, is a set of signs that people understand and use to communicate with each other.
Reid identifies two categories of linguistic signs: artificial linguistic signs and
natural linguistic signs. He identifies two corresponding types of language: natural
language and artificial language. Simply put, natural language consists of natural
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linguistic signs and artificial language consists of artificial linguistic signs. These two
categories of linguistic signs are, on Reid’s account, mutually exclusive and jointly
exhaustive of the general category of linguistic signs - which is to say that, on Reid’s
account, each linguistic sign is either natural or artificial, but not both. The distinction
between natural and artificial linguistic signs is a metasemantic distinction, in the sense
that it concerns who or what makes it the case that the sign means what it does. The
meaning of the linguistic sign, moreover, is identified with the object of thought it
normally signifies; to fix or determine the meaning of the sign, then, is to fix or determine
the normal signification of the sign. Artificial linguistic signs are those linguistic signs
“whose meaning is affixed to them by compact or agreement among those who use them”
(IHM 51), whereas natural linguistic signs are linguistic signs that “previous to all
compact or agreement have a meaning which every man understands by the principles of
his nature” (Ibid.)2 These definitions are a bit obscure; in part three, I discuss them in
more detail. For now, it is enough to note that, on the reading I defend, the difference
between natural and artificial linguistic signs is that the norms that govern the use of
artificial signs are determined by users of said signs - i.e., humans - whereas the norms
that govern the use of natural signs are determined instead by God. On this reading,
moreover, the users of artificial signs fix said norms by agreeing with each other - and
thereby taking on obligations to each other - to use said signs in accordance with general
rules; in the case of natural linguistic signs, in contrast, God fixes the norms that govern
the use of signs by creating us such that, when in normal circumstances and of a sound
mind, we just do understand and use signs in accord with general rules.
What sorts of things are linguistic signs and what sorts of things do they signify?
Reid writes that natural linguistic signs are “features of the face, gestures of the body, and
modulations of the voice” (Ibid.). He also writes that natural signs signify the “thoughts
and dispositions of the mind” of the speaker (Ibid.) A natural linguistic sign, then, is a

2

Henceforth, I refer to Reid’s works as follows: Inquiry into the Human Mind as IHM, Essays on
the Intellectual Powers of Man as EIP, Essays on the Active Powers of Man as EAP, Reid on
Logic, Rhetoric and Fine Arts as LRF, Reid On Practical Ethics as OPE, and Correspondences of
Thomas Reid as CTR. Numbers after the letters refer to page numbers in the cited editions. I refer
to manuscripts by catalog numbers - e.g., “MS II//2/vii” - from the Birkwood Collection at the
University of Aberdeen: https://www.abdn.ac.uk/diss/historic/Thomas_Reid/index.ht
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part or movement of a person’s body or voice that expresses a mental state or mental
operation of that same person. What sorts of things are artificial linguistic signs and what
sorts of things do they signify? All that is required for an object of thought to be an
artificial sign or to be a thing signified by such a sign, is that people agree that it is to be
used as either one or the other. In principle, then, on Reid’s account, any public object of
thought can be an artificial sign or a thing signified by an artificial sign. Reid holds that,
in most cases, artificial linguistic signs are written marks or spoken sounds. But Reid is
flexible there: in a manuscript I discuss in part three, e.g., Reid notes that various acts even, e.g., the act of remaining still or silent - can, in appropriate types of contexts,
function as artificial linguistic signs (OPE 136). But what do artificial signs typically
signify? Each artificial sign signifies either an individual substance or a universal. The
artificial signs that signify an individual are called “proper names”, whereas the artificial
signs that signify a universal are called “general words”. On his account, all common
nouns, verbs, adjectives, articles, adverbs, prepositions, copulas, as well as the other parts
of speech - excepting proper nouns, of course - are general words; as such, they signify
universals. A collection of artificial linguistic signs grammatically structured so as to
constitute a proper sentence, collectively signifies what we can call a “proposition” - i.e.,
an abstract object that can be true or false and is composed of the things signified by the
individual signs - and may, additionally, express an act of mind directed such a
proposition, such as an act of judgment, or any other mental act of the sort that we might
today call a “ propositional attitude”.3
It may be asked: does Reid really hold that all general words signify universals? It
might be argued that that is an implausible view, and, as such, that it should not be
attributed to Reid. It might well be an implausible view, but it is quite clear, I argue, that
Reid is committed to it. In EIP - specifically, in Essay 5 Chapter ii Of General
Conceptions - Reid aims to convince the reader that we have general conceptions - i.e.,

3

The claim that Reid understands a linguistic complex to signify an abstract proposition might
well be so very contemporary so as to raise eyebrows. But it is indeed Reid’s view. See EIP 408423. An act of judgment, on his account, is an act of mind that is directed at a proposition, an
object of thought that can be true or false. This proposition is not an act or state in the mind, but is
rather an extra-mental abstract object that is signified by a verbal proposition - that is, by a
complex of linguistic signs.
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that we conceive universals. Reid’s argument goes as follows: we understand the
meanings of general words; to understand the meaning of a general word is to conceive
what it signifies; general words signify objects that are general - i.e., they signify
universals rather than individual substances and their particular features; thus, we do
conceive universals. Reid spends the bulk of the chapter trying to convince the reader that
general terms signify universals - i.e., general words of the sort that can be used as either
the subject or predicate term in a complete sentence, such as ‘cat’, ‘square’, or ‘brown’.
At the end of the chapter, however, Reid writes the following:
“Having shewn that we may have a perfectly clear and distinct conception of the
meaning of general terms, we may, I think, take it for granted, that the same may
be said of the other general words, such as prepositions, conjunctions, articles. My
design at present being only to shew, that we have general conceptions no less
clear and distinct than those of individuals, it is sufficient to this purpose, if this
appears with regard to the conceptions expressed by general terms” (EIP 364)
Here, Reid says we can take it for granted that the other general words signify universals
too. He says, however, that arguing for that additional claim would be unnecessary, as the
claim he means to establish in the chapter - i.e., that we do conceive universals - has
already been established, and so any such further argument would be redundant. One can,
of course, contest Reid’s claim that we can just take it for granted. But Reid intends that
the reader do so, and, thus, it is clear he thinks that the other sorts of general words
signify universals. It might be worth asking, here, for clarity’s sake, what the universals
are that other general words signify. I have tentative suggestions to offer on this point.
Reid might hold, e.g., that prepositions - e.g., words such as ‘in’, ‘on’, and ‘between’ signify abstract relations of the sort that are instantiated between individual substances.
Reid might hold, moreover, that the copula - e.g., the word ‘is’ - signifies, depending on
the type of context in which it is used, an identity relation between individuals or a
relation of the sort that holds between individual substances and the universals
instantiated in them. An example of the former is ‘is’ in ‘Cicero is Tully’, whereas an
example of the latter is ‘is’ in ‘Jane is happy’. There are other sorts of general words e.g., conjunctions such as ‘and’ and ‘or’ - for which I do not have intuitive suggestions.
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What universal, e.g., does ‘or’ signify in the sentence ‘I am happy or you are hungry’? It
is not wholly clear what Reid might say. In any case, however, it is clear that Reid is
committed to the claim that these general words signify universals.
To further clarify Reid’s views, note that a collection of words, even if each of
those words, considered as an individual semantic unit, signifies an object of thought,
does not necessarily collectively signify a proposition. When one conceives a
proposition, the things signified by the individual words are not conceived in some
disordered jumble, but as related to each other in an appropriate sort of way. An account
of word meaning alone, then, on a view such as Reid’s, does not constitute a complete
account of sentence meaning. Reid does not discuss what in addition to word meaning is
required to fully account for sentence meaning. Presumably, I suggest, Reid’s view is one
on which the words must be arranged, modified, or inflected in accordance with
grammatical rules or conventions, and, further, that it is in virtue of such grammatical
rules or conventions that things signified by individual words are conceived as related to
each other in such a way as to collectively constitute a proposition.
To further clarify Reid’s views it helps to contrast Reid’s philosophy of the mind
with the views of his predecessors and then consider an example. Note Reid’s
predecessors held - or, at least, that he took them to have held - that all immediate objects
of thought are literally in the mind: e.g., things such as sensations, ideas, mental states,
mental acts, and operations. Reid famously rejected that theory: he held that we can think
about things that are “out there” in the external world, without first thinking of things in
the mind that represent those external things. Consequently, Reid rejected the claim that
all linguistic signs immediately signify things in the mind and only mediately signify
things in the external world. Reidian linguistic signs are indeed signs used by speakers to
communicate their thoughts, but each linguistic sign - when considered as an individual
semantic unit - does not necessarily express a thought. Some linguistic signs, of course,
express thoughts in the mind of speakers, but others signify the things “out there” that the
speakers’ and listeners’ thoughts are about.
Let’s consider an example. On Reid’s account, the word ‘dog’ does not express a
thought of a dog, a thought of all dogs, or a thought of the corresponding universal: it
signifies, rather, that universal itself. I can use ‘dog’ to communicate to another person
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my judgment that dogs are furry by uttering several linguistic signs arranged in
accordance with grammatical rules - e.g., by uttering a sentence such as “dogs are furry”.
The individual artificial signs ‘dogs’, ‘are’, and ‘furry’ signify universals and they
collectively signify a proposition - i.e., an abstract object of thought that can be true or
false and is composed of those universals. On Reid’s account, a judgment is a mental act
that is directed at such a proposition: it is an act of assenting to the truth of a proposition.
In our example, what signs express the mental act of judgment? On Reid’s account, it
depends on the particular case. If I utter something like “I judge that dogs are furry”, then
I use artificial signs to do it. But if I utter just “dogs are furry”, I do not - obviously, at
least - use artificial linguistic signs to do it; if artificial signs are not used in this sort of
case, Reid would need to say that the judgment is expressed by natural linguistic signs,
or, perhaps, that it is instead implicated or implied by facts about the explicit content of
the utterance and context in which that utterance is made. Reid’s views on implied or
implicit acts of communication are not but a bit obscure; I discuss them in detail in part
three, when said views are relevant to the main issues being discussed. For now, though,
let’s go on to discuss Reid’s claims about what artificial language makes possible.
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Chapter Two: Reid on What Artificial Language Makes
Possible
The aim here is to understand Reid’s answer to this question: what does artificial
language make possible? In particular, it is to understand his claim that the ability to
understand artificial linguistic signs makes it possible, for human minds, to acquire a
number of other mental abilities - such as, e.g., the abilities to conceive and remember
universals, to judge, and to reason. I first present a detailed exegesis of those noted
claims, and then go on to argue that those claims, in conjunction with his other views,
commit him to the further claim that artificial language makes it possible for humans to
acquire epistemic rationality and moral liberty.
The focus here in chapter two is on the content of manuscripts MS 2131/4/I/29,
MS 2131/4/I/30 and MS 2131/4/I/31, as well as on the contents of those parts of Reid’s
published texts in which the same - or at least closely related - views are expressed. The
noted manuscripts are collections of lecture notes that Reid prepared for a class he taught
at the University of Glasgow, and are variously dated between 1765 and 1768. Reid
began teaching at University of Glasgow in 1765, shortly after he published his first book
An Inquiry into the Human Mind on the Principles of Common Sense in 1764. Reid
taught at Glasgow until 1780, when he retired and composed his two major works Essays
on the Intellectual Powers of Man and Essays on the Active Powers of Man, published in
1785 and 1788 respectively. Reid taught two classes while at Glasgow: an introductory
public class as well as a senior private class. In the former class, Reid discussed powers
of the mind - such as, e.g., the powers of perception, memory, imagination, abstraction,
and judgment - as they are exercised in mature human minds. In the latter, Reid discussed
a number of other topics, including how the mind develops as a person grows from
infancy to maturity. The manuscripts discussed in this section are likely lecture notes that
Reid prepared for that senior class.
In these manuscripts, Reid claims that human infants come into the world with a
set of innate mental abilities and that they then subsequently interact with their physical
and social environments so as to acquire other mental abilities. This interaction is, on
Reid’s account, required for infants to acquire those other abilities. He draws an analogy
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to an oak tree: just as an oak seed requires appropriate exposure to soil, light, and water
in order to grow into its mature and most perfect state, so too infants require appropriate
exposure to their physical and social environments in order to grow into their mature and
most perfect state. Reid discusses three varieties of what he calls “culture”: (i) the culture
of nature, (ii) the culture of society, and (iii) the culture of education. The culture of
nature consists of the sorts of interactions with its environment that a human can have
independent of its interactions with other humans. The culture of society, in contrast,
consists of the sorts of interactions a human can have only with other humans, which
include, of course, its various linguistic interactions. The culture of education consists of
the special sorts of social interactions that a human has when it receives what we might
best call “formal instruction” or “formal education”. In these manuscripts, Reid identifies
various abilities that a human could or would acquire if they are exposed only to the
culture of nature, and he identifies abilities that a human could or would acquire only if
additionally exposed to the culture of society.
In chapters two and three of the dissertation, I discuss Reid’s claims that: (a) the
ability to understand natural linguistic signs is an innate ability that makes it possible to
be exposed to the culture of society in particular sorts of ways, (b) being so exposed to
the culture of society is required for people to invent and learn artificial language, and (c)
the ability to understand artificial language is required if one is to acquire the abilities to
conceive and remember universals, to judge, to reason, as well as to come to possess
epistemic rationality and moral liberty. Here in chapter two, I discuss just (c). In chapter
three, I discuss (a) and (b). To clarify all three of these claims at the outset, it helps to
note that they are not intended as claims about what is possible in principle, but rather
about what is possible for humans as a contingent matter of fact. There could, on Reid’s
view, be a sort of being that comes into the world with innate abilities to abstract, to
judge, to reason, and the rest, and there could be a sort of being that comes into the world
without such abilities but then acquires them without exposure to the culture of society
and without first acquiring the ability to understand artificial language: but we are not, on
Reid’s view, beings of either of those sorts.
Chapter two has five sections. In section (2.1), I present Reid’s accounts of both
abstraction and universals, as well as his reasons for claiming that the ability to
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understand artificial language makes it possible for us to conceive and remember
universals. In section (2.2), I do the same for his analogous claims about judgment,
reasoning, and epistemic rationality. In section (2.3), I go on to argue that the claims
discussed in (2.1) and (2.2) commit Reid to an analogous claim about moral liberty. In
section (2.4), I go on to argue that, although some of the views I attribute to Reid in
sections (2.1), (2.2), and (2.3) might be clearly and fully expressed only in the noted
manuscripts or entailed by manuscript claims in conjunction with claims he makes in the
later published Essays, there is nevertheless sufficient reason to believe Reid continued to
hold said views when he wrote the later Essays - and, consequently, that I can licitly
attribute said views to Reid when I work, in later in sections, to understand views Reid
expressed only in the later Essays. In section (2.5), I contrast my claims in the preceding
sections with similar claims made by Reid’s other commentators.

2.1 Reid on Abstraction and Universals
Reid claims that artificial language makes possible conceptions of universals. To begin,
let’s first get clear on Reid’s accounts of abstraction and universals. According to Reid,
abstraction is a mental activity in which a mind comes to focus its attention on a feature
of an individual substance so as to distinctly conceive said feature as a universal. To
clarify: to distinctly conceive something is, quite simply, to conceive it as different from rather than as confused with - other things. When, e.g., one distinctly conceives a feature
of an individual as a universal, one conceives it without conceiving it as confused with
any individual substance of which it either is or could be a feature or as confused with
any distinct features of any real or possible individuals. To grasp Reid’s account of
universals, it helps to note that Reid writes that Plato’s account of universals was correct
in every respect but one: whereas Plato believed that universals exist independently of the
individuals that participate in them, Reid believes universals exist only when instantiated
as features of presently existing individuals. Reid holds that the individual substances we
encounter in our experience are imbued with features that they do - or that they at least
could - share in common with other individuals, and that although said features cannot
exist independently of the individuals in which they are instantiated as token features, we
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can nevertheless think about said features as universals - i.e., think of them as abstracted
away from any real or possible instantiation relations to any such individual.
There are two excellent discussions of Reid’s views on abstraction and universals
in the secondary literature: Castagnetto (1992) and Lehrer (1989). Despite their merits,
neither attempts to make much sense of Reid’s distinction between abstract particulars
and universals. The nuances of this distinction are particularly relevant to our discussion
in chapter four, and it is worth taking the time, here, to get clear on some of said nuances.
Consider the following illustrative passage:
“If any man can doubt whether there be attributes that are really common to many
individuals, let him consider whether there be not many men that are above six
feet high, and many below it; whether there be not many men that are rich, and
many more that are poor; whether there be not many that were born in Britain,
and many that were born in France… It is certain therefore, that there are
innumerable attributes that are really common to many individuals; and if this be
what the schoolmen called universale a parte rei, we may affirm with certainty,
that there are such universals.
There are some attributes expressed by general words, of which this may
seem more doubtful. Such are the qualities inherent in their several subjects. It
may be said that every subject hath its own qualities, and that which is the quality
of one subject cannot be the quality of another subject. Thus the whiteness of the
sheet of paper upon which I write, cannot be the whiteness of another sheet,
though both are called white. The weight or one guinea is not the weight of
another guinea, though both are said to have the same weight.
To this I answer, that the whiteness of this sheet is one thing, whiteness is
another; the conceptions signified by these two forms of speech are as different as
the expressions: The first signifies an individual quality really existing, and is not
a general conception, though it be an abstract one: The second signifies a general
conception, which implies no existence, but may be predicated of every thing that
is white, and in the same sense…
If it should be asked, how early, or at what stage of life, men begin to form
general conceptions? I answer, As soon as a child can say, with understanding,
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that he has two brothers or two sisters; as soon as he can use the plural number, he
must have general conceptions” (EIP 367)
Let’s get clear on the key claim in the passage. First, let’s clear up some terminology. In
the passage, Reid refers to general conceptions and to attributes. As previously noted,
Reid often uses ‘conception’ to refer to acts of thinking about objects. The passage, then,
might be read as one in which Reid uses ‘general conception’ to refer to thoughts about
universals, rather than to universals. Note, however, that Reid takes pains in the quoted
section of EIP to clarify his use of ‘general conception’ there, noting that he always uses
it to refer to the objects conceived - i.e., to universals - rather than to acts of conceiving
such objects. Reid also uses ‘attribute’ in the passage. Reid uses ‘attribute’ to refer either
to universals or abstract particulars. It is usually quite clear, when one attends to the
broader context in which Reid uses the term, whether he intends, there, to refer
specifically to an abstract particular or to a universal.
Second, let’s get clear on the key claims in the passage. Reid draws a distinction
between abstract particulars and universals: the whiteness of this sheet is an object of
thought that is abstract but not also general, whereas whiteness conceived merely as such
is an object of thought that is both abstract and general. The former is but an abstract
particular, whereas the latter is a universal. On Reid’s view, to distinctly conceive a
feature of an individual as an abstract particular, is to conceive it as distinct from that
individual’s other features, but still as a feature of that individual, whereas to distinctly
conceive a feature as a universal is to conceive it as wholly abstracted away from not
only the individual’s other features but also as abstracted away from that individual itself.
For Reid, of course, it is correct to say abstract particulars and universals are the same
things; the only difference between an abstract particular and its corresponding universal
lies in the way it is conceived: in the former case, it is conceived as a particular feature of
a particular individual substance; whereas in the latter, it is conceived as abstracted away
from all individuals of which it is or can be a feature.
At the end of the quoted passage, Reid appears to claim, or at least imply, that the
ability to conceive universals is first acquired at - or at least by the time - one first learns
an artificial language. In the manuscripts, moreover, Reid makes a similar claim, but he
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discusses it in more detail and gives some reasons for it. Consider two key passages from
the manuscripts:
“Perhaps some may think that the want of Language will be no impediment to the
exercise of his rational Powers. Nay perhaps some will [be apt to
think]{apprehend}4 that he will think more accurately and reason more justly by
being free from the incumbrance of Language… I grant that without language a
Man might retain in his [Memory]{Imagination}distinct notions of the objects
which nature presents to his Senses, So as to know that it is the same Object when
it makes its appearance again. This the more sagacious Brutes can do. But as to
those Notions which are formed by the Mind itself, by Abstraction and
composition; in a word all general notions, I apprehend that without language we
[could]{would} never form them or be able to use them in reasoning. A general or
Abstract Notion… comprehends onely [sic] certain attributes or Relations of
Beings, [which are] {& is} distinguished from other things belonging to the same
being by giving a Name to it. The Name we give it, and the known Meaning or
definition of that Name serves as a boundary or enclosure to distinguish it, from
other attributes or Relations that are not comprehended under that name. Take
away the name and the enclosure is removed. Like a Field that has no limits to
distinguish it from the contiguous Ground.
Now it is to be observed that there can be no Reasoning, no rational train
of thinking without such general and abstract notions. For reasoning must consist
of propositions and every proposition must include some general notion. We learn
to form such General Notions by learning language, and if we had no Language
we should never learn to form them.
I believe every man will find in his Experience, that when he attempts any
regular train of thinking, though he does it in Silence and without uttering a
Sound, he will find it impossible to go on without conceiving more or less the
words by which his thought may be expressed and the more distinctly he cloaths
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When quoting from manuscripts, I use square brackets to indicate text that Reid crossed out, and
use curly brackets to indicate text that Reid inserted as either supralinear text or marginalia.
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[sic] his thoughts with words, the more accurately he will think; Thought being
too subtle and too spiritual a thing to be retained in the memory and imagination
without being cloathed [sic] with some sensible Image. This appears to me to be
the condition of human Nature in our present State. And I see no reason to think
that a Man without Society & consequently without any kind of Language, would
ever acquire so much of the exercise of his rational Powers as to be entitled to the
denomination of a Rational creature” (LRF 40-41)
“A Name given to any Conception limits & terminates it as an Inclosure or fence
limits a field so as to distinguish what belongs to it from what does not. And a
Conception without a name is like a field that has no distinct boundary… It slides
through the mind as a pure spirit might pass through a place without leaving any
footsteps or marks by which it may be traced. But by cloathing [sic] our thoughts
with words, we connect them with sensible signs by which means they make a
stronger impression upon the memory and are more easily retained” (LRF 20-21)
Let’s get clear on the key claims in the passages. Reid claims that without language, we
would be unable to have general notions or general conceptions. Once again, care must
be taken with Reid’s use of ‘conception’, ‘general conception’, and ‘general notion’.
These phrases, Reid notes, are ambiguous, as they are sometimes used to refer to acts of
thinking and sometimes used to refer to objects that acts of thinking are about. Reid’s key
claim in the quoted passages is that, without understanding language, one would be
unable to form general conceptions or notions, which is to say one would be unable to
conceive things that are general - i.e., universals. (Note Reid also claims in the passage
that we would, therefore, be unable to reason; I will consider this other key claim in more
detail in the next section.) The term ‘language’ in these passages is used to refer to
artificial language - i.e., those linguistic signs that sometimes signify universals. Reid’s
key claim in the passage then is that, without understanding artificial signs that signify
universals - i.e., those artificial signs that Reid calls “general words” - we would be
unable to conceive the features of individuals distinctly as universals. Without
understanding such signs, one might be able to attend to individual substances to a degree
that is sufficient to conceive them as distinct from other individual substances or to
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recognize that they resemble other individuals with whom they have common features,
but one could not distinctly conceive as universals those features said individuals have in
virtue of which they resemble each other.
How, on Reid’s account, does the ability to understand general words help us
conceive universals? The texts are a bit obscure on this point, but a straightforward
reading can be fleshed out. Recall Reid thinks that artificial linguistic signs are tokens namely, sensible individuals or parts of individuals. We can, then, on his account, focus
our attention on them to a degree that is sufficient to distinctly conceive them. If we
understand such signs - i.e., if they signify universals to us when we conceive them - then
we can, by attending to the signs, thereby come to attend to, and thus distinctly conceive,
the universals they signify to us.
What are Reid’s reasons for claiming we cannot think about universals without
the help of artificial linguistic signs? It is, after all, one thing to say we can, by thinking
of a sign that signifies some object, come to think about that object; but it is another thing
to say we cannot think about that object without first thinking of a sign that signifies it.
First, to understand Reid’s claim, recall that, on his account, it is a mere contingent fact
about our cognitive constitution that we cannot distinctly conceive universals without
artificial linguistic signs. Reid’s claim, then, is not that it is impossible in principle for a
being of any sort whatsoever to think about a universal without the help of an artificial
sign, but rather that it is impossible for a being with the particular cognitive constitution
of a human being to do so. But what are Reid’s reasons for this claim? He does not say
anything about it in his texts, at least not explicitly. But note that in the quoted passages
Reid appeals to introspective experience when he talks about why artificial language is
required for reasoning. There, Reid writes:
“I believe every man will find in his Experience, that when he attempts any regular train
of thinking, though he does it in Silence and and without uttering a Sound, he will find it
impossible to go on without conceiving more or less the words by which his thought may
be expressed and the more distinctly he cloaths his thoughts with words, the more
accurately he will think” (LRF 41)

On Reid’s account, laws of nature - including the laws of human psychology - are known
by empirical observation: we find that, in observed cases, such and such is the case, and
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we consequently take it to be a law of nature that things are thus and so, unless or until
further observation shows us otherwise. I suggest, then, Reid takes himself to be justified
in claiming we cannot conceive universals without understanding artificial signs on the
basis of empirical evidence he acquired through introspection. Note that it is a distinct
question whether Reid has some explanation for why we cannot conceive universals
without first understanding artificial signs. What would a Reidian explanation of that fact
look like? Reid adopts what can broadly be called a “nomological deductive” model of
explanation: on his view, we discover by reasoning inductively from experience general
laws of nature, and the most general laws that we discover are assumed - until yet more
general laws are discovered - to be brute facts about the way God made the world, and all
less general laws and particular events are fully explained by being deduced from those
presumed most general laws. Reid might simply take the apparent fact that we cannot
conceive universals without artificial signs to be a brute fact about the human cognitive
constitution. It is, however, an open question if some further explanation for that fact can
be reconstructed from Reid’s texts and thereby plausibly attributed to him. But I have not
been able to reconstruct any such further explanation. In what follows, I do not take any
stance on whether Reid would, if asked, offer any further explanation.
Now, note that there are any number of objections one might make against Reid’s
appeal to introspective experience in justifying the claim that artificial signs are required
for us to conceive universals. It might be pointed out, e.g., that Reid could only have
directly observed the case of one person - i.e., himself - and, moreover, the case of one
person who has been repeatedly exposed to the culture of society and is, presumably, in a
well ingrained habit of using artificial linguistic signs when thinking on abstract topics. It
might well be argued, then, that it simply does not follow, from those observations alone,
that a different person - one who was never exposed to the culture of society and who
never learned an artificial language - would be forever unable to conceive universals.
Alternatively, it might be argued, against Reid, that one finds by attending to one’s own
experience, that one can distinctly conceive universals and reason clearly about them
without the help of artificial signs. Reid does not respond to any such objections in his
texts. It is an open question whether he could or would respond to them convincingly.
But regardless of how one might evaluate the plausibility of Reid’s claims or his reasons
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for them, my claim - namely, the claim that Reid believes that we cannot distinctly
conceive universals without first understanding artificial linguistic signs that signify
them, and, further, that he takes himself to be justified in making that claim by way of an
appeal to introspective experience - still stands.
There is a further question to ask here: does Reid think that artificial language is
required for us to remember or to recall a universal - i.e., to think about a universal again
after having thought about it on some previous occasion - rather than just that artificial
language is required to think about a universal for the first time? In the quoted passages,
Reid appears to assert that artificial signs are also required to recall universals - or, at
least, to recall them fully distinctly. Reid might well concede that we can think about
universals that we have previously conceived without presently conceiving words that
signify them, but Reid clearly holds that by presently conceiving words we can conceive
said universals more distinctly. Reid gives some reasons for this claim, albeit obscurely,
in the previously quoted passage from LRF 20-21. Reid writes that thoughts pass through
the mind in the manner that a spirit passes through a place - that is, without leaving any
“footsteps” behind by which it might “be traced”. I suggest that the term ‘footsteps’,
there, when applied to the analogous case of thoughts about universals - is best
understood as signifying an alteration produced in the mind by the conception of the
universal, an alteration which grounds that mind’s ability to think of that same universal
later on. I suggest Reid’s view is that, when the mind conceives a universal, the alteration
does not persist for very long - or, at least, that it tends to diminish over time - and,
therefore, that it is only if the mind makes repeated use of artificial signs that it can go on
distinctly conceiving universals that it has conceived before. Why does Reid think this?
On the interpretation I offer here, his view is once again simply that we find by empirical
observation this is the case, that there is no known more general law from which this can
be deduced, and, thus, that we can therefore take it to be a brute fact about human nature.
Once again, I leave open the possibility Reid has a further explanation to give, but do not
attribute any such explanation to him.
Two more clarificatory questions might helpfully be asked here. First, does Reid
hold that we can conceive features of individuals as abstract particulars, rather than as
universals, without the help of artificial linguistic signs? First, let’s clarify the question.
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Recall the difference between conceiving a feature of an individual as an abstract
particular and conceiving it as a universal. Our question, here, concerns whether artificial
language is required just for conceiving features as universals, or additionally required
for conceiving features as mere abstract particulars.
Reid states in the previously quoted manuscript passages that we cannot conceive
universals without first understanding artificial language, but he does not explicitly say
the same about abstract particulars. I suspect that Reid is most plausibly construed as
holding that we can conceive abstract particulars without the help of artificial signs, but I
am not certain that that is correct. In any case, Reid explicitly claims only that artificial
signs are required for conceiving universals, so we should not attribute further claims to
him about whether such signs are required for conceiving features as abstract particulars.
However, I would still note that this much is quite clear: on Reid’s account, even if one
could conceive the features of individuals as mere abstract particulars without the help of
artificial language, one could not also conceive said particulars as tokens of distinctly
conceived universal types. To do so, on his account, would be to conceive an abstract
particular in as an instantiation of a distinctly conceived universal, which is impossible if
one cannot also conceive said feature as a universal. To clarify, consider Reid’s example
of the whiteness of a sheet of paper. It is, I suggest, unclear if Reid holds that, without the
help of artificial language, one could conceive the whiteness of a sheet of paper as
distinct from the sheet’s other features, but it is nonetheless clear Reid holds that, even if
one could conceive the whiteness of the sheet as such, one could not also conceive it as a
token instantiation of the universal WHITE; one might of course recognize that there is
some resemblance between one white thing and another white thing, but one could not
put one’s finger on the fact that they resemble each other because the universal WHITE is
instantiated in both of them.
Second, does Reid think one can indistinctly conceive a universal without first
understanding an artificial sign that signifies it? The answer depends on what it means to
say that one indistinctly conceives a universal. There are three things that it could mean,
for Reid, to say that one indistinctly conceives a universal. The first thing it could mean,
is to conceive a universal as confused with the individual substance of which it is a
feature as well as with that substance’s other conceived features. This does not require
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artificial language. Is this even a conception of a universal? The features of individuals
are instantiated universals; if, then, one conceives an individual as confused with some of
its features, one can be said to indistinctly conceive universals. The second thing it could
mean, is to conceive a feature as distinct from the individual but as a feature of it, and
also as distinct from that individual’s other features - i.e., to conceive it as an abstract
particular. As noted, it is unclear whether Reid thinks this is possible. The third thing it
could mean, is to conceive a universal as abstracted away from all individual substances
and particular features of such substances, but nevertheless as confused with some other
universal. To be clear: This is a case in which a person indistinctly conceives a universal,
which is different than conceiving indistinct universals. The universals are what they are
and are distinct from each other; it is just that we may fail to grasp distinctions that exist
between them. To clarify this third sort of case, let’s consider an example. When my
niece Mary was just four years old, she could correctly distinguish yellow/orange objects
from objects of other colours - such as, e.g., green or blue objects - but she could not
correctly distinguish yellow objects from orange objects. She would describe both yellow
objects and orange objects as “orange”. Reid would say Mary was able to conceive a
complex universal of the form A or B - i.e., the complex universal that is signified to
mature English language users by the phrase ‘orange or yellow’ - but that she was unable
to distinctly conceive the simpler universals of which that more complex universal is
composed. Mary could not, that is, distinctly conceive the universals that are signified to
us by the word ‘yellow’ and the word ‘orange’. Does Reid hold that it was possible for
Mary to conceive that complex universal as a single confused whole without
understanding any artificial language? No, he does not. On Reid’s account, Mary could
distinguish yellow/orange objects from other sorts of objects, because she understood
some of the relevant artificial signs to some extent, even if she did not yet fully
understand them. On Reid’s account, one fully understands an artificial sign when it
signifies to you the universal it ought to signify, where the universal it ought to signify is
determined by the norms that govern the use of that sign in one’s linguistic community. It
was a norm in Mary’s community that ‘orange’ and ‘yellow’ signify distinct universals.
She did not fully understand those terms, and, consequently, did not yet recognize that
tokens of yellow and orange are tokens of distinct universal types - i.e., she did not yet
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recognize that token instances of yellow and orange are instantiations of distinct
universals.
There are two other questions the reader might have. How, on Reid’s account, do
children first learn to understand the artificial linguistic signs used by the members of
their communities and thereby first come to conceive universals? And how, on Reid’s
account, were artificial linguistic signs first invented by early human societies? I answer
these questions in part three. Before doing so, however, I first complete this discussion of
Reid’s claims about what artificial language makes possible.

2.2 Reid on Judgment, Reasoning, and Rationality
Reid claims that the ability to understand artificial language makes both judgment and
reasoning possible. Recall the following passage:
“Now it is to be observed, that there can be no Reasoning, no rational train of thinking
without such general and abstract notions. For reasoning must consist of propositions and
every proposition must include some general Notion. We learn to form such General
Notions by learning Language and if we had no Language we should never learn to form
them” (LRF 41)

What are Reid’s reasons for claiming artificial language makes judgment and reasoning
possible? First, let’s recall Reid’s accounts of propositions and judgments. A proposition
is a complex and abstract object of thought that can be true or false and is composed of
universals. A judgment is an act of the mind directed at a proposition, and, specifically,
an act of assenting to the truth of a proposition. Why does Reid think artificial language
is required for acts of judgment? One can assent to the truth of a proposition only if one
can conceive it, which is possible only if one can conceive the universals of which the
proposition is composed. Reid holds, of course, that artificial language is required for
conceiving universals; and, consequently, he holds that artificial language is required for
judgment. Second, recall Reid’s account of reasoning: reasoning involves judging that a
proposition is true in virtue of inferring its truth from that of another proposition. Why is
artificial language required for reasoning? The point is just that one must conceive the
propositions in order to infer the truth of the one from that of the other. On Reid’s
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account, artificial language makes conceptions of propositions possible; thus, he is
committed to holding that artificial language makes reasoning possible.
Reid does not explicitly claim that artificial language makes epistemic rationality
possible. Why do I attribute this additional claim to Reid? There are two reasons. These
reasons draw on both the manuscript claim that artificial language makes conceptions of
universals and propositions possible as well as on further claims that Reid makes in his
published texts. First, in Reid’s published Essays, e.g., he holds that judgment is required
for epistemic rationality. Knowledge, on Reid’s account, involves recognizing a
proposition is evident and consequently judging it to be true. Artificial language makes
conceptions of propositions possible; consequently, it makes epistemic rationality
possible. Second, Reid holds that we possess epistemic rationality only if we possess a
sufficiently rich set of beliefs, which collectively constitute the background against which
we evaluate the evidentness of non-self-evident propositions. Some background beliefs
are in self-evident propositions, whereas others are in non-self-evident propositions. With
respect to the former propositions, we recognize the evidentness of the propositions by
exercising our faculty of common sense - i.e., we grasp its evidentness by the light of
nature, as it were - and consequently judge them to be true. Our common sense can do
that work for us, however, only if we can conceive the proposition in question. With
respect to the latter propositions, Reid holds that we initially acquire such beliefs, in part,
in childhood, by credulously accepting testimony from members of our community. The
idea is that people tell children things, children believe what they are told, and the beliefs
they thus acquire partly constitute their initial sets of background beliefs. When a child
reaches maturity, they can exercise their rationality to question and subsequently revise
their non-self-evident background beliefs. But that exercise of rationality is possible for
the child only if they already possess a sufficiently rich set of background beliefs. How
does this relate to the claim about artificial language? Simply put, on Reid’s account, the
ability to understand artificial linguistic signs by which the testimonies of other people
are expressed, is required for the child to receive said testimonies, and, thus, required for
the child to first come to acquire a set of background beliefs that is sufficiently rich for it
to possess epistemic rationality.
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2.3 Reid on Moral Liberty
What is moral liberty? A subject possesses moral liberty if and only if it is capable of
performing actions in such a way as to be morally responsible for having done so. Reid
does not explicitly claim that artificial language makes moral liberty possible. In what
follows, I argue that his claims about artificial language and moral liberty jointly commit
him to that claim. There are passages in which Reid makes claims similar to the claim I
attribute to him here. Consider, e.g., the following passage:
“3. The Solitary Man could have no Religion. Whether his Fear might lead him
to some superstitious Dread of unknown Powers I cannot say; but there is no
reason to think that he could form any rational Notion of a Diety.
4 As little could there be any Exercise of his Moral Powers or any Notion of
Duty. {All Notion of} the duty we owe to the Supreme Being, supposes that we
have a Notion and Belief of a Supreme Being. And all Notion of Duty towards
men supposes some Knowledge of them & intercourse with [them]. The Wild
Man has neither” (LRF 41)
Consider another example:
“I am very apt to think, that, if a man could be reared from infancy, without any
society of his fellow, creatures, he would hardly ever shew any sign, either of
moral judgment, or of the power of reasoning” (EAP 279)
The claims come close to the claim that artificial language makes moral liberty possible.
Strictly speaking, however, the claim in the first passage is that the culture of society is
needed for one to acquire one’s “moral powers” quite broadly, and, more specifically, to
acquire one’s rational notions of duty and of God. The claim, then, is not precisely the
claim that artificial language is required for moral liberty. Further, strictly speaking, the
claim in the second quoted passage is that moral judgment - i.e., the ability to judge that
an act is either right or wrong - is possible only if one is exposed to the culture of society,
which is, once again, not exactly the claim that artificial language is required for moral
liberty. Familiarity with the details of Reid’s views on agency and moral responsibility,
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however, allows us to see clearly that Reid is committed to the related but distinct claim
that I wish to attribute to him.
First, what are Reid’s views on agency and moral responsibility? Note that Reid
believes in agent causation: Reid holds that only agents - i.e., minds with particular
powers - are genuine efficient causes. Reid holds that agents are efficient causes just
when they exercise their active powers to thereby perform their voluntary actions. What
is involved in exerting active power? Consider the following passages:
“...if we had not will, and that degree of understanding which will necessarily
implies, we could exert no active power, and consequently have none: For power
which cannot be exerted is no power” (EAP 29)
“...to constitute the relation between me and my action, my conception of the
action, and will to do it, are essential. For what I never conceived, nor willed, I
never did” (EAP 33)
“In the strict philosophical sense, nothing can be called the action of a man, but
what he previously conceived and willed or determined to do” (EAP 74)
To exert active power, an agent must will to perform an action. An act of will is a mental
act that is directed at one of the mind’s other acts. That other act is the act that is willed,
and the act of will is what makes that other act a voluntary action. The point to take away
from the quoted passages, moreover, is that Reid rejects blind agency: he thinks that acts
of will require understanding - i.e., that one must conceive what one wills prior to willing
it. One must first conceive of the action willed, and only then is it possible to exert active
power to thereby bring that action into effect.
Our question is this: what degree of understanding is required, on Reid’s view, if
one is to will an act in such a way that one can be held morally responsible for doing so?
Reid has much to say on this topic. Consider several choice passages:
“Two things are implied in the notion of a moral and accountable being;
understanding and active power.
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First, he must understand the law to which he is bound, and his obligation
to obey it…
Brute animals are incapable of moral obligation, because they have not the
degree of understanding which it implies. They have not the conception of a rule
of conduct, and of obligation to obey it, and therefore, though they may be
noxious, they cannot be criminal.
Man, by his rational nature, is capable both of understanding the law that
is prescribed to him, and of perceiving its obligation” (EAP 236)
“The brutes are stimulated to various actions by their instincts, by their appetites,
by their passions. But they seem to be necessarily determined by the strongest
impulse, without any capacity for self-government. Therefore we do not blame
them for what they do; nor have we any reason to think that they blame
themselves. They may be trained up by discipline, but cannot be governed by law.
There is no evidence that they have a conception of a law, or of its obligation.
Man is capable of acting from motives of a higher nature. He perceives a
dignity and worth in one course of conduct, a demerit and turpitude in another...”
(EAP 23)
“A man who seriously charged a brute with a crime, would be laughed at. They
may do actions hurtful to themselves, or to man. They may have qualities, or
acquire habits, that lead to such actions; and this is all we mean when we call
them vicious. But they cannot be immoral; nor can they be virtuous. They are not
capable of self-government; and when they act according to the passion or habit
which is strongest at the time, they act according to the nature that God has given
them, and no more can be required of them.
They cannot lay down a rule to themselves, which they are not to
transgress, though prompted by appetite, or ruffled by passion. We see no reason
to think that they can form the conception of a general rule, or of obligation to
adhere to it…” (EAP 190)
“The liberty of a moral agent implies, not only a conception of what he wills, but
some degree of practical judgment or reason…
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What kind, or what degree of liberty belongs to brute animals, or two our
own species, before any use of reason, I do not know. We acknowledge that they
have not the power of self-government. Such of their actions as may be called
voluntary, seem to be invariably determined by the passion or appetite, or
affection or habit which is strongest at the time…
But of civil or moral government, which are addressed to the rational
powers, and require a conception of law and an intentional obedience, they are, in
the judgment of all mankind, incapable” (EAP 196)
For an agent to possess moral liberty just is for that agent to be able to perform an action
in such a way that they can be held morally responsible for it. These passages show that,
according to Reid, moral liberty requires that the agent can conceive a general law or
rule, can recognize that they are obligated to act in accord with that law or rule, and can
consequently exert their will so as to act in accord with that law or rule. Why, then, do I
claim Reid is committed to the view that artificial language makes moral liberty possible?
Reid holds that the ability to understand an artificial language is required if one is to
conceive any general rule that one is to be obligated to follow. Conceiving a rule of that
sort, afterall, involves conceiving at least one or more universals. Reid holds that artificial
language makes it possible for us to conceive universals, and, thus, holds that it makes it
possible for us to possess moral liberty.
There is an important corollary to Reid’s claim that artificial language makes
moral liberty possible: on his account, the ability to understand artificial language makes
it possible to be the efficient cause of any regular or rational pattern of behaviour. To
understand this claim, as well as to understand why Reid is committed to it, we need to
know a little about Reid’s account of the motives of our actions. We have, Reid holds,
three sorts of motives for the things we do: mechanical principles of action, animal
principles of action, and rational principles of action. The mechanical principles include
our innate instincts and acquired habits. The animal principles include our motivational
mental states such as appetites, desires, and feelings. On Reid’s account, both humans
and non-human animals act from mechanical and animal principles, but only humans act
from rational principles. There are two rational principles of action, both of which are
possible only for beings that have general conceptions. The first rational principle is
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one’s regard for one’s good upon the whole. When one acts from this rational principle,
one understands that performing an action would be for one’s overall benefit and is
thereby moved to perform it. The notion of one’s good upon the whole, Reid holds, is one
of the most abstract general conceptions of which the mind is capable. On his account,
then, that notion is possible only for one who understands artificial signs. The second
rational principle is one’s regard for one’s moral duty. When one acts from this second
rational principle, one conceives a general rule, recognizes that one has an obligation to
obey it, and is then moved to act in accord with that rule by the fact that one has said
obligation - one acts, that is, in such a way that presupposes moral liberty. On Reid’s
account, the ability to understand artificial language makes it possible to act from the
second rational principle, because it makes it possible to conceive general rules. The
ability to understand artificial language, then, makes it possible for us humans to be
motivated by either of the two rational principles of action.
What, then, is the important corollary? It is this: the ability to understand artificial
language makes it possible for a human to be the efficient cause of any regular or rational
pattern of behaviour. To see why this follows, note that, on Reid’s account, only some
principles of action can motivate a regular or rational pattern of behaviour - such as, e.g.,
repeatedly acting in accord with a general rule. Reid holds that the mechanical principles
can do so, when one is innately constituted such that one’s instincts lead one to respond
in regular ways to types of situations in which one repeatedly finds oneself, or when one
has acquired an habit of doing so by way of being trained to do so by a rational being
who is capable of conceiving the pattern of behaviour. When acting from mechanical
principles, however, one does not act voluntarily, and, thus, one is not the efficient cause
of one’s actions. The animal principles of action, in contrast, can motivate voluntary
actions, but they cannot, on Reid’s account, motivate regular or rational patterns of
behaviour. It is only the rational principles of action, then, on his account, that not only
motivate regular patterns of behaviour, but also motivate voluntary actions. It follows
that, on his account, the ability to understand artificial language makes it possible for a
human being to be the efficient cause of a regular or rational pattern of behaviour. An
animal or human infant can repeatedly act in accord with a general rule, but it is only a
mature human - or else a being with broadly equivalent rational, active, and moral powers
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- that can be the genuine efficient cause of their doing so. This corollary becomes quite
important in part three, when we come to discuss in more detail Reid’s metasemantics of
artificial linguistic signs.

2.4 Manuscripts and Published Texts
Did Reid continue to hold the views he expressed in the manuscripts when he composed
the later Essays? These manuscripts were composed in the late 1760s, so it is possible
that Reid gave up the relevant claims by the time he wrote the Essays in the 1780s. In
what follows, I argue we have sufficient reason to think Reid did not give those claims
up. First, note that there are contextualist considerations that support the claim that the
fact that a view is expressed only in the manuscripts does not provide reason to think
Reid gave the view up when he wrote the Essays. There are many topics discussed in
Reid’s manuscripts that are not discussed in the Essays. Such topics include, e.g.,
economics, politics, practical ethics, as well as many others. If we take the fact that Reid
did not express his views on those topics in detail in the Essays as sufficient reason to
conclude he gave those views up, we must conclude Reid gave up his views on many if
not most of the topics he taught in the aforementioned private class, as well as many
views that he expressed in papers he presented to philosophical societies throughout his
career. Doing so would be highly unreasonable, as there is no reason to think Reid
intended the Essays to contain all his views; there is, in fact, reason to think Reid
intended the Essays to be partial expressions of his views. From Reid’s letters, we learn
that, in 1784, he thought his health was failing, and he published EIP and EAP as
separate volumes in 1785 and 1788 because he doubted that he would finish EAP in time
and consequently sent EIP essays to print early to make sure he got something published
(see CTR 163). The collections of Essays, then, should not be read as if Reid intended
them to be statements of all his mature views, but rather as the most complete statement
of his views that he thought he could manage in the limited time he thought he had. In
light of such considerations, it is unreasonable to conclude from the fact that a view Reid
expressed in manuscripts is not expressed in EIP or EAP, that he rejected that view by the
time he wrote the Essays.
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Which manuscript views are expressed in the Essays and which are not? This is a
hard question to answer definitively, as many claims in the Essays read as statements of
the manuscript views, but are - arguably, at least - expressed unclearly or only partially.
Consider several examples:
“It may be observed, that every individual object that falls within our view has
various attributes; and it is by them that it becomes useful or hurtful to us… and it
is only by attention to their attributes that we can make them subservient to our
ends; and therefore we give names to such attributes” (EIP 355)
“If it should be asked, how early, or at what period of life, men begin to form
general conceptions? I answer, As soon as a child can say, with understanding,
that he has two brothers or two sisters; as soon as he can use the plural number, he
must have general conceptions” (EIP 367)
“The labour of forming abstract notions, is the labour of learning to speak, and to
understand what is spoken. As the words of every language, excepting a few
proper names, are general words, the minds are furnished with general
conceptions, in proportion as they learn the meanings of general words” (EIP
398)
“No man can pursue a train of thought or reasoning without the use of language…
the sign is so associated with the thing signified, that the last can hardly present
itself to the imagination, without drawing the other along with it” (EIP 538)
Do these passages express the claim that artificial language is needed for us to conceive
universals, to judge, and to reason? I suggest that they do - especially the passage from
EIP 398. One might argue, however, that these passages, as well as the many others like
them, are either vague or lacking in key details. What do I make of such an argument?
First, I disagree and suggest that one would need to read the passages quite unnaturally if
one was to maintain that they do not contain the relevant views. Second, however, I can
concede just for the sake of argument that the passages are vague or lacking details and
still make my point. Passages in EIP and EAP in which Reid imperfectly expresses the
manuscript views are evidence that he continued to hold said views when he wrote the
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Essays, because the interpretive hypothesis that Reid continued to hold the views when
writing the Essays allows us to make better sense of those passages in the Essays. It is
unclear, e.g., why Reid notes that giving names to attributes is part of the process of
abstraction. Reid makes the point that giving names to attributes is involved in that
process a number of times in the Essays - on each occasion, in fact, in which he explicitly
outlines that process - but he does not make it clear in the text itself why he does so.
What does giving the attribute or feature a name have to do with it? Reid does not tell us
in EIP. But the manuscript claims help us make sense of his likely reasons. The fact that
the manuscript claims help us make sense of the Essays gives us reason to think the
manuscript views were working in the background, as it were, when Reid wrote the
Essays. We have, then, reason to attribute the relevant manuscript views to Reid at the
time that he wrote the later Essays.

2.5 Reid’s Other Commentators
There are two discussions in the literature that address the issues discussed in previous
sections at notable length: Gallie (1998) and Copenhaver (2020). Gallie does not discuss
the noted manuscripts, but he does discuss the parts of Reid’s published texts that cover
the same or at least analogous topics. Copenhaver discusses the manuscripts. In what
follows, I outline these two author’s main points - or, at least, the points they make that
are most relevant to my discussions in preceding sections - and then compare and contrast
their points with my own. Doing so serves to reemphasize the key points to note going
forward, as well as to make clear the novelty of my conclusions.
Gallie discusses Reid’s account of artificial language and the role understanding
artificial language plays in our conceiving universals. Gallie notes that Reid holds that,
when we first set out in the world as mere infants, we indistinctly conceive features of
individuals, and that this brute acquaintance with such features is, in part, what makes it
possible for us to come to learn artificial language. Gallie claims, however, that “Reid’s
account of the formation of... general conceptions is essentially non-linguistic” (Gallie
1998, 50). On Gallie’s reading, Reid holds that we are acquainted with individuals that
have common features, that we can attend to said features, and that we can thereby come
to distinctly conceive said features as universals, without any help from artificial
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linguistic signs. However, he goes on to write that, according to Reid, “the common
meaning [of artificial linguistic signs] is the standard by which such conceptions are
formed, and they are said to be true or false as they agree or disagree with [the
conceptions normally signified by the signs]... Reid’s position is that you cannot possess
[true] general conceptions without having had transactions with linguistically meaningful
items such as general terms. This is a thesis about possession of general conceptions and
is not, on the face of it, a thesis about their formation” (Ibid.) On his reading, then, Reid
holds that we can conceive of universals without assistance from artificial signs, but that
only insofar as we conceive of universals via understanding artificial signs that those
conceptions can be meaningfully said to be true or false.
Gallie is at least partly incorrect. Reid is clear that the process through which we
conceive universals involves linguistic signs. There is, however, a point on which I partly
agree with Gallie: Gallie claims Reid holds that artificial language is required for our
conceptions of universals to be true or false. I agree, but I would modify this claim just
slightly. On Reid’s account, a conception considered merely as such cannot be true or
false: on his account, rather, only sentences, propositions, beliefs, and judgments can,
strictly speaking, be true or false. However, Reid does hold one can correctly understand
an artificial sign, only insofar as that sign signifies to you the universal that it ought to
signify, where the fact of what it ought to signify is determined by the rules or norms that
govern the use of the sign in one’s linguistic community. Reid holds, then, that you can
be said to correctly - and so, in a sense, to truly - conceive a universal, only if the sign
that signifies the universal to you ought to signify that universal, where the fact of what it
ought to signify to you is determined by the normal use of that sign within your linguistic
community. Absent any public standard, no such conception could be said to be correct
or incorrect, but would, instead, merely be the conception of the universal that it happens
to be. On that point, Gallie and I are in rough agreement. The key point to note, however,
is the point of contrast: Reid thinks conceptions of universals are possible, for us, only if
we understand artificial linguistic signs.
Unlike Gallie, Copenhaver notes Reid holds that artificial linguistic signs play a
necessary role in the process through which we come to conceive universals. One point
she makes which I did not, moreover, is that Reid holds that children’s thoughts first
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come to follow regular or rational patterns in consequence of their instinctually imitating
the thoughts and behaviours of the members of their community that are revealed to them
through said members’ use of linguistic signs. Copenhaver is correct on this point. Note,
however, the point I make - i.e., that Reid thinks artificial language makes it possible for
one to be the efficient cause of a regular pattern of thought or behaviour, including
linguistic behaviour - is a distinct point. Her point concerns Reid’s account of how a
person’s thoughts and actions first come to acquire the character of the thoughts and
actions of a being who acts from rational principles, but with respect to cases in which
that person may not actually act from such principles: on Reid’s account, if one merely
instinctually imitates the behaviour of other people and thereby acquires habits in virtue
of which one behaves in rational ways, one is motivated by mechanical principles of
action and is not acting voluntarily, and one is not, therefore, the efficient cause of that
behaviour. The point that I make, in contrast, concerns Reid’s account of what is required
if one is to be an agent who possesses moral liberty and is the efficient cause of any
regular or rational pattern of thought or behaviour. As I noted previously, this point will
be important when we come, in part three, to discuss Reid’s account of the metasemantics
of artificial linguistic signs.
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Chapter Three: Reid on What Makes Artificial Language
Possible
In part (3), I now consider Reid’s answer to this question: what makes artificial language
possible? More precisely, I consider Reid’s answer to two distinct questions: (i) what
made it possible for humans to first invent artificial signs? (ii) what makes it possible for
a human infant to be taught to understand previously invented artificial signs? My focus,
moreover, is Reid’s common answer to both questions: namely, that we must possess a
natural language with which we can express social operations of the mind. In sections
(3.1) and (3.2), I aim quite simply to understand that key claim. In (3.1) I discuss in detail
Reid’s account of social operations of the mind, and then, in (3.2), I do the same with
respect to his account of natural linguistic signs - and, specifically, his account of natural
linguistic signs that can be used to express social operations. I argue for several novel
claims on these topics. I argue Reid is committed to holding that social operations are
remote - rather than immediate - operations of the mind of which the mind is not
conscious. I argue Reid holds that the natural linguistic signs that express social
operations are signs that, as Reid puts it, signify their objects “by a natural kind of
magic”. In (3.3), I discuss Reid’ arguments for the key claim. First, I present novel
reconstructions of his arguments. Then, I critically engage the secondary literature on the
first of his two arguments. Last, I argue that the presuppositions of that first argument are
prima facie incompatible with some of Reid’s other commitments. I then consider three
ways in which we might be able to absolve Reid of these problems. I conclude that none
of these three ways is wholly satisfactory, and, consequently, that Reid’s views are quite
possibly incompatible with each other

3.1 Reid on Social Operations of the Mind
What are social operations? Reid’s examples of social operations include the acts of
promising, testifying, commanding, requesting, agreeing, as well many others.5 Reid
5

Reid’s examples invite comparisons between Reid’s account of social operations and speech act
theories offered by 20th century philosophers. There are indeed striking comparisons and
contrasts to note between Reid’s account of social operations and accounts of speech acts given
in Austin (1962), Searle (1969), Bach and Harnish (1979), and other works. However, I do not
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contrasts social operations with solitary operations. His examples of solitary operations
include sensations, perceptions, memories, imaginings, judgments, desires, as well as
many other more typical mental states and acts. My aim here in (3.1) is to understand
Reid’s account of the social operations of the mind. A number of publications have
shared this same aim.6 Indeed, I myself made a preliminary attempt at doing so in my
MA thesis.7 The discussion that follows, however, is more comprehensive and detailed
than any such previous discussions, and my key exegetical claims are novel. In what
follows, I first identify and explain four claims that Reid makes about social operations,
and discuss his likely reasons for making said claims. The four claims are: all social
operations (i) are operations of the mind, (ii) cannot exist unless expressed by sensible
signs and thereby made known to another intelligent being, (iii) cannot exist unless
performed with both understanding and will, (iv) are as simple as and cannot cannot be
identified with mere solitary operations. I then go on to argue that Reid is committed to a
fifth claim: all social operations are remote operations of which the mind is not
conscious. I also note that Reid makes a sixth claim: at least some - but perhaps not all social operations can be expressed by natural linguistic signs. I discuss this sixth claim in
detail in section (3.2).
To begin, consider (i): social operations are operations of the mind. What does
this mean? Note Reid is a substance dualist, and one of the essential differences between
mind and matter, on his account, is that minds are active things whereas bodies are
passive things. The features of bodies are their properties and relations, whereas the
features of minds are their powers and operations. Powers just are the mind’s abilities to
perform acts, and operations just are the mind’s acts - i.e., they are exertions of its

look to discuss any such comparisons and contrasts in what follows, but instead look to discuss
and understand Reid’s view on its own terms.
6
Notable publications on Reid’s account of the social operations include: Ardal (1984), Lehrer
(1989), Coady (1989), Schuhmann and Smith (1990), Coady (2004), Huston (2006), Yaffe
(2007), Pouivent (2012), Rysiew (2015), and Copenahver (2020). I briefly discuss several of
these publications later in this section. For the most part, however, I aim just to present Reid’s
account as I understand it, and I do not take time to critically engage Reid’s other commentators.
One should note, however, that the first four claims I attribute to Reid have been discussed in one
form or another in the literature. The novelty of my work consists in working out the details of
those claims and Reid’s reasons for them, as well as in attributing the fifth noted claim to Reid.
7
Crosby (2015).
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powers. On Reid’s view, all acts are operations of minds, rather than properties of bodies;
it is simply incoherent, on his account, to say that a body - i.e., a passive thing - can be
the subject of an action. Since social operations - e.g., acts of promising, commanding,
and testifying - are clearly acts, it follows, for Reid, given his metaphysical
commitments, that they are operations of the mind. Does this mean that social operations
are in the mind in the same sense that sensations, judgments, desires, and the other
solitary operations are in the mind? Yes, it does. But note that Reid does not think
operations - social or solitary - are in the mind in the sense, e.g., that water is in a bucket.
He does not think that there is some odd metaphysical space “filled” with the entities that
we refer to with words like ‘sensation’ and ‘desire’. Reid holds, rather, that operations are
in the mind only in the more basic sense that the mind is their metaphysical subject - i.e.,
that it is the mind, rather than some other sort of substance, that is the thing that engages
in the activities that are operations.
Next, consider claim (ii): social operations cannot exist unless they are expressed
by sensible signs and thereby made known to other intelligent beings. Note the following
key passages:
“Some operations of our minds, from their very nature, are social, others are
solitary. By the first, I understand such operations as necessarily suppose an
intercourse with some other intelligent being” (EIP 68)
“I call those operations solitary, which may be performed by a man in solitude,
without intercourse with any other intelligent being.
I call those operations social, which necessarily imply social intercourse
with some other intelligent being…” (EAP 330)
“Between the operations of the mind, which, for want of a more proper name, I
have called solitary, and those I have called social, there is this very remarkable
distinction, that, in the solitary, the expression of them by words, or any other
sensible sign, is accidental. They may exist, and be complete, without being
expressed, without being known to any other person. But, in the social operations,
the expression is essential. They cannot exist without being expressed by words or
signs, and known to the other party” (EAP 330)
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Solitary operations are mental acts that can be performed without being made known to
others; social operations, in contrast, cannot be so performed, but must be expressed by
sensible signs and thereby made known to others in order to exist. Solitary operations can
be expressed by such signs and thereby made known to others; whereas social operations
must be so expressed and made known.
To clarify, note the distinction between a condition that must be satisfied for an
act to be performed and a condition that ought to be satisfied when an act is performed.
To hit a baseball with a baseball bat, e.g., the bat must contact the ball. When one
promises, in contrast, one of course ought to intend to keep the promise, but it is possible
to make a promise even if one does not intend to keep it. The claim that social operations
cannot exist unless expressed by sensible signs and made known to another person is a
claim of the former sort: the claim is that the social operations must be expressed and
made known in order to be performed; the claim is not merely that the social operations
ought to be - or even just ought to be intended to be - expressed and made known. One
can utter words in solitude, and one can intend to perform a social operation in another’s
presence and fail to be understood; but one performs a social operation only if that
operation is actually expressed and made known to another person.
There is an ambiguity in Reid’s claim. What is the modality? Is it nomological
necessity, or some stronger logical/metaphysical sort of necessity? Put differently, the
question is: is it a mere contingent fact about humans that they cannot perform a social
operation unless the operation is expressed and made known to another, or is this a fact
that holds about the social operations regardless of contingent facts about the agent who
performs them or the world in which they are performed? On my suggested reading, it is
a matter of nomological necessity that social operations cannot exist unless expressed by
sensible signs, but logical/metaphysical necessity that they cannot exist unless made
known to another intelligent being. There is some evidence that supports this reading.
Recall the first two quoted passages:
“Some operations of our minds, from their very nature, are social, others are
solitary. By the first, I understand such operations as necessarily suppose an
intercourse with some other intelligent being” (EIP 68)
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“I call those operations solitary, which may be performed by a man in solitude,
without intercourse with any other intelligent being.
I call those operations social, which necessarily imply social intercourse
with some other intelligent being…” (EAP 330)
The phrases we need to understand are ‘necessarily suppose’ and ‘necessarily imply’.
Consider the following passage:
“I take it for granted that there are some things which cannot exist by themselves,
but must be in something else to which they belong, as qualities or attributes…
That thing, what it be, of which they are qualities, is called their subject,
and such qualities necessarily suppose a subject…
Things which may exist by themselves, and do not necessarily suppose the
existence of anything else, are called substances” (EIP 43)
In this passage, Reid claims that attributes - i.e., universals - necessarily suppose a
subject, in the sense that they cannot exist unless instantiated as features of existing
individuals. What is the modality of that claim? It is not, on Reid’s account, a mere
contingent fact about attributes that they cannot exist unless they are instantiated in an
existing substance; it is a fact that holds, rather, of anything that can rightly be called an
attribute. Moreover, Reid uses ‘X necessarily supposes Y’ and ‘X necessarily implies Y’
consistently throughout his works to make claims that appear to involve
logical/metaphysical necessity rather than mere nomological necessity. If, then, we are to
read Reid as using ‘necessarily suppose’ and ‘necessarily implies’ in this sense when he
makes the noted claim about the social operations, it follows that the necessity involved
in that claim is not nomological necessity. It is best to conclude Reid uses technical terms
consistently, unless we have good reason to conclude otherwise.
What about Reid’s claim that social operations must be expressed by sensible
linguistic signs in order to exist? I suggest the necessity here is nomological necessity.
There are two reasons to believe this is correct. First, note Reid does not use ‘necessarily
suppose’ and ‘necessarily imply’ when speaking of the need for social operations to be
expressed by sensible signs; he only uses those phrases when speaking about the need for
social operations to be made known. We do not, then, have the same textual reasons to
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conclude that the necessity of the expression is metaphysical/logical necessity. Second, it
is not in the spirit of Reid’s philosophy, nor is it in accord with the views one would
expect of a religious philosopher of Reid’s time, to claim it is a logically/metaphysically
necessary truth that it is possible to communicate only through a medium of sensible
linguistic signs. Reid would, presumably, be open to the possibility that other beings such as, e.g., angels or God - could perform social operations without recourse to the use
of sensible signs; it would be quite odd for a devout 18th century man to believe that God
needs sensible signs to communicate.
To clarify what has been said so far, let’s consider an example. Recall that, on
Reid’s account of linguistic signs, some such signs signify objects that speakers’ thoughts
are about - such as, e.g., individual substances or universals - whereas other linguistic
signs express mental acts that speakers perform that are directed at such objects of
thought. Signs that express social operations are signs that express mental acts. If, e.g., I
were to say “I promise that I will pick you up at the airport”, some linguistic signs used namely, ‘I will pick you up at the airport’ - would be used to signify an abstract
proposition about the future, whereas the other linguistic signs would be used to express
the social operation of promising. The act of promising is indeed part of the meaning of
the sentence - i.e., it is part of what is expressed or signified by the words in sentence but not part of what one might call the “propositional content” of the sentence. When I
say “I hereby promise to pick you up at the airport”, I am not making an assertion about
what I am doing, but expressing to another - and thereby performing - a social operation
that is directed at that propositional content.
Next, consider (iii): social operations must be performed with understanding and
will. Note the following passage:
“They [i.e., the social operations] suppose understanding and will” (EIP 68)

To explain: recall Reid rejects blind agency, which is to say that he holds that an act of
will is possible only if one understands what one wills prior to willing it. On Reid’s
account, social operations are exertions of active power, and, as such, must be performed
with understanding and will. Consider the example of promising: Reid’s claim is that I
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can perform the act of promising to pick you up at the airport only if I already understand
what it is to pick you up at the airport and what it is to promise.
Why does Reid believe social operations suppose understanding and will? To
understand Reid’s reasons, I suggest that it helps to consider his comments on the two
types of social operations that he discusses in any detail - i.e., promising and testifying.
On Reid’s account, to perform a promise is to perform an act in which one takes upon
oneself a prima facie obligation to do what one promises to do. A promise, then, is an act
for which one can be held morally responsible for having performed. Reid’s comments
on testimony are analogous, insofar as he insists testimony has a moral dimension: to
give a false testimony, Reid writes, is to lie, which is to do something wrong. He is quite
explicit about this key point:
“In all testimony, in all promises… there is necessarily implied a moral
obligation” (EAP 171)
On Reid’s account, then, social operations of promising and giving testimony are acts for
which one can be held morally responsible, and, as such, they are acts that require not
only understanding and will but also moral liberty. Recall our discussion about moral
liberty in part two. On Reid’s view, promising and testimony are social operations that
one can perform only if one is capable of conceiving a general rule and of recognizing
that one has an obligation to follow that general rule. What is the rule in these cases? It is
not clear. In the case of promising, the rule might be “one ought to keep one’s promises”;
in the case of testimony, moreover, it might be “one ought to testify only to what one
knows to be true”. Of course, one might fail to be moved by one’s duty and thereby fail
act in accord with such rules - one might, that is, either knowingly give false testimony or
promise to do what one has no intention to do - but one cannot perform these social
operations unless one is capable of conceiving general rules and of recognizing that one
has some obligation to follow them.
Consider claim (iv): social operations are just as simple as/cannot be reduced to
solitary operations. Consider the following key passages:
“To ask a question, is as simple an operation as to judge or to reason; yet it is neither
judgment, nor reasoning, nor simple apprehension, nor is it any composition of these.
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Testimony is neither simple apprehension, nor judgment, nor reasoning. The same may
be said of a promise, or of a contract” (EIP 68-69)
“I take it to be the common opinion of Philosophers, That the social operations of the
human mind are not specifically different than the solitary, and that they are only various
modifications or compositions of our solitary operations, and may be resolved into
them...
I apprehend, however, it will be found extremely difficult, if not impossible, to
resolve our social operations into any modification of the solitary: And that an attempt to
do this, would prove as ineffectual as the attempts that have been made to resolve all our
social affections into the selfish. The social operations appear to be as simple in their
nature as the solitary” (EAP 330-331)

The claim is that social operations are distinct from the solitary, in the sense that social
operations are not individual solitary operations or complex sets of such operations that
happen to be expressed by sensible signs in some appropriate context; they are, rather, a
wholly distinct class of acts. This claim has been aptly discussed in Houston (2004), with
respect to Reid’s distinction between testimony and expressions of judgment. Houston
does not, however, quite succeed in making sense of Reid’s reasons for drawing that
distinction. To do so, I suggest we consider once again the examples of promising and
testimony. With respect to both, Reid argues that the social operation is not merely an act
of expressing a solitary operation in an appropriate sort of context. Reid argues, e.g., that
the act of giving testimony is distinct from that of expressing one’s judgment; Reid
argues, e.g., that promising to do something is distinct from expressing one’s intention to
do something. Importantly, moreover, with respect to both operations, Reid argues by
claiming that social operations have normative consequences that any mere expression of
the solitary operation cannot have. Reid writes, e.g., that
“Every man knows that there may be a fraudulent promise, made without
intention of performing. But the intention to perform the promise, or not to
perform it, whether the intention be known to the other party or not, makes no
part of the promise, it is a solitary act of mind, and can neither constitute nor
dissolve an obligation” (EAP 342)
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If I promise to pick you up at the airport, I have taken on an obligation to do so. In
contrast, if I just express my intention to pick you up, I have not - necessarily, at least taken on any such obligation. The same point, Reid’s claims, holds about testimony and
expressions of judgment. With the latter, if what I say is false, I might merely have made
a mistake; whereas with the former, if what I say is false, then I have not merely made a
mistake, but I have lied - or, at least, I have testified to something of which I was not
justifiably certain - and am morally blameworthy for having done so in a way I am not
morally blameworthy for having made a mere mistake. My suggestion is Reid’s claim
that the social operations - or, at least, the social operations of testifying and promising are not reducible to mere sets of solitary operations is, at least in part, grounded in the
fact that he doubts that any expression of a solitary operation or set of solitary operations
could have the normative consequences that necessarily follow from performances of the
mentioned social operations.
To clarify, consider an objection. Note there are some cases in which one says “I
intend to pick you up at the airport” or perhaps just “I will pick you up at the airport” in
which one can plausibly be said to have taken on an obligation to pick up a person at the
airport. Reid need not and does not deny this. Reid discusses this sort of case with respect
to the distinction between acts of testimony and expressions of judgment. In the first
chapter of the essay on judgment in EIP, he notes that, sometimes, a sentence that we
normally use to just express judgment is used to testify. One might, that is, give
testimony by saying “The man drank the coffee” rather than the more explicit “I testify
that the man drank the coffee”. How can Reid make sense of these sorts of cases? He has
three options available to him. First, Reid can say that, in some such cases, there exists an
artificial convention in virtue of which, in the type of context in which the utterance is
made, signs that are normally used to express the solitary operation are used to express
the social operation. In such a case, artificial signs are used to express the act of
testimony. Second, Reid can say that, in some such cases, natural rather than artificial
linguistic signs are used to express the social operation. Third, Reid can say that, in some
such cases, the social operation is not expressed by linguistic signs, but is performed by
being implied or implicated. What does that mean? Roughly put, the social operation is
not expressed by any linguistic sign, but the people who understand the signs used to
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signify or express other things and acts are able reason, from facts about what was
literally said and the particular context in which it was said, to the conclusion that the
speaker intended to perform the social operation in question. This option is potentially
problematic for Reid, of course, as it appears to conflict with his claim social operations
cannot exist unless they are expressed by sensible linguistic signs. How exactly does Reid
deal with the considered case of judgment and testimony? Reid writes that a person is
usually able to “tell from the matter and circumstances” that the speaker intended to give
her testimony rather than to express her judgment (EIP 407). The word ‘tell’ is not a
Reidian technical term: it is a bit unclear, then, from that passage alone, which option
Reid meant to take. I discuss Reid’s views on implied meaning in more detail in section
(3.3), when I come to discuss his argument for the claim that artificial language could
have been first invented, only if we shared a natural language with which we could
express the social operations. I leave further discussion of this issue until then.
To clarify what has been said so far, it helps to take a detour into the literature on
Reid’s account of social operations. In particular, it helps to note Reid’s commentators
are often confused by the fact Reid claims that social operations (a) are operations of the
mind, (b) cannot exist unless expressed by signs and thereby made known to others, and
(c) are not solitary operations expressed in some appropriate context. These three claims
appear to be in tension: how, one might ask, can the existence of something in my head
depend on the way things stand out there in the external world? His commentators do not
always frame their confusion in the exact terms in which I frame it here; but they are, I
suggest, quite often confused on that very point. Perhaps they have good reasons to be.
Schumann and Smith (1990) express their confusion, writing it is unclear what exactly
Reid means when he says social operations are operations of the mind. Coady (2004)
expresses that same confusion. Some commentators not only express their confusion, but
attempt to make sense of how Reid’s claims might be reconciled. Yaffe (2007) attempts
to make sense of just the first two claims. He says that social operations are solitary
operations that, when expressed in some appropriate context, are somehow transformed
into social operations. The view Yaffe attributes to Reid there - insofar as that view is at
all clear - is that the social operations just are solitary operations expressed in some
context in which they stand in some appropriate sort of relation to the external world and
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other intelligent beings. Note, however, that Yaffe makes sense of the conjunction of the
first two mentioned claims, but only at the expense of ignoring the third: contrary to
Yaffe’s suggestion here, Reid does not hold that social operations are merely solitary
operations expressed in some appropriate context. Pouivent (2007) attempts to make
sense of all three claims. To do so, he suggests that Reid’s distinction between the
solitary and social operations reflects a deeper distinction between what Pouivent calls
the primary and secondary natures of the mind. Pouvient is perhaps onto something here;
it is, however, a little unclear what exactly he means by ‘primary and secondary natures
of the mind’, and, more importantly, it is unclear whether the distinction is one that can
be plausibly attributed to Reid.
To make sense of Reid’s views, I suggest that part of what is required is that we
recognize that Reid is making a radical break with a common picture of the mind on
which the mind can be exhaustively described by describing its intrinsic features - i.e.,
the powers and thoughts that it can have independently of the way everything else is - and
by describing the relations that it bears to other individuals in virtue of that fact that it has
said intrinsic features and other individuals happen to have their own sets of intrinsic
features. I suggest that the Reidian mind is best understood, rather, as a substance that
possesses irreducibly extrinsic features. Why suggest this? There are a number of
reasons. The suggestion not only fits with Reid’s direct realist theories of perception and
memory, but also with several comments Reid makes about how the mind relates to the
world. In some manuscripts titled by Reid’s editors “Lectures on the Nature and Duration
of the Soul”, e.g., Reid writes that
“The Soul has no place otherwise it must have figure & Extension. Yet there is a certain
sphere in which its perceptions are limited so as to extend no further… We cannot move
any body but by Means of our own nor our own but by Means of Muscles Nerves &c The
Space within which its agency [is limited] & its power of perceiving external things {is
limited} may be called its place” (EIP 619-620)

The Reidian picture is not one in which the mind’s operations are literally inside the
head. The Reidian mind does not perform acts all alone inside some private Cartesian
theatre, but rather “out there” in the external world. Given his metaphysics, then, Reid’s
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claim that the social operations are acts which are, simply put, ways in which the mind
acts so as to directly engage with other minds, is not that odd.
However, to make further sense of Reid’s views, I suggest we should understand
Reid’s account of the social operations as one on which a special relation holds between
social operations and the signs that express them, a relation that does not also hold
between solitary operations and the signs that express them. This relation, I suggest, also
helps us to make sense of Reid’s reasons for claiming that social operations cannot exist
unless expressed by sensible linguistic signs.
To understand this relation, consider claim (v): social operations are remote rather
than immediate operations of the mind. Reid does not explicitly make this claim. In what
follows, I explain this claim and then give my reasons for attributing it to Reid. Consider
the following passage:
“The effects of human power are either immediate, or they are remote.
The immediate effects, I think, are reducible to two heads. We can give certain
motions to our own bodies, or certain directions to our own thoughts.
Whatever we can do beyond this, must be done by one of these two means, or
both” (EAP 39)

First, note that the “human power” mentioned in the first quotation is our ability to exert
our will, and that the effects of that exertion of power are the acts that we perform when
we exercise our will, as well as any intended further effects of those acts. Now ask: What
is the relation between the mind’s immediate acts and remote acts? Simply put, remote
acts are acts we perform by means of performing immediate acts. Consider examples: I
move my finger; I pull a trigger on a gun; I shoot somebody; I kill somebody. Suppose
that first act is the immediate act. If I perform that act, and, in doing so, I both will to and
succeed in performing any one of the other acts, then those other acts are remote acts I
perform by means of that immediate act. I suggest we can use the distinction between
immediate and remote acts to make better sense of Reid’s account of social operations
and the linguistic signs that express them. I suggest he holds that, when one performs a
social operation, one performs both an immediate and a remote act: the immediate act is
that of producing the linguistic sign that expresses the social operation, and the remote
act is the social operation. On this reading, e.g., Reid would say that it is by performing
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the act of uttering the sentence “I promise to pick you up at the airport” that I perform the
act of promising to pick you up. What is the nature, then, of the special relation that holds
between linguistic signs and social operations? The sign is a tool that is used to perform
the social operation. The sign can be so used, moreover, just because it is a sign of that
operation: it is because the sign signifies the social operation that it is possible to use the
sign to make that operation known to another intelligent being, and, in doing so, to
perform it. What is the difference between the relation between linguistic signs and social
operations and the relation between linguistic signs and solitary operations? Linguistic
signs can be used to express the solitary operations, of course, but a solitary operation, in
contrast to a social operation, is not a remote act performed by means of the immediate
act of producing the sign that expresses it.
Why do I attribute claim (v) to Reid? I believe doing so is required if Reid’s
account of the social operations is to be compatible with his other commitments. To be
clear: I do not think there is a problem for Reid in claiming that the mind directly engages
with things in the external world; the claim that social operations are remote acts does not
conflict or importantly modify that earlier claim. The point to note, however, is that a
potential problem for Reid’s account of social operations arises when we note Reid
appears to hold that one is conscious of all of the operations of one’s own mind, and,
further, that one can know by attending to said operations when they are presented to one
via consciousness that they exist. To clarify: on Reid’s account, an act of consciousness is
an intentional mental act that takes as its object a presently existing operation of one’s
own mind, and, further, an act that essentially involves not only a conception of that
presently existing operation but also a firm, involuntary, and justified belief in that
operation’s present existence. To see the problem that arises for Reid here, imagine a case
in which I utter words, and, in doing so, intend to perform a social operation. Imagine,
further, I am unable to discern whether the person I mean to be talking to understands me,
because they do not react to my utterance in any way that is discernible to me. On Reid’s
account, I perform the social operation only if the other person actually understands me.
It is reasonable to think, then, that in our considered case I have no way of knowing I
performed the social operation. It is reasonable to think, moreover, that I would not even
believe that I performed the operation. But if I am conscious of all the present operations
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of my mind and can know that said operations exist by attending to them when they are
presented via consciousness, and if the social operations are indeed operations of the
mind, then it seems that I can know by consciousness alone, in the considered sort of
case, that I performed the social operation. If I can know I performed the social operation,
then I can, presumably, reason from that knowledge, in conjunction with my knowledge
that the social operations exist only if actually made known to another person, to the
conclusion that I made the operation known to the other person. I can, then, reason from
facts about my mind that are known to me solely via consciousness, to conclusions about
what happened in another person’s mind. But that is absurd. Note we can modify the
example to make the view even more absurd. Suppose that I attempt to make a promise to
you with written instead of spoken signs - suppose, e.g., I write a letter and then send it to
you. Can I, by consciousness and reasoning alone, know that you received my letter, read
it, and understood it? Surely not.
How does the claim that Reid thinks the social operations are remote rather than
immediate operations of the mind help? It does so only if we additionally suppose that
Reid holds we are conscious of our immediate operations but not our remote operations.
If Reid holds this view, he can deny the absurd claim that one can know via
consciousness and reasoning alone that another person has understood what one has said.
There is, of course, the possibility Reid holds that social operations are known to us via
consciousness, and, consequently, that Reid is committed to the noted absurd claims. But
it is, I argue, appropriately charitable to attribute to Reid the claim that social operations
are remote operations of which we are, strictly speaking, not conscious. To clarify: on
this reading, Reid holds that we do conceive the social operations; we conceive social
operations whenever we perform them or even try to perform them, and we conceive
social operations whenever we are on the receiving end of a performance of one of them
by another person. My claim here is just that Reid holds that one is not conscious of the
social operations when one performs them.
Reid makes a sixth claim about the social operations: at least some of the social
operations are expressed not only by artificial linguistic signs, but also natural linguistic
signs. I discuss this claim in detail in the next section.
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3.2 Reid on Natural Linguistic Signs
In this section, I discuss Reid’s account of natural linguistic signs. First, I briefly review
the basics. Second, I explain the sense in which Reid is rightly understood as a concept
empiricist, in order to frame the key exegetical issue addressed in the section and to head
off some confusions that might otherwise arise later on in the discussion. Third, I discuss
the literature on that exegetical issue and argue for a novel solution to it. I discuss this
issue because doing so helps us better understand the claim that social operations can be
expressed by natural linguistic signs, which, in turn, helps us to understand the arguments
that are discussed in section (3.3).
What are the basics of Reid’s account of natural linguistic signs? Recall natural
linguistic signs are “modulations of the voice, gestures, and features [of the face]” (IHM
52). Recall natural linguistic signs express token operations in the mind of the person
whose body manifests the sign; Jane’s smile, e.g., expresses her happiness. Recall,
moreover, that natural linguistic signs normally prompt both a conception of and belief in
the existence of the things signified; in the normal case, Jane’s smile not only prompts
one to conceive of Jane’s happiness, but also to believe that it exists. Recall, moreover,
that natural linguistic signs express the things that they do because we are innately
constituted by God such that, when we are of a sound mind, the signs express to us an
operation of the appropriate type: our mind is wired up such that it possesses an innate
disposition to go from thought of sign to thought of thing signified. This disposition is
not a habit that is learned or acquired in the way that a disposition to go from a
conception of smoke to a conception of fire is learned or acquired - i.e., we do not
observe the repeated conjunction of smiles and happiness and thus acquire some habit of
conceiving the one on the occasion of conceiving the other.
Reid is a concept empiricist. What does that mean? Note Reid writes that
“Fancy may combine things that never were combined in reality. It may enlarge or
diminish, multiply or divide, compound and fashion, the objects which nature presents;
but it cannot, by the utmost effort of that creative power which we ascribe to it, bring any
one simple ingredient into its productions, which nature has not framed, and brought to
our knowledge by some other faculty.
This Mr LOCKE has expressed as beautifully as justly…
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...Mr Hume, indeed, after acknowledging the truth of the principle in general,
mentions what he thinks a single exception to it. That a man, who had seen all the shades
of a particular colour except one, might frame in his mind a conception of that shade
which he never saw. I think this is not an exception; because a particular shade of a
colour differs not specifically, but only in degree, from other shades of the same colour”
(EIP 309)

Reid says that he accepts the broad principle endorsed before him by Locke and - with
one famous exception - by Hume. Reid’s view is just this: all the things we can conceive
or imagine are either simples, or complexes composed of such simples, that were first
conceived by us via the exercise of some faculty other than that of bare conception or
imagination. What might these other faculties be? Well, there is the faculty of perception,
e.g., by which we first conceive material objects and their features. And there is the
faculty of consciousness, e.g., by which we first conceive many operations of our minds,
such as sensations, desires, judgments, and so on. Why is Reid’s concept empiricism
relevant here? The exegetical issue concerns Reid’s account of the source of our first
conceptions of social operations. I argue, in what follows, Reid holds that the source of
such first conceptions is not perception or consciousness, but rather the natural language
faculty - i.e., the innate faculty by the exercise of which we can understand the natural
linguistic signs that express said operations.
The exegetical issue that I address in this section, however, specifically concerns
how to understand a taxonomy of natural signs that Reid presents in IHM. Consider the
passage in which he presents that taxonomy:
“...there are different orders of natural signs, and to point out the different classes
into which they can be distinguished, that we may more distinctly conceive the
relations between our sensations and the things they suggest, and what we mean
by calling sensations signs of external things.
The first class of natural signs comprehends those whose connection with
the thing signified is established by nature, but discovered only by experience…
What we commonly call natural causes might, with more propriety, be called
natural signs, and what we call effects, the things signified. The causes have no
proper efficiency or causality, as far as we know; and all we can certainly affirm
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is, that nature hath established a constant conjunction between them and the
things called their effects; and hath given to mankind a disposition to observe
these connections, to confide in their continuance, and to make use of them for the
improvement of our knowledge, and increase of our power.
A second class is that wherein the connection between the sign and thing
signified is not only established by nature, but discovered to us by a natural
principle, without reasoning or experience. Of this kind are the natural signs of
human thoughts, purposes, and desires, which have been already mentioned as the
natural language of mankind...
A third class of natural signs comprehends those which, though we never
before had any notion or conception of the thing signified, do suggest it, or
conjure it up, as it were, by a natural kind of magic, and at once give us a
conception and create a belief of it. I shewed formerly, that our sensations suggest
to us a sentient being to which they belong - a being which hath a permanent
existence, although the sensations are transient and of short duration… The first
conception of it… is suggested to every thinking being, we do not know how…
The notion of hardness, and the belief of it, is first got by means of that
particular sensation which, as far back as we can remember, does invariably
suggest it; and, if we had never had such a feeling, we should never have had any
notion of hardness. I think it is evident, that we cannot, by reasoning from our
sensations, collect the existence of bodies at all, far less any of their qualities”
(IHM 59-60)
Reid identifies three classes of natural signs. The first includes natural events/objects that
signify other events/objects. Smoke, e.g., is a first class natural sign of fire. The second
includes our natural linguistic signs. The third class includes operations of the mind that
signify the mind that is their metaphysical subject, and it also includes the sensations
involved in sense perception that signify features of the objects perceived. Reid identifies
some marks of the second and third classes which serve to distinguish the signs in those
classes from the signs in the other classes. The second class signs are distinguished from
the first class signs, he writes, by the fact that we learn of the connection between first
class signs and the objects they signify from past experience, whereas the connections
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between second class signs and the objects they signify are known to us by a natural
principle. This is just the point explained above: unlike smoke and fire, smiles do not
signify happiness to us in virtue of our having experienced the repeated conjunction of
token smiles and token happy feelings. Third class signs, Reid holds, are distinguished
from first class signs in that same way, and he writes, further, that they are distinguished
by the fact that they signify their objects even if the mind has never before conceived a
token of the type of thing signified. Reid puts the key point like this: third class signs
signify their objects by a natural kind of magic. Note it is natural to infer that Reid thinks
the second class natural signs do not also signify by a natural kind of magic. Why is this
natural? It is natural to infer from the fact Reid says that a feature is characteristic of the
third class signs, that he does not think second class signs have that same feature. If we
make that natural inference, we conclude Reid thinks our first conceptions of operations
expressed by natural linguistic signs do not come from understanding signs, but instead
from some other source.
I call the reading on which Reid holds that natural linguistic signs do not signify
by a natural kind of magic the “prima facie reading” of the taxonomy. The problem
addressed in this section is just that of answering this question: is the prima facie reading
correct? I argue that the answer is “no”.
The problem is noted in Van Cleve (2015). Van Cleve claims that the taxonomy
in IHM is ambiguous on whether natural linguistic signs signify by a natural kind of
magic. He makes a good point: Reid does not explicitly claim second class signs do not
signify by a natural kind of magic, even if it is natural for us to take that claim to be
implied. Van Cleve suggests we have two interpretive options available: we either
conclude that Reid holds signs of natural language do signify by a natural kind of magic,
or that Reid holds that first conceptions of operations of the mind are acquired from
another source - namely, by our being conscious of them when we first perform them.
The interpretive options, however, appear to be at least four: either (i) Reid thinks all
natural linguistic signs signify by a natural kind of magic, (ii) thinks that none of them
signify by a natural kind of magic, (iii) has no firm or clear commitments on this issue, or
(iv) has more nuanced commitments, and left the passage ambiguous for some good
reason. In what follows, I argue for option (iv): I argue Reid thinks that the natural
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linguistic signs that signify social operations signify by a natural kind of magic, and is
likely undecided on the question of whether natural linguistic signs that signify solitary
operations signify by a natural kind of magic. I argue, further, that Reid would not think
it helpful to clarify his views in the passage quoted from IHM, and, consequently, it is
plausible that he meant to leave the taxonomy ambiguous.
Van Cleve does not defend an interpretive option, but merely notes the ambiguity
of the quoted passage from IHM. Lehrer (1989) argues for the prima facie reading. To do
so, Lehrer offers us an account of the type of reason that Reid would need to have, if Reid
were to take himself to be justified in claiming that natural linguistic signs signify by a
natural kind of magic. Lehrer then argues, further, that Reid does not have that type of
reason. What is that type of reason? Lehrer argues Reid takes himself to be justified in
claiming that we possess a distinct mental faculty by the exercise of which we perform
some sort of mental act, only if Reid has decisive reason to believe that our ability to
perform an act of that sort cannot be explained or otherwise accounted for as the exercise
of one of the mind’s other known faculties. Lehrer has evidence to support the first claim.
E.g., Reid writes that
“...nature is frugal in her operations, and will not be at the expense of a particular
instinct, to give us that knowledge which experience will soon produce, by means
of a general principle of human nature” (IHM 116-117)
Further, Reid often appears to reason this way in the types of cases we are considering.
Consider the following passage:
“That many operations have their natural signs in the countenance, voice, and
gestures, I suppose every man will admit… The only question is, whether we
understand the signification of those signs, by the constitution of our nature, by a
kind of natural perception similar to the perceptions of sense; or whether we
gradually learn the signification of such signs from experience, as we learn that
smoke is the sign of fire, or that freezing is the sign of cold. I take the first to be
the truth…
… I apprehend that it is impossible that this shouldn’t be learned from
experience.
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When we see the sign, and see the thing signified always conjoined with
it, experience may be the instructor, and teach us how that sign is to be
interpreted. But how shall experience instruct us when we see the sign only, when
the thing signified is invisible? Now this is the case here; the thoughts and
passions of the mind… are invisible, and therefore their connection cannot be first
discovered by experience; there must be some earlier source of this knowledge”
(EIP 485-486)
In this passage, Reid argues that the mark that distinguishes second class natural signs
from first class natural signs is that the connection between sign and thing signified, in
the case of the second class signs, is discovered to us by the operation of a faculty
appropriated to that purpose, rather than by reasoning. Reid’s reasoning is of the form
noted: our knowledge of the connection between signs and things signified in the case of
natural linguistic signs cannot be accounted for as an exercise of the faculties of
perception, reasoning, or our other known faculties; thus, we are licensed to conclude our
knowledge of that connection is explained by positing that we have a distinct faculty that
is fitted to that particular purpose - i.e., a natural language faculty.
Further, note that Reid employs this same reasoning when he argues that third
class natural signs signify by a natural kind of magic, in the passage from IHM, in which
he presents the taxonomy. Consider again the end that passage:
“...the notion of hardness, and the belief of it, is first got by means of that
particular sensation which, as far back as we can remember, does invariably
suggest it; and, if we had never had such a feeling, we should never have had any
notion of hardness. I think it is evident, that we cannot, by reasoning from our
sensations, collect the existence of bodies at all, far less any of their qualities…”
(IHM 59-60)
Lehrer’s claim, then, that Reid uses this reasoning in these sorts of cases, is supported by
the text. So the question is: why does Lehrer think Reid cannot use this sort of reasoning
to argue that signs of natural language signify by a natural kind of magic? He eloquently
sums up his reasoning as follows:
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“The distinction between the second and third kind of signs reflects a difference
in the problem of other minds and the problem of the external world. In the case
of other minds, we have a conception of mental operations from our
consciousness of them. The problem is not that of obtaining a conception of
mental operations of others. It is to determine what behaviour signifies those
operations in that the operations are ‘invisible’ to us. Here nature supplies the
connection between the sign and what it signifies as a result of a first principle. In
the case of the external world, there is the problem of obtaining a conception of
external objects and their… qualities as well as that of determining what signifies
the existence of such objects and qualities. Here nature supplies our first
conception of external objects and their… qualities by a first principle as well as
supplying the connection between the sign and what it signifies in this way”
(Lehrer 1989, 45)
Lehrer reasons as follows: initial conceptions of the operations of the mind could come
from the faculty of consciousness, rather than the natural language faculty; thus, Reid
would not take himself to be justified in claiming that natural linguistic signs signify by a
natural kind of magic. On Lehrer’s reading, Reid holds that it is via consciousness that
one first conceives operations of the mind that are, only later, signified by natural
linguistic signs; it is, on Lehrer’s reading, only after one conceives of a token of some
type of operation via consciousness that the natural language faculty “kicks in”, as it
were, such that the natural linguistic signs one perceives signify operations of that type in
the minds of others. Consider an example. On Lehrer’s reading, if Jane had never been in
pain and thus had never conceived her pain via consciousness, then natural signs of pain
in others would not express their pains to her; but if she had previously been conscious of
her own pain, then such signs would express their pains to her.
Lehrer’s interpretation is insightful, but it ought to be rejected. The point to note
is this: Reid is committed, on pain of absurdity, to the claim that initial conceptions of
social operations cannot come from the exercise of the faculty of consciousness, but he
does not have analogous reasons to think the same about the other types of operations.
Further, Reid is best understood as agnostic, as it were, on whether the natural linguistic
signs that signify the solitary operations signify by a natural kind of magic; he does not
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have reason to say they do, but he does not thereby have reason to say they do not. I
suggest, then, that Reid likely holds a complex view on whether natural linguistic signs
signify by a natural kind of magic.
Why claim Reid is committed to the view that our initial conceptions of social
operations cannot come from consciousness? There are two reasons. First, recall social
operations must be performed with both understanding and will. On his view, then, a
social operation can be performed, only if one can conceive that operation prior to
performing it. On his account, then, one cannot perform a social operation unless one can
already conceive of it; thus, on his account, one’s first conception of a social operation
cannot come from one being conscious of it when one first performs it. (Note this same
reasoning holds for any operation that is essentially voluntary, and, thus, that Reid has
grounds to conclude that any natural linguistic sign that signifies an essentially voluntary
operation that is not a social operation - if indeed there are any such operations - signifies
by a natural kind of magic.) What is the second reason? Recall I argued in the last section
that, on pain of absurdity, Reid is committed to the claim that the social operations are
remote operations of which we are not conscious. If so, Reid has decisive reasons to hold
that the ability to first conceive social operations cannot be accounted for by appeal to the
faculty of consciousness . If so, Lehrer is clearly wrong.
To sum up: Reid holds that natural linguistic signs that express social operations or any essentially voluntary operation - express said operations to a person even if that
person has never before conceived a token of that type of operation. On Reid’s account,
the natural language faculty is the unique source of our first conceptions of the social
operations; Reid thinks, that is, that the natural language faculty is one of the fundamental
sources - along with the faculties of perception and consciousness - of our empirical
concepts. There is an important corollary here. Recall that, on Reid’s account, social
operations require both understanding and will, and, consequently, one can perform a
social operation only if one can conceive the operation prior to performing it. What else
follows from this? It follows that, on his account, if one has never perceived and thus
understood a natural linguistic sign of a social operation, and, consequently, one cannot
conceive that social operation, one is also unable to perform that social operation. On his
account, then, the possibility of not only the conception but also the performance of the
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social operations, depends on whether one has been appropriately exposed to the culture
of society - in particular, whether one has perceived and also understood natural linguistic
signs that express the social operations.
In what follows, I respond to three objections. The first objection: why not just
say Reid thinks that we first conceive the social operations via consciousness, by way of
being conscious of them at the very moment we first perform them?
This is an objection only to my first reason, not the second. It is unconvincing,
however, even as an objection to that first reason. Reid’s comments in EAP on active
power make clear he thinks one must be able to conceive an action before one can step in
and will to execute it. Is Reid right about that? Does Reid have good or compelling
reasons to believe that? Maybe he does; maybe he does not. But Reid believes it, which is
the point that concerns us. It is one thing to attribute to Reid a view he does not explicitly
express in his texts, but it is another thing altogether to deny that Reid holds a view that
he does explicitly express.
Second objection: if Reid holds that some signs of natural language signify by a
natural kind of magic, why does he only say third class signs signify by a natural kind of
magic in the taxonomy in IHM? Why does Reid not make his views clear? Lehrer gives
us an explanation of this aspect of that text, and it is reasonable to demand that I am able
to do the same.
I have an explanation to give. Suppose Reid holds the view that I attribute to him:
suppose he holds that some - but not all - natural linguistic signs signify by a natural kind
of magic. If so, it makes sense that Reid would not claim that all natural linguistic signs
signify by a natural kind of magic. Reid does not do so in the text, which is consistent
with my reading. But why does Reid not take the time to clarify the nuances of his views
in that section of IHM? To understand why this might be so, consider Reid’s stated aim in
quoted the section of IHM in which he presents the noted taxonomy. Reid is not
concerned, there, with his account of linguistic signs for its own sake, much less with his
account of the social operations. His primary concern, rather, is to explain and argue for
his account of sense perception. His stated aim in the section in which he presents the
taxonomy, moreover, is to explain the sense in which sensations involved in sense
perceptions are signs of the features of external objects - and, specifically, to emphasize
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that they signify by a natural kind of magic. It is understandable, then, that Reid would
not think it important to go off on a tangent in which he clarifies the details of his account
of the social operations in order to clarify the nuances of his views on whether any
natural linguistic signs signify by a natural kind of magic. It is understandable, then, if
Reid holds the views I attribute to him, that he would leave the taxonomy of natural signs
ambiguous in precisely the way that he does.
Third objection: there is a passage that might conflict with my claim that Reid
holds that we do not initially conceive social operations by consciousness, but rather by
the natural language faculty. Consider that passage:
“An anatomist who hath happy opportunities, may have access to examine
with his own eyes, and with equal accuracy, bodies of all different ages,
sexes, and conditions; so that what is defective, obscure, or preternatural
in one, may be discerned clearly, and in its most perfect state in another.
But the anatomist of the mind cannot have the same advantage. It is his
own mind only that he can examine, with any degree of accuracy and
distinctness. This is the only subject he can look into. He may, from
outward signs, collect the operations of other minds; but these signs are
for the most part ambiguous, and must be interpreted by what he perceives
within himself” (IHM 13)
There are two questions here: Does this passage conflict with my claim that Reid holds
that the social operations are first conceived by understanding natural signs we perceive
in other people? And does this passage conflict with my claim that Reid holds that social
operations are never conceived via consciousness and are only conceived either via
conception/imagination or via understanding natural signs? To begin, note the quoted
passage speaks only about what is required for distinct conceptions of operations. It
might be thought, then, that the passage does not conflict with the first mentioned claim.
Perhaps, the thought goes, Reid’s view is that we first conceive social operations by
understanding natural linguistic signs, but that we subsequently come to have distinct
conceptions of them - i.e., to be able to conceive the operations as universals - only by
attending to the operations as they are presented to us via consciousness. Note, however,
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Reid is likely committed to the claim that we can distinctly conceive at least some of the
social operations - namely, those operations that presuppose moral liberty - prior to our
performing them. Even if, then, the passage does contain the claim that we can distinctly
conceive operations of the mind only by way of attending to them as they are presented to
us in consciousness, it still conflicts with my claims.
To see why the passage does not conflict with my claims, first consider the last
part of the passage in isolation:
“He may, from outward signs, collect the operations of other minds; but these
signs are for the most part ambiguous, and must be interpreted by what he
perceives within himself” (Ibid.)
As written, the claim is ambiguous. The claim might be that signs that express operations
of the mind are in most cases ambiguous, and that in such ambiguous cases can be
disambiguated only by being interpreted - whatever ‘interpreted’ means - by what the
mind is conscious of within itself. But the claim might alternately be that signs that
express operations of the mind are in most cases ambiguous, and in all cases must be
interpreted by what the mind is conscious of within itself. The former, I suggest, is the
more straightforward reading of the passage, as the claim that signs must be interpreted
by reference to what one is conscious of in oneself is naturally read as an explanation of
how the noted ambiguities are to be resolved. If, moreover, the former is the correct
reading, this part of the passage does not conflict with my claims. Simply put, the ‘for the
most part’ saves me: I only claim that Reid thinks that some natural linguistic signs namely, those that signify the social operations - signify by a natural kind of magic. I
would point out, moreover, that the fact that Reid qualifies his claim in the passage with
the “for the most part” implies he believes that some signs of operations may not be
ambiguous and in need of disambiguation via introspection. This part of the passage,
then, actually lends support to my reading, as my reading provides us with an explanation
for why Reid adds “for the most part”.
However, I am not off the hook that easily. Consider the whole passage again:
“An anatomist who hath happy opportunities, may have access to examine
with his own eyes, and with equal accuracy, bodies of all different ages,
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sexes, and conditions; so that what is defective, obscure, or preternatural
in one, may be discerned clearly, and in its most perfect state in another.
But the anatomist of the mind cannot have the same advantage. It is his
own mind only that he can examine, with any degree of accuracy and
distinctness. This is the only subject he can look into. He may, from
outward signs, collect the operations of other minds; but these signs are
for the most part ambiguous, and must be interpreted by what he perceives
within himself” (Ibid.)
Note Reid writes here that it is only one’s own mind that one can “examine, with any
degree of accuracy or distinctness”. That is the most problematic part of the passage.
Reid’s claim appears to be that distinct conceptions of operations can be had only by
attending to said operations as they are presented in consciousness. If so, it appears to
conflict with my claims.
Considered in its broader context, however, the passage need not be read as
making that claim. The passage comes from an introductory section of IHM, in which
Reid characterizes his overall aims and methods in that book. In IHM, Reid argues that
philosophers - most notably Hume, but of course also others - failed to correctly analyze
the operations involved in sense perception. Most crucially, Reid argues that they failed
to distinguish the sensations that occasion acts of sense perception from the acts of
perception and the objects perceived. This distinction between acts of sensation and acts
of perception is, Reid suggests, particularly hard to get clear on, because it is difficult to
attend via consciousness to the operations involved. It is difficult to do so for several
reasons. One is that our attention is normally occupied with the objects perceived, in
consequence of which we hardly - if indeed ever - give more than a scant attention to the
operations involved when we are perceiving them. A second reason is we have no need to
distinguish acts of perception from the sensations that occasion them in day to day life.
This lack of need is born out in the fact that the artificial linguistic signs that we use day
to day to talk about sense perceptions do not capture the distinction. It is notable,
moreover, that any natural linguistic signs that express perceptions do not, presumably,
capture that distinction either. The fact the linguistic signs we ordinarily use to talk about
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the operations are ambiguous, moreover, is one reason we fail to distinctly conceive said
operations. E.g., note Reid writes in EIP that:
“The perception of external objects is accompanied with some sensation
corresponding to the object perceived, and such sensations have in many cases,
the same name with the external object which they always accompany. The
difficulty of disjoining in abstraction… things, which have one and the same
name in all languages, has likewise been frequently the occasion of errors in the
philosophy of the mind” (EIP 37)
Now, return to consider the problematic passage. Note that Reid thinks the anatomist of
the mind - i.e., a philosopher or scientist whose aim is to accurately describe the
operations of the mind - is a person who needs to find a way to get clear on the noted
distinctions, in spite of the fact that the signs that we normally use to talk about the
relevant sorts of operations do not help us do so. In IHM, Reid’s aim is to help the reader
get clear on the distinction between acts of perception and the sensations that occasion
them by leading the reader through several introspective exercises. First, Reid helps the
reader recall their general notion of sensation by describing sensations that are not
involved in the most problematic cases of sense perception. With that general notion in
hand, Reid leads the reader through a number of the most difficult sorts of cases - in
particular, the cases that involve perceptions of primary qualities via the sense modality
of touch - and Reid tasks the reader with bringing their distinct general notion of
sensation to bear on the analysis of said examples. Reid hopes the reader will thereby be
able to conceive the sensations involved as distinct from the acts of perception as well as
from the objects perceived.
Why does this context help me reconcile the passage with my claim that Reid
holds that we do not first - or indeed ever - conceive social operations by consciousness?
In the passage, I suggest, Reid ought to be read as making a narrow methodological point
relevant to the aims and arguments of the IHM. His aim in the IHM is to get clear on
distinctions between operations of the mind that, if signified by linguistic signs, are
signified only ambiguously - i.e., as confused with each other. On my reading, Reid is
fully licensed to claim that part of what is required to get clear on such distinctions is to
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attend to the operations as they are presented in consciousness. There is no reason, I
suggest, to think Reid needs to be read in the quoted passage as making that claim about
all operations. Reid uses the phrase ‘look into’ and ‘examine’ in the passage to refer
narrowly to the activities of a philosopher whose aim is to get clear on distinctions that
ordinary folks are not already clear on. The social operations are not, on Reid’s account,
operations of that sort. Reid writes, e.g., that “the nature of a... promise is perfectly
understood by all men of common understanding” (EAP 328). I suggest this is true, on
his account, because signs that express social operations are not always ambiguous; on
his account, we first conceive - and distinctly conceive - social operations by attending to
and understanding linguistic signs that express them.

3.3 Reconstructions of Reid’s Arguments
In the previous sections, I discussed Reid’s accounts of social operations and natural
linguistic signs; we can now understand his claim that it was possible for humans to first
invent and subsequently to be taught already invented artificial languages only if they
possess a natural language with which they can express social operations. In section (3.3),
(3.4), and (3.5), I discuss Reid’s main arguments for that claim. In what follows here in
(3.3), I first discuss Reid’s account of the particular social operation of agreement, which
needs to be understood, if we are to understand Reid’s first argument. Second, I present
my reconstructions of the two arguments. In (3.4), I engage the literature on the first
argument. In that literature, Reid’s commentators present objections to the argument and
consider replies to said objections on Reid’s behalf. Reid’s commentators, I suggest, do
not fully grasp the nuances of his argument - in particular, they do not fully grasp the role
that his account of the social operations plays in it - and, consequently, their objections at
least partly miss the mark. Their objections, however, are still instructive and worth
considering: after discussing their objections, I go on in (3.5) to present two criticisms of
my own invention to the argument, which are informed by criticisms offered by Reid’s
other commentators and by my conclusions in earlier sections. Both of my criticisms are
of the same sort: I do not argue that Reid’s argument is either invalid or unsound, but
rather that presuppositions of the argument are prima facie incompatible with some of
Reid’s other commitments. Last, I consider suggestions for how we might read Reid
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differently so as to absolve his views of these prima facie incompatibilities. I conclude
that these suggestions are not successful, and, consequently, that it is likely - although not
completely certain - that Reid’s views are in tension with each other.
To begin: what is Reid’s account of agreement? It helps to lay out the context in
which Reid discusses the act of agreement, which also happens to be one of the contexts
in which Reid presents the two arguments discussed later in this section. Reid discusses
the act of agreement in EAP 5.6, titled Of the Nature and Obligation of a Contract.
There, Reid’s aim is to critique David Hume’s claim that we do not have any natural
obligation to do what we have agreed to do. Reid and Hume agree on one point: they hold
that an act of agreements- which they also call “compacts” and “contracts” - are what we
can call “two-way promises”. To clarify, note Reid writes that
“A promise and a contract differ so little in what concerns the present disquisition,
that the same reasoning extends to both… In a promise, one party only comes
under the obligation, the other acquires a right to the prestation promised. But we
give the name of a contract to a transaction in which each party comes under an
obligation to the other, and each reciprocally acquires a right to what is promised
by the other” (EAP 328)
In entering into an agreement or contract, people make promises and thereby take on
obligations to each other. Reid and Hume’s disagreement, then, concerns more precisely
whether we have natural obligations to keep our promises. In Treatise III.ii.5, Hume
argues that we are obligated to keep promises because it is in the interests of society at
large that we do so, and, consequently, we have adopted a social convention on which
people who utter the phrase ‘I promise to X’ - or anything that counts as equivalent ought to X, and disapprove of people who promise to X but fail to X. On his account, we
have no obligation to keep promises prior to the establishment of such artificial social
conventions, which is to say we have no natural obligations to keep promises. In EAP
5.6, Reid argues we do have such natural obligations.
To get a better grasp on the dispute, let’s summarize Hume’s reasoning. It goes
roughly as follows. Suppose that the obligation to keep our promises is not grounded in
any such artificial social conventions. If so, then what could ground said obligations?

62

Hume claims there would need to be a mental act expressed by the words “I promise”
that creates a new obligation. He argues, however, that there can be no such act. He
claims, first, that no expression of a mental state such as a belief, desire, or intention
could create a new obligation. Hume claims, moreover, that the only other candidate for
the mental act expressed by ‘I promise’ that creates a new obligation is the act of willing
to be obligated. He argues, however, that no act of will can create a new obligation. On
Hume’s account, something is obligatory because one’s failing to do it is disapproved of
by oneself and/or others, which is to say that something is obligatory in virtue of facts
about people’s sentiments. But sentiments, on Hume’s account, are involuntary acts, and
thus cannot be created or changed by any act of will. Hume concludes, then, there can be
no act of mind expressed by ‘I promise’ that creates a new obligation, and, consequently,
that obligations to keep promises must instead be grounded in artificial conventions.
Hume adds in a footnote that, even if one were to deny his claim that facts about
obligations are grounded in facts about sentiments - even if, e.g., one were to adopt some
sort of rationalist account of obligations - it would still make no sense to claim that one
can create an obligation by an act of will. On any alternative rationalist account, Hume
claims, to create an obligation just is to create a new abstract relation, but one cannot
create a new abstract relation by a mere act of will. Hume concludes, on these grounds,
that there is no natural obligation to keep promises and that said obligations are instead
grounded in artificial social conventions.
How does Reid respond? Reid argues that the mental act expressed by ‘I promise’
that creates a new obligation just is the social operation of promising. Reid claims that
Hume’s failure to recognize that social operations are distinct from solitary operations led
Hume to overlook the operation of promising when considering whether any operation of
the mind can create a new obligation. As we learnt in (3.1), Reid thinks promising is an
operation of the mind that cannot exist unless expressed by sensible signs and made
known to another person, that must be performed with both understanding and will, that
presupposes moral liberty, that is not reducible to the solitary operations, that is a remote
operation, and - importantly for our discussion here - can be expressed by natural signs
rather than just artificial signs. That last claim is a key part of Reid’s response to Hume in
EAP 5.6, as it is in virtue of this claim that Reid can argue not only that a promise is act
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of mind that can create a new obligation, but also that the possibility of the performance
of that act does not depend on pre-established social conventions, and, consequently, that
we must have a natural obligation to keep promises.
As noted, in this section, I discuss Reid’s arguments for the claim that it was
possible for humans to first invent and learn artificial linguistic signs, only if they shared
a natural language with which they could express social operations - including, most
importantly, the social operation of promising or agreeing. How do these arguments fit in
with Reid’s broader critique of Hume in the mentioned chapter of EAP? When giving
these arguments, Reid takes it for granted that we invented and learnt artificial linguistic
signs for some first time, and argues that this was possible only if we possessed, at that
time - and therefore also currently possess - a natural language with which we could
perform social operations. The arguments I discuss in this section, then, are a key part of
Reid’s critique of Hume in EAP 5.6. In what follows, however, I do not discuss that
critique in any detail, but instead focus narrowly on getting clear on the details of Reid’s
arguments and, in particular, on the extent to which they are informed by and compatible
with Reid’s broader set of philosophical commitments.
The two arguments are for distinct but related claims. The first argument is for the
precise claim that people could have invented artificial linguistic signs for the very first
time - i.e., at a time back in prehistory, before artificial signs had as yet been invented only if they possessed a natural language with which they could perform the operation of
promising/agreeing. The second argument is for the distinct claim that people have a
natural language with which they can express social operations to each other, and it
contains a subargument for the claim that an artificial language used to perform social
operations cannot be taught to a person who does not as yet understand such a language,
unless teacher and student already share a natural language with which they can perform
social operations. Reid presents the arguments in several texts. He presents the first in
IHM, MS 2/II/14, MS 2131/4/I/30, as well as briefly - and, perhaps, merely arguably - in
the very chapter of EAP in which he critiques Hume’s noted claims about promising. He
also presents the second in MS 2/II/14 - it is written in the margin of the folio, right next
to where the first argument is written in the body text - and is presented once again in the
just noted chapter of EAP. I discuss each of these texts and manuscripts in this section;
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my reconstructions of the arguments, however, focus on the statements of the arguments
given in the published texts.
First, then, let’s reconstruct the arguments. The first argument is first presented in
IHM in the following passage:
“I think it is demonstrable, that if mankind had not a natural language, they could
never have invented an artificial one by their reason and ingenuity. For all
artificial language suppose some compact or agreement to affix a certain meaning
to certain signs; therefore there must be compacts or agreements before the use of
artificial signs; but there can be no compact or agreement without signs, nor
without language; and therefore there must be a natural language before any
artificial language can be invented. Which was to be demonstrated” (IHM 51)
I suggest that the argument can be reasonably reconstructed as follows:
1. An artificial language can be invented only if the members of a community agree
that linguistic signs are to have certain meanings affixed to them.
2. The members of a community can agree to anything at all only if they can use
linguistic signs to express the social operation of agreeing.
3. Thus, an artificial language can be invented only if the members of a community
can use linguistic signs to express the social operation of agreeing.
4. Artificial language was invented for the first time at some point in the past.
5. When artificial language was first invented, the linguistic signs used to express
agreement could not have been artificial signs, as artificial signs had not yet been
invented.
6. All linguistic signs are either natural or artificial.
7. Thus, when artificial language was first invented, the linguistic signs used to
express agreement must have been natural linguistic signs.
8. Thus, when artificial language was first invented, the members of the community
shared a natural language with which they could express the social operation of
agreeing.
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One can reconstruct the argument as being for the claim that we currently have a natural
language with which we express acts of agreeing to each other. To do so, one need only
add the following implicit premise and conclusion:
9. If people in the past shared a natural language with which they could express the
social operation of agreeing, people today share a natural language with which
they can express the social operation of agreeing.
10. Thus, people today share a natural language with which they can express the
social operation of agreeing.
Are there any objections to my reconstruction? The first point to note is an obvious one: I
read the argument as concerned with what is required to perform the social operation of
agreeing, prior to the first invention of artificial signs. Note, then, I read the argument as
concerned with what is required for the invention of artificial language, in the sense of
what is required for people to fix meanings of signs by performing promises to each other
and thereby taking on obligations to each other concerning their use of said signs. There
is an objection that one might make to me here: Reid does not explicitly mention social
operations in the quoted passage; it might be argued, then, that I am mistaken or at least
unjustified in reading the argument this way. The hypothetical objector, here, claims that
the compact or agreement that Reid mentions in the just quoted passage is not the social
operation, but rather some other sort of agreement. The claim would presumably be that
the agreement involved in fixing the meaning of artificial signs is merely an agreement in
our use of words - i.e., that we agree in the sense that we do, in fact, use the words in the
same way as each other.
The objector’s claim here is not obviously false: indeed, in the literature on the
argument - which I discuss later - a number of Reid’s commentators do interpret the
argument as being for the claim that we need a natural language capable of expressing
operations of the mind in general, rather than the social operations in particular, merely in
order to coordinate our use of artificial linguistic signs, rather than to take on obligations
to each other concerning our use of such signs. There is, however, textual evidence that
supports my reading. Reid writes in IHM, in the paragraph that immediately follows the
quoted statement of the argument, that:
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“...brutes have some natural signs by which they express their own thoughts,
affections, and desires, and understand those of others… But brutes, as far as we
know, have no notion of contracts or covenants, or of moral obligation to perform
them. If nature had given them these notions, she would probably have given
them natural signs to express them. And where nature has denied them these
notions, it is impossible to acquire them by art… Some brutes are sensible of
honour or disgrace; they have resentment and gratitude: none of them, as far as
we know, can make a promise, or plight their faith, having no such notions from
their constitution. And if mankind had not these notions by nature, and natural
signs to express them by, with all their with an ingenuity they could never have
invented language” (IHM 51)
Reid makes it clear, in this subsequent paragraph, that he is talking about promises - that
is, acts by which we take on obligations. This makes sense only if one holds, with me,
that the argument is premised on the claim that the invention of artificial signs requires
the performance of the social operation of agreeing - i.e., a two-way promise - and that
the conclusion of the argument is that the first invention of artificial linguistic signs was
possible, only because the people possessed a natural language with which they could
make agreements of that sort. There is more evidence that supports my reading of the
argument. In MS 2/II/14, Reid presents the first argument again, and, there, he makes the
salient point explicit. Reid writes:
“Let suppose a number of intelligent beings like men in every other power but
that of communicating their sentiments by natural signs of features voice, &
gesture or by artificial signs of language. If it can be shown that by their reason &
understanding (which we suppose to be equal to that of men) they can invent a
way of communicating their thoughts so as to ask a question & testify facts, so as
to give commands, ask favours make promises and bargains, then it will follow
that the power of communicating our sentiments in social intercourse, is not an
original faculty but may be acquired by our judging and reasoning powers. If on
the other hand such a company of rational beings could not by any effort of
reason make a language...
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Then it will follow that the power of social intercourse by language is an
original power of the human mind...
...there must be compacts or agreements before the language is begun,
before the first sign of it is understood. But a compact or agreement being a social
act cannot be without signs by which it may be understood by the parties. That is
there must be signs whose meaning is understood before there are any signs
whose meaning is understood, which is impossible.
If this reasoning is just as it seems to me to be, it follows that if men had
not a natural language by which they can converse with one another in some
degree, it would be impossible for them to invent any artificial language. It is by
means of this natural language that those compacts are made which we have
shewn to be necessary previous to all artificial language” (MS 2/II/14)
Reid explicitly presents the argument as being for the claim that the invention of artificial
language was possible because we possessed a natural language with which we could
express the social operation of agreement. In this manuscript, Reid’s aim is to refute
Hume’s claim that we have no natural obligation to keep promises - this manuscript, in
fact, contains many sentences included in the analogous chapter of EAP, and was quite
likely a preliminary draft of that chapter. Reid’s arguments for the claim that we have a
natural language with which we perform social operations is a key part of his critique of
Hume, and this is not only true in EAP but also in this manuscript. The conclusion of
Reid’s argument, then, must be that we have a natural language with which we can make
agreements - where the act of agreement is understood in the precise sense that is at issue
in his dispute with Hume - or the argument cannot serve the dialectical purposes that
Reid needs it to serve. It is clear, then, Reid does not merely intend for this first argument
to be an argument for the claim that we need a natural language, of any old sort, merely
in order to coordinate our use of signs, but instead for the claim that we need a natural
language with which we can make promises and take on obligations concerning our use
of said signs. Reid’s first argument, then, is clearly premised on his account of the
metasemantics of artificial signs, where that account is understood as I explained it in
part one: artificial linguistic signs are those signs whose meaning is fixed by an act of
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agreement - i.e., a social operation by which people take on obligations to each other between the members of the community of sign users.
To further clarify the argument, it helps to comment on its premises, and, in doing
so, to discuss Reid’s likely or at least possible reasons for adopting them. First, consider
premise two: members of a community can agree to anything only if they can use
linguistic signs to express the social operation of agreement. Why does Reid adopt this
premise? Simply put, he holds that the act of agreement, as a social operation, can exist
only if expressed by linguistic signs and thereby made known to another intelligent being.
His argument, then, on this reading, is premised on the details of his account of the social
operations of the mind.
Next, consider premise one: artificial language can be invented only if members
of a community agree that linguistic signs are to have certain meanings affixed to them.
Is that true? One might suggest that, for Reid, it is true by definition, as Reidian artificial
linguistic signs are, by definition, signs whose meaning is fixed by such an agreement.
But that would be too easy. Reid’s argument is not only premised on the claim that
artificial signs, by definition, are signs whose meaning are fixed by an agreement, but
also on the claim that we did, in fact, at some point, invent artificial signs of that precise
sort. After all, Reid can succeed in arguing we have a natural language with which we
can perform social operations of the mind, only if he can establish that we did in fact
invent artificial signs of that sort in that way. Reid’s argument, then, is premised on the
claim that non-natural linguistic signs such as ‘dog’ and ‘big’ are linguistic signs whose
meanings are fixed by acts of agreement. It might be argued, however, that Reid is simply
mistaken in believing that these signs are artificial signs in his defined sense. It might be
argued, then, that his argument is premised on a mistaken metasemantics of non-natural
linguistic signs. How might Reid respond to this objection? Note this objection can be
reframed as an objection to premise six; I respond to the objection as reframed that way
in what immediately follows.
Consider premises five and six and also the inference to seven. Note Reid can
conclude that the signs used to perform the act of agreeing, when artificial language was
first invented, must have been natural linguistic signs, because he holds that all linguistic
signs are either artificial or natural signs in his defined senses. There is an objection to
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Reid’s argument that can be considered here. On what grounds can Reid deny that there
are - or even that there could be - linguistic signs that are neither natural nor artificial in
his defined senses? This objection points to a possible gap between the two ways that
Reid characterizes artificial signs: (i) signs whose meanings are fixed by the wills of the
users of said signs, and (ii) signs whose meanings are fixed by a social act of agreement.
Why think that there is a possible gap? It appears quite possible, at least prima facie, that
people can exert their wills so as to use non-natural linguistic signs in accord with some
common set of general rules, without ever agreeing to do so in Reid’s precise sense of
agreement. If Reid admits this possibility, he is not licensed to adopt premise six and the
inference to seven is blocked.
How might Reid respond to this objection? He needs to deny that there can be
linguistic signs whose meanings are fixed by the wills of the users of said signs but are
not also fixed by agreement. Reid does not explicitly argue this, but we can understand
what his reasons for it could be by drawing on results from part two. Reid could deny that
it is possible for people in the relevant sort of case - i.e., a case in which artificial
linguistic signs are being invented for the very first time - to exert their wills so as to use
signs in accord with general rules without agreeing to do so. To understand why, recall
that, on Reid’s account, if one uses a word repeatedly in accord with a rule, and,
moreover, if one is the efficient cause of doing so, one must be motivated by a rational
principle of action. Why must it be a rational principle of action? Recall Reid identifies
three types of principles of action - i.e., three sorts of motives for the things we do. There
are mechanical principles, animal principles, and rational principles. Reid holds that
people can be moved to repeatedly act in accord with a general rule by a mechanical
principle of action - children, e.g., might first use artificial signs in accord with general
rules in consequence of having acquired a habit of doing so - but also holds that if people
act from mere mechanical principles, they are not the genuine efficient causes of their
actions. Reid holds, moreover, that animal principles motivate voluntary actions, but that
they cannot motivate rational or regular patterns of thought or behaviour. People must,
then, on Reid’s own account, be motivated to exert their wills so as to repeatedly follow
general rules by some rational principle of action. And now note: if a person repeatedly
uses a linguistic sign in accord with a general rule but is not the efficient cause of their
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doing so, then that sign is not an artificial sign in either of the two senses noted in the last
paragraph. On Reid’s account, then, people can fix meanings of artificial signs by
exercising their wills, but only if they are moved by a rational principle of action - which,
in turn, requires that they have some obligation or reason to use the signs in the ways that
they do. This obligation or reason cannot be grounded in the natural law, as there is no
natural obligation or reason for us to repeatedly use the sound ‘dog’ to refer to our furry
friends, and so this obligation or reason must instead be one that people somehow take
upon themselves. The act promising, on Reid’s account, just is the act by which people
take on such obligations; and that, I suggest, might be why Reid holds that all artificial
linguistic signs - i.e., those signs whose meanings are fixed by the wills of those who use
them - are signs whose meanings are fixed by a social act of agreement. His argument,
then, on this reading, presupposes not only his account of the social operations, but also
of active power, moral liberty, and efficient causation.
There is an objection to the response outlined in the last paragraph. Recall Reid
recognizes two rational principle of action. On Reid’s account, one can be rationally
moved to do something because one has some obligation to do it, or one can be rationally
moved to do something just because it is in one’s best interest to do it. The fact that Reid
recognizes both rational principles grounds the objection. The objection can be put as a
question to Reid: why, Reid, must the motive involved in the first use of artificial
linguistic signs be grounded in an obligation created by the act of agreeing, rather than in
the mere fact that it was in each person’s rational self-interest to use signs in the way that
other people use them? The objection is prima facie compelling; it appears obvious that it
is often in one’s interest to use words in ways that other people use them, just because, by
doing so, one is able to make oneself understood and thereby able to achieve any number
of one’s further aims. On what grounds, then, might Reid rule out the possibility it was
the regard to one’s individual good upon the whole that provided humans’ motives to first
use artificial linguistic signs in the same ways as each other?
I do not think that Reid would deny that we normally have reasons grounded in
self-interest to use artificial linguistic signs in the ways that others do, but that he might
instead deny that that reason could have been operative at the time artificial signs were
first invented. He might argue that it is only if there is an established public practice of
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using linguistic signs in accord with general rules, that one has reasons grounded in self
interest to use words in accord with said rules, because it is only then that one can use
said signs to make oneself understood and thereby achieve one’s further aims. If artificial
signs have not been invented - and, thus, if people do not use such signs in accord with
common public rules - there can be no reason grounded in rational self interest to use a
sign in accord with one rule rather than any other. But people could, Reid might claim,
nevertheless agree to use the word in accord with some rule, and thereby take on
obligations to use the word in that way. Once the agreement is made and the people
subsequently go on using the word in that way, they acquire additional reasons grounded
in their rational self-interest to use the word in that way; but the first invention of the
artificial signs, he might argue, must instead have involved an act of agreement.
What do we make of that response? I am not certain that Reid would make that
sort of response, nor I am certain that, if he did, he could defend it against further
criticisms. It is only a suggestion for what he might say. The issue will perhaps be moot,
though, as I go on to present objections to Reid’s argument later in this section that would
appear to undermine the possibility of Reid successfully pursuing this response. Before
doing so, however, I first discuss Reid’s second argument for the claim that we must
possess a natural language with which we can express social operations. Reid presents
that argument in the following passage from the mentioned chapter of EAP in which he
critiques Hume’s claims about promising:
“The power which man has of holding social intercourse with his kind, by asking
and refusing, threatening and supplicating, commanding and obeying, testifying
and promising, must either be a distinct faculty given by our Maker, and a part of
our constitution, like the powers of seeing, and hearing, or it must be a human
invention. If men have invented this art of social intercourse, it must follow, that
every individual of the species must have invented it for himself. It cannot be
taught; for though, when once carried to a certain pitch, it may be improved by
teaching; yet it is impossible it can begin in that way, because all teaching
supposes a social intercourse between the teacher and the learner. This intercourse
must, from the very first, be carried on by sensible signs; for the thoughts of other
men can be discovered in no other way. I think it likewise evident, that this
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intercourse, in its beginnings at least, must be carried on by natural signs, whose
meaning is understood by both parties, previous to all compact or agreement. For
there can be no compact without signs, nor without social intercourse.
I apprehend therefore, that the social intercourse of mankind, consisting of
those social operations which I have mentioned, is the exercise of a faculty
appropriated to that purpose, which is the gift of God, no less than the powers of
seeing and hearing. And that, in order to carry on this intercourse, God has given
to man a natural language, by which his social operations are expressed, and,
without which, the artificial languages of articulate sounds, and of writing, could
never have been invented by human art” (EAP 331)
Before reconstructing the argument, I have several preliminary remarks. First, note Reid
mentions the social operations in the quoted passage. Unlike the first argument in IHM,
then, there can be no doubt, even prima facie, that the conclusion of the second argument
is that we have a natural language with which we can perform social operations. Second,
recall that, when stating the first argument in IHM, Reid writes he means to argue that “if
mankind had not a natural language, they could never have invented an artificial one by
their reason and ingenuity [emphasis added]” (IHM 51). It would appear, then, that
Reid’s claim in IHM is that people could not have invented artificial language without a
natural language, even if they possessed their mature abilities to judge and reason. Reid
includes that qualification because, I suggest, he means to emphasize that the invention of
artificial linguistic signs requires that people have a natural language with which they can
take on obligations. The point to note here, however, is that Reid does not include any
such qualification about what is possible even with one’s reasoning abilities when he
states the second argument in EAP. This, I suggest, is because several of the premises of
the second argument presupposes some of his views about what is impossible without and thus prior to - having learnt artificial language.
Let’s get clear on the details of the second argument. My suggested reconstruction
of that argument goes as follows:
1. Either the practice of performing social operations is at least partly the exercise of
a natural faculty, or it is wholly invented by human beings.
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2. Assume: the practice of performing social operations is wholly invented by
human beings.
3. If (2), then each person either first engages in that practice by inventing it by
themself, or first engages in that practice by being taught to do so by another
person.
4. But each person cannot first engage that practice by inventing it by themself.
5. If a person is taught to engage in that practice by another person, that person and
their teacher must already be able to engage in that practice with each other.
6. Thus, each person cannot first acquire the ability to engage in that practice by
being taught to do so by another person.
7. Thus, (2) is false: the practice of performing social operations is not wholly
invented by human beings.
8. Thus, the practice of performing social operations is at least partly the exercise of
a natural faculty.
9. The thoughts of other people can be known only by the use of linguistic signs that
express them.
10. Thus, the practice of performing social operations only can be carried on by the
use of linguistic signs that express them.
11. Thus, the practice of performing social operations between the teacher and
student, in its beginning, must be carried on by the use of linguistic signs that
express them.
At this point in the argument, it appears that Reid uses reasoning drawn from the first
argument to support the claim - premise (12), listed below - that the signs used, in the
beginning, were natural linguistic signs. It is unclear, however, if Reid needs to employ
the first argument there to support that claim, or whether he can argue for it via (a), (b)
and (c) listed here:
a. When the practice of performing social operations between teacher and student
first begins, no artificial linguistic signs are as yet understood by both parties.
b. Thus, when the practice of performing social operations between teacher and
student first begins, the signs used cannot be artificial linguistic signs.
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c. All linguistic signs are natural or artificial.
However, regardless of how one reconstructs the details of the reasoning drawn from the
first argument in the passage in EAP, Reid can complete the argument needed to establish
his main conclusion roughly as follows:
12. Thus, when practice of performing social operations first begins, the signs used
must be natural linguistic signs.
13. Thus, when the practice of performing social operations between teacher and
student first begins, teacher and student must share a natural language with which
they can express the social operations.
14. Thus, people have a natural language with which they can express the social
operations.
The details of this reconstruction of the second argument are highly debatable, as the
structure of the reasoning in the text is not exactly clear. This reconstruction I offer here
is only as a suggestion for how the details of that argument might be best understood.
Nevertheless, I insist that the key premises included in this reconstruction are either in the
text or needed to render that argument valid. To make progress towards further clarifying
the various details of this argument, it might help if I once again discuss Reid’s possible if not also likely - reasons for adopting its key premises, as those reasons are not made
explicit in the text. In what follows, I offer my suggestions for what Reid’s reasons for
said premises could be, suggestions that are informed by my results in earlier chapters
and sections of the dissertation.
Consider premise four: a person cannot first engage in the practice of performing
social operations by inventing it for themself. As noted in section (3.1), Reid holds that
social operations cannot be performed unless made known to others, so it is perhaps
trivially true, on his account, that one cannot invent a practice of social intercourse - in
the sense of actually beginning to use signs that signify social operations to communicate
with other people - by oneself. Note, however, that it appears - at last prima facie - that a
person could nevertheless exercise their will so as to use a sign to signify a social
operation, even if that person could not use that sign to express that social operation to
another person and thereby perform it. A person might, the suggestion goes, invent such a
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sign for some odd sort of private use, and might do so, moreover, in virtue of the fact that
said private use serves their rational self interest. On Reid’s commitments, however, a
person in the relevant sort of case could not exercise their will so as to use such a sign
privately. Reid has at least two reasons for this. To understand the first reason, recall that,
on Reid’s account, the principle of utile - i.e., one’s regard for one’s good upon the whole
- is a rational principle just as much as one’s regard for one’s duty. Reid writes, e.g., of
the principle of utile that
“It cannot be denied that man, when he comes to years of understanding, is led by
his rational nature, to form the conception of what is good for him upon the
whole.
How early in life this general notion of good enters into the mind, I cannot
pretend to determine. It is one of the most general and abstract notions we form”
(EAP 154)
On Reid’s account, a person who does not yet understand an artificial language - and thus
is not yet capable of conceiving universals - cannot be moved by rational self interest to
use non-natural signs in accord with general rules. A person who does not yet understand
artificial language, afterall, cannot conceive their good upon the whole or general rules,
much less exert their will so as to act in accord with such a rule for the sake of their good
upon the whole. Mature rational persons such as ourselves, of course, if we have some
reason to do so, might well exert our will so as to use signs in accord with general rules
for some merely private purpose, but newborn infants or children who have not as yet
come to understand artificial language cannot do so. Reid’s second argument concerns
the sort of case in which a child or person learns to use and understand artificial signs that
signify the social operations for the first time. This, I suggest, is one reason Reid has for
his claim that a person, in the relevant sort of case, could not invent the practice of social
intercourse all by themself.
What is the second reason? Recall that, on Reid’s account, one first conceives of a
social operation by understanding another person’s use of a natural linguistic sign of that
operation, and, consequently, that if one had never conceived such a social operation by
understanding another person’s use of such a sign, one would be unable to conceive an
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operation of that sort, and thus unable to exert one’s will so as to use a sign to signify it.
The child in the relevant sort of case, then, on Reid’s account, could not conceive a social
operation unless they had previously perceived and also understood a linguistic sign of it.
On Reid’s account, then, it follows that a child in the relevant sort of case could not exert
their will so as to use linguistic signs to signify social operations, even if only privately to
themselves, unless they had already engaged in social intercourse of the relevant sort with
another person. This is a second reason Reid has, given his commitments, for premise
four. It is, of course, highly debatable whether Reid in fact had either of these two
reasons in mind when composing his argument; but it is possible he did, and also
plausible, given that the reasons are grounded in commitments that Reid takes on
elsewhere in his texts or at least that follow from such commitments.
Consider premise five: if a person is taught to engage in that practice by another
person, that person and their teacher must already be able to engage in that practice with
each other. Why might Reid accept this premise? I have a suggestion. Here, we need to
discuss Reid’s account of the processes through which children first learn the meanings
of artificial linguistic signs. Reid discusses this topic in EIP, as well as in the manuscripts
discussed in part two. In both of those texts, Reid claims that the culture of society plays
a key role in that process. Consider two passages from EIP:
“The labour of forming abstract notions, is the labour of learning to speak, and to
understand what is spoken. As the words of every language, excepting a few
proper names, are general words, the minds of children are furnished with general
conceptions, in proportion as they learn the meanings of general words… The
meaning of some of these is learned by a definition, which at once conveys a
distinct and accurate general conception. The meaning of other general words we
collect, by a kind of induction, from the way in which we see them used on
various occasions by those who understand the language” (EIP 398)
“[The meaning of general words not learned by definition are learned] by a kind
of induction, by observing to what individuals they are applied by those who
understand the language” (EIP 363)
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Reid says we learn artificial signs - including general words - either by a definition or by
“a kind of induction”. The former involves being told by another person, with artificial
signs that convey a distinct general conception that the artificial sign in question is used
to signify a general conception or else some type of individual. I might say to you, e.g.,
“the word ‘square’ is used to signify two dimensional closed euclidean figures with four
equal sides and four equal angles” and thereby explain to you the meaning of ‘square’.
That is not, however, how children first learn the meanings of words; such children, after
all, do not yet understand artificial signs, and, consequently, cannot have meanings
explained to them just like that. Reid claims that children first learn general words by “a
kind of induction”. This induction cannot involve, on the part of the child, any inductive
reasoning - i.e., any act of inferring the probable truth of one proposition from another as reasoning is not yet possible for a child who has not learned artificial language. On
Reid’s account, this induction must instead involve the child acquiring a habit of
associating general words with universals. How is this habit acquired? Reid is light on the
details here, but the view expressed in the quoted passages appears to be that children
associate artificial signs with universals by observing the use that the people in their
community make of said signs. The picture appears to be one on which people repeatedly
use tokens of some type of sign in reference to individuals that have a common feature,
the child observes that repeated use of the signs - and it is able to do so, presumably, at
least in part, in virtue of their understanding natural linguistic signs that express social
and solitary operations - and thereby observes the repeated conjunction of token signs of
some type and features of some type. After observing enough repetitions, the child
acquires a habit in virtue of which a conception of a token sign of that type prompts it to
conceive of that common feature, but as abstracted away from the individuals in which it
is instantiated - i.e., the sign signifies a universal to the child.
As brief and sketchy as it might be, Reid’s account of the process through which
children first learn artificial language nevertheless might help us understand why Reid
might think it is possible for a teacher to teach a child to understand artificial signs that
express or signify the social operations, only if the teacher can already engage in social
intercourse with the child. The point is that the teacher must have some means by which
they can present token social operations to the child, if the child is to experience the

78

repeated conjunction of tokens of some type of sign with tokens of some type of social
operation. How, on Reid’s account, can a teacher present such token social operations to
a child? This can only be done, on Reid’s account, by the teacher performing the social
operations in the child’s presence in ways that the child is able to understand - i.e., the
teacher must engage in social intercourse, at least in some rudimentary way, with the
child. The natural language faculty, on Reid’s account, is the source of our first
conceptions of social operations, and, consequently, grounds our ability to be trained to
associate artificial signs with such operations.
Consider premise nine: Reid claims that the thoughts of other people can be made
known only by the use of signs that express them. There is an objection to this premise.
There are, presumably, ways of knowing other people’s thoughts, other than by
understanding signs that express them. Reid himself almost acknowledges this himself in
a manuscript in which he discusses political contracts. There, Reid writes:
“But it is to be observed that the Consent which is essential in all Contracts may
be expressed many different ways; either by formal writing Signed sealed and
delivered; or by the verbal declaration of the several parties; or by the actions of
the parties; or even sometimes by their Silence, or by their doing nothing, when it
may reasonably be presumed that they would not be silent or inactive if they did
not consent… When I hear a Sermon my Silence signifies nothing, it neither
implys my assent to what the preacher affirms nor my consent to what he requires
me to do. But on the other hand if I am called to a meeting of Electors of a
Member of Parliament, where a Candidate is proposed by one and agreed to by
others. Should it be at last moved that if any man has any Objection to the
candidate mentioned he should speak, & that silence would be held for a Consent,
here every honest man would conceive himself no less bound by his Silence than
by his Consent expressed by words… Thus I conceive it is evident that the
consent of Parties which is essential to every real Contract may be expressed in a
great variety of ways. By writing by words, by signs artificial or natural, by
Silence or even by doing nothing; it is sufficient if the meaning of the sign
whatever it be is understood by the parties” (OPE 136)
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Reid writes that the act of consent involved in agreements or contracts can be made
known in a variety of ways. Our question concerns whether Reid thinks that all such
ways must involve the use of a sign that expresses or signifies the act of consent. What is
the alternative to the use of a sign? The operation might be implied or implicated. To
clarify, recall that Reidian signification is immediate: it does not involve reasoning to a
conclusion about what is signified by the sign. The suggestion is that a person might
observe the behaviour of another person and then reason to a conclusion about what
thoughts the other person meant to make known, even in cases in which those thoughts
are not strictly speaking expressed or signified by signs. Does Reid think it is possible to
make thoughts known to others in this other way? It might be claimed that Reid admits as
much in the quoted passage. Reid writes, e.g., that a person’s silence or inactivity can
make their act of consent or agreement known to others “when it may reasonably be
presumed that they would not be silent or inactive if they did not consent” (Ibid.) If the
mental move from the thought of silence or inactivity to the thought of consent involves
reasoning - i.e., inferring the truth of one proposition from that or another - then the case
is not one that involves the use of signs, but rather one in which the operation is implied
or implicated in the noted sense. If so, Reid’s claim in this passage would conflict with
his claim that social operations can be made known to others only by way of the use of
linguistic signs that express them. However, Reid speaks of expression by means of signs
throughout the quoted passage. His example, in fact, appears intended as a case in which
there is an established convention that silence in a particular type of context counts as an
expression of consent. Close reading of the passage, then, leads to the conclusion that
Reid thinks silence or inactivity in the mentioned sort of case is an artificial linguistic
sign that expresses consent. I suggest, then, that Reid - be it rightly or wrongly - holds
that this sort of case involves the use of a sign.
Suppose, then, Reid holds that thoughts of others are always made known by the
use of linguistic signs that express them, and denies that thoughts are ever implied or
implicated in the relevant sense. If he holds this, he is likely wrong about it. But our task
is not to decide whether Reid is right, but to decide whether, if he is wrong, this creates a
problem for his second argument. I do not think that it does. To understand why, note that
the second argument concerns a case in which a person or child who does not as yet
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understand any artificial signs first learns to understand them. In such a case as that, the
child cannot reason to any conclusions at all, much less to any conclusions about what
other people either did or did not intend to make known by remaining silent or acting in
some other way, because Reid holds the ability to understand artificial language is part of
what makes reasoning possible. The person in such a case could move from a thought of
one thing to a thought of another, of course, because of an instinct or acquired habit. But
neither of those possibilities involves reasoning, but rather signification by signs. Even if,
then, Reid would - and even if he ought to - acknowledge that thoughts can be made
known to others by being implied or implicated in the noted sense, his second argument
can still accomplish what he means for it to accomplish.

3.4 Reid’s Other Commentators
In this section, I discuss some of the existing literature on Reid’s first argument. In this
literature, Reid’s commentators present objections to the argument and consider possible
responses to said objections on Reid’s behalf. In this section, I survey the objections
presented in the literature and discuss whether Reid could respond in the ways proposed
by his other commentators. In the next section, I present novel objections to Reid’s first
argument, objections which are, at least in part, inspired by the underlying point of the
objections in the literature, and are, additionally, informed by my key results in previous
chapters and sections of this dissertation. After presenting my objections, I then close
chapter three by considering suggestions for how we might be able to read Reid
differently so as to enable him to sidestep my objections. I conclude, there, that none of
those suggestions is wholly successful.
The first publication to discuss the argument in detail is Turri (2015). Turri’s
objection takes the form of a fanciful counter-example. To appreciate the force of this
counter-example, note Turri interprets Reid’s argument as being for the claim that people
could not coordinate their use of artificial linguistic signs - where artificial linguistic
signs are understood simply as non-natural signs that are used to communicate - unless
they shared a natural language with which they could express operations of the mind in
general. This is to say that Turri does not interpret the argument as being for the claim
that people cannot establish norms that govern their use of artificial signs, unless they
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share a natural language with which they can express the social operation of agreement.
In a sense, then, Turri’s objection simply misses the mark, as it is not an objection to the
argument that Reid gives. However, for reasons that will become clear, Turri’s example
is well-worth considering. His example goes like this: suppose that a person sees a wolf
in a forest, comes out of the forest, and, then, upon seeing another person about to enter
the forest, makes the sound of a wolf - ‘owooooooooo’ - with the intention of letting that
other person know that a wolf is lurking nearby. Turri claims it is reasonable to conclude
that the second person would, or at least could, understand or figure out that the first
person intends to let her know that a wolf is lurking nearby, even if the two people do not
share - or, at least, do not make use of - natural linguistic signs. He reasons that since
‘owooooooooo’ is clearly a linguistic sign but not a natural linguistic sign, and since Reid
holds that linguistic signs are natural or artificial, it is clear the situation described is one
in which an artificial linguistic sign has been used - and thus invented - without recourse
to the use of any natural linguistic signs.
Rysiew (2017) responds to Turri on Reid’s behalf. His main point is just this: in
light of the fact that we are supposing the people do not share any natural language, it is
not clear the second person would come to recognize that the first person means to let her
know that a wolf is lurking nearby. To understand the force of this reply, just consider
again the sort of case we are dealing with. We are supposing that the people do not share
any natural language: we are supposing, then, that nothing about the first person’s
appearance or behaviour immediately prompts the other to think she has a mental state of
any sort - including, e.g., an intention to communicate. This case, I suggest, is difficult
for us to imagine, as insofar as we imagine a case involving two people, we are inclined
to imagine it as involving things that act in ways people typically act - i.e., in ways
naturally expressive to us of their thoughts. When one first imagines Turri’s example,
e.g., one likely imagines that the person runs out of the forest, moves in some frightened
way, looks at the other person, perhaps points in the direction of the forest, and then cries
“owooooooooo”. If I were in that situation, and if the person’s noted behaviours
expressed to me the sorts of mental states that they normally express, then, yes, I would
likely immediately perceive - or at least reason to the conclusion - that she meant to say
something to me about a wolf. Typically, we interpret eye contact, vocal sounds, and
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even bodily movements, as signs of people’s mental states, and, often, as signs of an
intention to communicate with us. If, however, we really are to imagine a case in which
the people involved do not share any natural language at all, we must imagine a case that
involves something that is not very much like a person at all. At least, if we are to
imagine a case that involves people, we must imagine that that person who comes out of
the forest stands perfectly still, does not look in the direction of the other person at all,
does not move in ways that are expressive of their emotions, intentions, or thoughts, and,
then, makes a wolf sound. We must also imagine that the second person is not inclined to
interpret a vocal sound as a sign of any mental state, much less of an intention to
communicate. I suggest Rysiew is quite correct, here, to suggest that it is not clear that
the second person would or even could figure out that the first person intends to
communicate something. Of course, the cry “owooooooooo” might signify something to
the second person. If, e.g., the second person has past experience of wolves and noises
they make, “owooooooooo” might well prompt her to think about wolves or about the
sounds they make. But that alone would not make ‘owooooooooo’ a Reidian linguistic
sign - i.e., a sign that is used to communicate thoughts. It is, after all, one thing for a sign
to signify a wolf, but another for a sign to express a thought about a wolf.
Another similar counterexample is discussed in Powell (2017). Powell, like Turri,
interprets the argument as being for the claim that we could not coordinate our use of
non-natural linguistic signs unless we share a natural language, rather than - following me
- as an argument for the claim that we could not establish norms that govern our use of
artificial linguistic signs unless we shared a natural language with which we could make
agreements with each other. He presents his counter-example in the following passage:
“Suppose that there is an intelligent alien race, whose facial expressions and tones
of voice are radically different from those of humankind, and suppose, further,
that we are not so constituted as to respond to facial expressions, gestures or tones
of voice as signs of their mental lives. We can tell that they are an intelligent
species because they build spaceships and engage in complex behavior. Could
we... learn their language or develop a common language for communicating with
them? It seems plausible to me that we would be able to” (Powell 2017)
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Powell writes that Reid could respond to this objection in two ways: either Reid could
just bite the bullet and claim we could not or would not develop a language with which
we could communicate with these aliens; or Reid could claim that we either do or must
share some natural language in common with any intelligent being.
Let’s briefly consider Powell’s suggested responses. First, what about the second
option? Note that this response cannot be plausibly attributed to Reid. Reid holds that it is
a mere contingent fact about the human cognitive constitution that natural linguistic signs
signify the operations that they do. On Reid’s account, then, it is possible other intelligent
beings - such as, e.g., Powell’s aliens - are constituted such that they share natural
linguistic signs completely different than our own. Reid cannot, then, respond to the
example by claiming that we must share some natural language in common with any
intelligent being.
What about the first option? Powell thinks it reasonable to conclude that we could
figure out that the aliens are intelligent beings that built the spaceships and engage in
complex behaviours, and, moreover, that we could figure out a way to communicate with
the aliens. It is a plausible suggestion. I do not think Reid could or would simply deny it.
If we imagine people relevantly like ourselves in that scenario - i.e., if we imagine
rational creatures - then it is likely, I agree, that those people would be able to figure out
that the aliens are intelligent creatures and perhaps even figure out ways to communicate
with them, at least rudimentary ways. Note, moreover, that this is a significant concession
to make on Reid’s behalf: it is to concede that the response Rysiew suggests in response
to Turri - i.e., to deny it is reasonable to conclude that the people would, in the sort of
case being described, be able to reason to the relevant conclusion - is not going to work
as a response to Powell’s counter-example.
There is another response available to Reid, which might also work as a response
to Turri’s example. Recall the issue that in our discussion so far has revolved around
whether the person in the described scenario would be able to reason to the relevant
conclusion. Reid has a way to block this whole line of discussion. Recall my earlier
discussion of Reid’s second argument. Recall, specifically, I noted Reid could respond to
an objection to that other argument by noting that, in the relevant sort of case - namely,
one in which at least one person involved does not as yet understand artificial language -
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the relevant person is not as yet capable of reasoning, and, consequently, is not capable of
reasoning to any conclusions at all about what operation is implied by another person’s
behaviour. An analogous response to Turri’s and Powell’s objections, then, could go like
this: Turri’s and Powell’s objections just miss the mark, as they are thinking of cases in
which the person involved already understands an artificial language - only not the same
artificial language as the other person or the aliens - and, consequently, already has the
ability to judge and to reason about things; but the relevant sort of case, here, is one in
which the person does not as yet understand any artificial language at all. This is the
relevant sort of case simply because Reid’s argument concerns the question of what made
possible the very first invention of artificial language, and consequently, on Reid’s
account of what artificial language makes possible, concerns a case in which the people
involved are not yet capable of judgment or reasoning. If we suppose that the people in
Turri and Powell’s cases do not have natural language or their reasoning abilities, it is
clear, I suggest, they could not grasp that ‘owooooooooo’ is being used to let them know
that a wolf is nearby or figure out how to communicate with the aliens.

3.5 Problems with Reid’s Arguments
Can Reid successfully respond to Turri and Powell’s examples in the way just outlined at
the end of the last section? Perhaps. That response was premised on Reid’s claim that the
conception of universals, judgment and reasoning - and by extension, epistemic
rationality and moral liberty - are impossible for humans prior to understanding artificial
language. In this section, I go on to outline two further objections to Reid’s argument. I
argue first that Reid’s commitments concerning what artificial language makes possible
give rise to serious problems for his argument. I argue, second, that Reid’s commitments
concerning the natural linguistic signs that express social operations give rise to a second
serious problem for it. I then conclude by considering three ways in which Reid might be
able to deal with these objections. I conclude that none are wholly satisfactory.
The first problem is that a key presupposition of Reid’s first argument - i.e., the
claim that the first invention of artificial linguistic signs involved people performing the
social operation of agreement - is prima facie incompatible with his other commitments.
To recognize the first problem, recall Reid holds that one can make a promise - and, more
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relevantly, one can make a promise to use a linguistic sign in accord with a general rule only if one possesses moral liberty and can conceive general rules. The incompatibility,
then, is just this: on Reid’s account, the act involved in the first invention of artificial
language - i.e., the social operation of agreeing - cannot be performed unless those
involved already possess moral liberty, which, in turn, is possible only if they can already
understand artificial language. It would appear, then, Reid is actually committed to
saying that the invention of artificial language is impossible, for humans, before they
learnt - and thus before they invented - artificial language; it appears, then, that Reid’s
first argument is incompatible with his other philosophical commitments.
The second problem, again, is that a presupposition of Reid’s argument is prima
facie incompatible with his other commitments. Recall I argued in section (3.2) that, on
pain of absurdity, Reid is committed to the view that one conceives the social operations
for the first time - and thereby acquires the ability to conceive them and thus perform
them oneself later on - by understanding natural linguistic signs of them. It appears to
follow that, on Reid’s account, no person could be the first in history to perform a social
operation, just because each person must have observed other people perform social
operations before they could perform social operations themself. It appears, then, that
Reid is committed to the claim that the act involved in the first invention of artificial
linguistic signs could not have been performed for the very first time in history. It is
unclear, then, if Reid can give a coherent account of how the practice of performing
social operations ever got started, and, consequently, it is unclear if the account of the
first invention of artificial language presupposed by his argument is coherent. It might be
suggested, of course, Reid could respond to this problem by claiming that the practice of
performing promises with natural linguistic signs extends indefinitely far back in time,
and, consequently, that there never was a person who was the first to perform promises.
But Reid cannot make that response, unless he can claim that people possessed moral
liberty indefinitely far back in time, which would mean that, on Reid’s account, people
possessed moral liberty before they ever invented an artificial language. But Reid cannot
make that claim, as it is apparently incompatible with his commitments concerning what
it is that artificial language makes possible. It might also be suggested that Reid could
respond by claiming that artificial language was never invented for a very first time, and
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that the practice of using artificial language extends indefinitely far back. But that, of
course, would undermine the whole point of Reid’s first argument: if we never invented
artificial language for a first time, then it makes no sense to argue that we could not have
invented it for the first time unless we had an appropriate natural language, and, thus, that
we have such a language. It appears, then, that there is no straightforward way for Reid to
avoid this second problem either.
In what follows, I consider three suggestions for how we might read Reid, so as to
absolve him of responsibility for these apparent problems. I argue, however, that none of
these suggestions is wholly successful.
The first two suggestions are of the same sort: the suggestion in each case is that
Reid’s views and commitments may have evolved throughout his career, and that the
views Reid held at any one time were compatible with each other, and that it is only
because I have attempted to attribute to Reid views that he held at different moments in
his career, that he appears to have held incompatible views at the very same time. Either
suggestion is plausible, only if we are able to flesh out the details of a developmental
story on which Reid first took on, and subsequently gave up, the relevant views and
commitments. Such a story is plausible, moreover, only if it is at the very least consistent
with - if not also well supported by - the textual evidence. In what immediately follows, I
flush out each of the suggestions in detail, consider the relevant texts, and then argue that
neither is supported by the textual evidence.
What is the first developmental story? Here, the claim is that Reid developed the
first argument early on in his career, later took on the commitments that are incompatible
with it, and, consequently, abandoned the first argument at some point later in his career.
On this developmental story, moreover, Reid might have developed the second argument
as a replacement for the first argument, as the second argument supports Reid’s claim
that we have natural language with which we can make promises, but appears consistent
with Reid’s commitments about what artificial language makes possible, and, indeed,
appears premised on some of those commitments. The second argument, afterall, merely
makes the claim that a person or child could not be taught to understand an already
invented artificial language with which one can perform social operations, and so it
avoids any problems that arise for Reid’s account of the first invention of artificial
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language and avoids any problems that might be arise his account of how the practice of
performing the social operations got started.
Is this story supported by the texts? On first glance, it appears not. The key point
to note, here, is that Reid presents the first argument not only in IHM, but also in EAP,
which was the last work Reid published in his lifetime, and which was written after he
developed his accounts of moral liberty and social operations as well as after he took on
his commitments about what artificial language makes possible.
This first glance, however, might be deceiving. I have not yet argued for the claim
that the first argument is in EAP, but instead have merely claimed that that is. One might
be tempted to argue, here, that the first argument is not presented in EAP, and,
consequently, that the considered developmental story is plausible after all. Is the first
argument, as I have interpreted it, expressed in EAP? Admittedly, it is rather difficult to
reconstruct the details of the argument in EAP. But there is sufficient reason to conclude
that EAP contains relevant claims. Recall that Reid appears to restate the reasoning from
the first argument in EAP as follows:
“...I think it is likewise evident, that this intercourse, in its beginning at least, must
be carried on by natural signs, whose meaning is understood by both parties,
previous to all compact and agreement. For there can be no compact without
signs, nor without social intercourse.
I apprehend, therefore, that the social intercourse of mankind, consisting
of those social operations I have mentioned, is the exercise of a faculty
appropriated to that purpose, which is a gift of God, no less than the powers of
seeing and hearing. And that, in order to carry on this intercourse, God has given
to man a natural language, by which his social operations are expressed, and,
without which, the artificial languages of articulate sounds, and of writing, could
never have been invented by human art” (EAP 331)
Is the claim here that we must be able to perform the social operation of agreeing, with
natural linguistic signs, before we invented artificial linguistic signs, if artificial language
was to be first invented? One might argue reasonably that the reasoning Reid presents in
these passages ought not to be reconstructed in the exact way that I reconstructed the
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analogous reasoning that he presented in IHM. The structure of the reasoning in the EAP
is muddled, so it is difficult to argue decisively that the reasoning is exactly the same. But
just recall what Reid needs to be committed to in order for my criticisms to get a firm
foothold: Reid needs only to be committed to the claim that we could use natural
linguistic signs to perform the act of agreeing - where agreeing is understood in the
precise sense at issue in his dispute with Hume, which is to say a social operation by
which we voluntarily take on obligations to each other - before we first invented any
artificial language. It is difficult, then, to read the EAP passage and not conclude that
Reid’s first argument, whatever its exact structure, commits him to that claim. It appears,
then, we cannot absolve Reid of the noted problems by claiming that he did not express
in EAP the claims that, I argue, are presupposed in his first argument and incompatible
with his other mature commitments.
However, the plausibility of our developmental story cannot be dismissed merely
by way of noting that the relevant views are expressed in EAP. To understand why, note
Reid includes the following note in EAP:
“The substance of the following four chapters was wrote long ago, and read in a
literary society, with a view to justify some points of morals from metaphysical
objections urged against them in the writings of DAVID HUME, Esq. If they
answer that end, and, at the same time, serve to illustrate the account I have given
of our moral powers, it is hoped that the reader will not think them improperly
placed here; and that he will forgive some repetitions, and perhaps anachronisms,
occasioned by their being wrote at different times, and on different occasions”
(EAP 289)
The chapter of EAP in which Reid critiques Hume on promising is one of the four
chapters Reid mentions in this footnote. The content of that chapter, then, was likely
developed earlier in Reid’s career, before the text of EAP was submitted for publication
in the late 1780s, and, perhaps, before Reid took on the commitments that are
incompatible with his first argument. It is perhaps possible, then, Reid did not take time
to revise the text of EAP before publishing EAP, and that this might explain why the
problematic claims about the first invention of artificial language are included in it.
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Perhaps Reid never got around to revising the details of his critique of Hume in that
chapter, and, if he had, he would have abandoned the first argument and just replaced it
wholesale with the second. To evaluate the plausibility of this story, we need to survey
the relevant texts in chronological order and ask whether our story is supported by that
textual evidence. I do that in what follows.
Reid’s earliest statement of the first argument is in IHM, which was published in
1764. I discussed this statement of the argument in section (3.3). That argument
presupposes the relevant aspects of Reid’s account of the social operations - in particular,
it presupposes his claim that social operations cannot exist unless they are expressed by
sensible linguistic signs and his claim that the first invention of artificial linguistic signs
involved the social operation of agreement. The next texts are the manuscripts I discussed
in part two - i.e., the manuscripts in which Reid claims that the ability to understand
artificial language makes possible conceptions of universals and propositions, judgments,
and reasoning. These manuscripts are dated, so we know they were composed in the late
1760s. The next texts are the manuscripts MS 2/II/14 and MS 7/VII/2-6. In these
manuscripts, Reid critiques Hume’s account of promises and presents his account of the
social operations. MS 2/II/14 contains statements of the first and second arguments, and,
moreover, contains many sentences found in the chapter of EAP in which Reid critiques
Hume on promising - about a third of the sentences of that chapter, in fact, are taken
directly from that manuscript. It is possible, then, that MS 2/II/14 served as a draft of that
chapter. These two manuscripts are not dated. We know, however, that in 1765 - i.e.,
immediately after publishing IHM, but before writing the manuscripts I discussed in
chapter two - Reid presented a talk to the Aberdeen Philosophical Society titled ‘Wherein
does the nature of a promise consist, & whence does its obligation arise’. We also know
that in 1779 - i.e., a full decade after writing the manuscripts I discussed in chapter two,
and several years years before publishing EIP and EAP respectively - Reid gave a talk to
the Glasgow Literary Society titled ‘Wherein consists the nature of a contract and does it
involve contradictions as Mr. Hume asserts?’. We know, then, that Reid first engaged the
issues involved in his dispute with Hume on promising as early as 1765, before we know
for certain that he took on his commitment to the claim that artificial language makes
conceptions of universals possible, and that he explicitly engaged Hume on the topic in
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detail as early as 1779, after having taken on the noted commitments. It is possible, of
course, that these manuscripts were composed in 1765 or 1779. It is not entirely clear,
however, when exactly Reid composed those manuscripts. The next texts are EIP and
EAP, published in 1785 and 1788 respectively. In EIP, Reid presents his account of
social operations and claims that it is by learning artificial language that we first form
general conceptions. In EAP, Reid presents his accounts of rational principles of action
and moral liberty; claims that without the culture of society, people would not grow into
rational and moral creatures; presents his account of social operations; critiques Hume on
promises in EAP 5.6; and, in doing so, presents the arguments we have been considering.
Is this textual evidence compatible with the claim Reid took on the commitments
that are incompatible with the first argument only after he developed that first argument,
and on which he subsequently rejected that argument, possibly replaced it wholesale with
the second, and only presented the first argument in the text of EAP - to the extent that he
did - because he did not revise the relevant material before sending EAP out for
publication? If so, then we can explain away the prima facie incompatibilities noted
between the argument and Reid’s other commitments. The textual evidence, however,
does support that story. We know that Reid revisited the issues involved in his dispute
with Hume on promising in detail in 1779, after he wrote the manuscripts that I discussed
in part two in which he claims artificial language makes conceptions of universals
possible and after he had developed the relevant aspects of his account of social
operations. Reid, then, reconsidered the first argument in detail after he had taken on the
various commitments that are, I have argued, incompatible with it. It seems quite
unlikely, therefore, that Reid simply did not get around to reworking the material in EAP
5.6 after he had taken on the relevant commitments.
There is an additional reason to conclude that Reid continued to make the first
argument at the end of his career. Dugald Stewart was a student of Reid’s at the
University of Glasgow and became Professor of Moral Philosophy at the University of
Edinburgh in the late 18th century. Reid’s essays are dedicated to Stewart and to Reid’s
nephew Dr. James Gregory. Reid writes in the dedication to EIP that
“...if these Essays have any merit, you [i.e., Stewart and Gregory] have a
considerable share in it, having not only encouraged me to hope that they may be

91

useful, but favoured me with your observations on every part of them, both before
they were sent to the Press and while they were under it” (EIP 3)
Stewart was a student of Reid’s at Glasgow, himself an expert on the subjects in Reid’s
Essays, and a person who discussed the content of said essays with Reid in considerable
detail. Stewart, then, we can assume, is, at least, a respectable source concerning Reid’s
mature views. This point is relevant, here, because Stewart reports in 1792 that Reid
endorses the first argument (Stewart 2007, 133-134). It is unlikely, I suggest, that Stewart
would report that Reid endorses that argument, if Reid had given up or abandoned that
argument decades earlier.
The first developmental story, then, is not plausible. Perhaps there is a different
developmental story that might do the trick. On our second story, Reid gave up the claim
that the ability to understand artificial language makes conception of universals possible
before he published EIP and EAP in the 1780s. Here, Reid developed the first argument
no later than in 1764, and took on the commitment that artificial language makes
conceptions of universals, judgment, and reasoning possible sometime in the late 1760s,
but then perhaps noticed that that claim is incompatible with the presuppositions of his
first argument - perhaps, e.g., when he reconsidered his dispute with Hume on promising
in detail in 1779 - and, consequently, chose to keep the first argument and abandon his
claim that the ability to understand artificial language makes possible distinct conceptions
of universals and rationality. If this story is consistent with and even well supported by
the textual evidence, we have a way to absolve Reid of any responsibility for the prima
facie incompatibilities between his views.
There are, however, reasons to think that this story is implausible. First, recall that
there are two problems. First, Reid’s first argument is incompatible with his commitment
to the claim that artificial language is part of what makes conceptions of universals and
moral liberty possible. Second, Reid has difficulties accounting for the first performance
of the social operations. Our story does not help Reid with that second problem. Reid
gives his account of social operations in both EIP and EAP, so it is implausible to suggest
that he had given up his account of social operations later in his career. But note the story
cannot help with the first problem either. We have reasons to conclude Reid that
continued to claim that artificial language makes conceptions of universals possible - and
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thus that he was committed to holding that artificial language makes moral liberty
possible - when he composed his later essays. As I noted in part two, numerous passages
in EIP and EAP support the claim that Reid continued to hold that artificial language
makes conceptions of universals possible. There are passages in the Essays in which Reid
claims, e.g., that the process through which we first conceive universals involves learning
general words and that the culture of society is required for rationality and moral agency.
The textual evidence, then, supports the claim that Reid continued to hold the views that
are prima facie in conflict with his first argument right up until the end of his career.
There is a third suggestion to consider, which was made to me in conversation by
Lorne Falkenstein. This suggestion is of a different sort. We are not suggesting, here, that
a developmental story helps Reid avoid conflicts between his views. We are suggesting,
rather, that Reid might be saved by a sort of deus ex machina. The suggestion is that,
given Reid’s presumed commitment to theism and creationism, he may have believed
that God created the first humans - i.e., Adam and Eve - as mature adults in possession of
their rational and moral faculties and as in possession of innate ideas of social operations.
On this suggestion, Reid only held that subsequent human beings - so, e.g., Cain, Abel,
and so on - came into the world without an ability to reason or conceive social operations.
The suggestion, then, is that Reid’s theological commitments might render his account of
the first invention of artificial signs consistent with those of social operations and what
artificial language makes possible.
The suggestion is plausible. I think, in fact, Reid could pursue this line of defense.
It may offend contemporary sensibilities, but that is no reason to not attribute it to Reid. I
have my doubts, however, whether Reid would pursue this line of defense. To see why,
let’s consider Reid’s commitments on methodology and explanation, and also consider
the role that appeals to God play for him, given such commitments.
When it comes to methodology, Reid takes himself to be a committed Newtonian.
On Reid’s understanding of what that involves, we properly do philosophy or science by
first empirically observing many objects, events, or facts in the world, and then, second,
by reasoning inductively from those observed events or facts to discover general laws of
nature. We then explain particular facts and less general laws by reasoning deductively
from those most general laws of nature. His Newtonian methodology rules out appeals to
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hypotheses, in the sense that it rules about positing the existence of as yet unobserved or
undiscovered objects or facts and appealing to said facts when attempting to explain what
we do observe. If, e.g., you were to explain why the flowers bloom in spring by appeal to
the fact that there are flower fairies with the power to make flowers bloom that come
around in springtime, Reid, a committed Newtonian, would reject your explanation on
the grounds that we have not observed such flower fairies as constantly conjoined with
blooming flowers, much less reasoned inductively to a general law of nature which states
that flower fairies cause flowers to bloom.
What role do appeals to God play in Reid’s conception of philosophical method
and explanation? Simply put, God serves as the explanation for the known brute facts. I
know, e,g, through observation, that particular facts are what they are. I know, moreover,
through observation and inductive reasoning, that general laws of nature are what they
are. The existence of the world itself and the most general laws of nature are brute facts
that have no further philosophical explanation - i.e., there is no more general law of
nature from which those most general laws can be deduced and explained. Why are the
brute facts what they are? The answer is that God made the world that way. On this view,
God, to put the point suggestively, is the principle of sufficient reason personified. But
the point to note is that, on Reid’s methodology, God only serves to explain the already
known brute facts: faith and revelation do not supply us with knowledge of novel brute
facts not discovered to us via empirical observation and reasoning - at least, that is, they
do not supply us with new knowledge to which we can legitimately appeal when doing
proper philosophy. If one were to theorize on the supposition that God made something
the case, where that something is not already independently known by way of observation
and reasoning, then one would have adopted an hypothesis in a sense that Reid would
have regarded as illicit.
Now, the question is: if Reid were to adopt the third suggestion - i.e., if he were to
suppose that God created the first human beings with their full rational and moral powers
and innate ideas of social operations, to explain the first invention of artificial language would he violate his methodological commitments? I suggest he would. I suggest, then, it
is unlikely that Reid would have wished to adopt that suggestion.
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Are we to conclude, then, that Reid’s views were in tension with each other? It is
unlikely that Reid would have knowingly held incompatible views. Had he noticed either
of the two noted conflicts, he likely would, on reflection, have revised or rejected either
his first argument or his other commitments. How, then, are we to account for these
prima facie incompatibilities? I wrote, in the preface, that it is appropriately charitable to
attempt, first, to read Reid’s views as maximally internally coherent. But that principle of
charity can be taken too far: if one’s aim is to to understand what Reid actually thought,
one must remain open to the possibility that Reid held views that were in conflict with
each other. There are, inevitably, judgment calls to be made that concern how to best
balance the desire to read Reid as charitably as possible and the desire to read each
passage in Reid’s texts in as straightforward a manner as possible. I suggest that,, we
analyzed Reid’s views to a degree that is sufficient for us to have uncovered conflicts of
which Reid himself may not have been aware. It is also possible, of course, that Reid has
another response available to him that I have not yet considered.
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Chapter Four: Reid on Perception, Memory, and Imagination
In chapter four, I discuss Reid’s accounts of perception, memory, and imagination. I
build upon my results in chapter two - namely, our recognition that Reid thinks that
artificial language makes conceptions of universals and reasoning possible - to better
understand several aspects of his accounts of the three noted operations. In particular, I
argue Reid holds that we perform acts of perception, memory, and imagination before we
learn artificial language, and, consequently, that he holds that said acts do not essentially
involve the exercise of those abilities that the ability to understand artificial language
makes possible. I point out that Reid’s other commentators have not fully recognized that
key point, and that they have, consequently, failed to fully understand some related
details of his accounts of perception, memory, and imagination. Chapter four has four
sections. In section (4.1), I present the basics of Reid’s accounts of original perception,
acquired perception, memory, and imagination, in order to provide readers who lack
broad familiarity with Reid’s views the background information required for them to
follow and critically engage the discussions in later sections. In (4.2), I argue that Reid
holds that perception, memory, and imagination do not essentially involve distinct
conceptual content. In (4.3), I compare and contrast my claims in (4.2) with analogous
claims by Reid’s other commentators. In (4.4), I propose a novel reading of Reid’s
distinction between acquired perceptions and judgments made habitually on the occasion
of original and acquired perceptions.

4.1 The Basics of Reid on Perception, Memory, and
Imagination
In this section, I present the basics of Reid’s accounts of original perception, acquired
perception, memory, and imagination. I do not aim to make controversial claims, but
instead to present the basics of Reid’s accounts of these operations in ways to which
other commentators would not reasonably object.
The first point that needs to be made, here, concerns all three operations. Reid
himself points to one key difference between his accounts of perception, memory, and
imagination, and the accounts of said operations by his predecessors and contemporaries.

96

On Reid’s telling of the history of philosophy, all other philosophers - with perhaps the
exception of Antoine Arnauld (EIP 165) - held that acts of perception, memory, and
imagination are intentional mental acts that are directed at objects that exist in the mind,
which objects function as representations of the objects that ordinary folks naively take
such acts to be immediately directed at. On the view he attributes to others, e.g., when
one perceives a chair, the immediate object of the act is an object in the mind that is a
representation of the chair, and the chair itself is but only a mediate object of the
perception that is, in some sense or another, perceived by means of the mind’s immediate
awareness of said mental representation. Likewise, on the view Reid attributes to others,
when one remembers a chair that one perceived yesterday, the immediate object of the
memory is but a presently existing mental representation of that past chair, rather than
that chair itself; and when one imagines a chair, the immediate object of the act of
imagination is but a presently existing mental representation of a possible chair. The
point, here, is not that Reid was ultimately correct to attribute that representationalist
theory to all his predecessors and contemporaries; the point, rather, is that Reid rejected
that theory. To illustrate, consider a few choice passages:
“Perception, as we here understand it, hath always an object distinct from the act
by which it is perceived; an object which may exist whether it be perceived or not.
I perceive a tree that grows before my window; there is here an object which is
perceived, and an act of the mind by which it is perceived, and these two are not
only distinguishable, but they are extremely unlike in their natures. The object is
made up of a trunk, branches, and leaves; but the act of the mind by which it is
perceived hath neither trunk, branches, nor leaves” (IHM 168)
“Philosophers tell me, that the immediate object of my memory … is not the past
[object], but an idea of it, an image, phantasm, or species… that this idea now
exists in my mind, or in my sensorium; and the mind contemplating this present
idea, finds in it a representation of what is past, or of what may exist; and
accordingly calls it memory… Upon the strictest attention, memory appears to me
to have things that are past, and not present ideas, for its object” (IHM 28)
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“Memory must have an object. Every man who remembers must remember
something, and that which he remembers is called the object of his
rememberance…The object of memory, or thing remembered, must be something
that is past; as the object of perception and of consciousness must be something
which is present: What is now, cannot be an object of memory; neither can that
which is past and gone be an object of perception or of consciousness” (EIP 253)
“The philosopher says, I cannot conceive a centaur without having an idea of it in
my mind. I am at a loss to understand what he means… what then is this idea? Is
it an animal, half horse and half man? No. Then I am certain that it is not the thing
I conceive. Perhaps he will say, that the idea is an image of the animal, and is the
immediate object of my conception, and that the animal is the mediate or remote
object.
To this I answer: First, I am certain there are not two objects of this
conception, but one only; and that one is as immediate an object of my conception
as any can be.
Secondly, This one object which I conceive, is not the image of an animal,
it is an animal. I know what it is to conceive an image of an animal, and what it is
to conceive an animal; and I can distinguish the one of these from the other
without any danger of mistake. The thing I conceive is a body of a certain figure
and colour, having life and spontaneous motion” (EIP 321-322)
Reidian perceptions are about external material objects that now exist, Reidian memories
are about objects that existed in the past, and Reidian acts of imagining are about objects
conceived without any regard for their actual existence. With that point made clear, let us
survey the key details of Reid’s accounts of each of these operations.
Let’s begin with Reid’s account of perception. Reid distinguishes original
perception from acquired perception. First, let’s consider the former. On Reid’s account,
an act of original perception is a complex act, in the sense that it involves a number of
distinct constituent parts and/or constant or necessary concomitants. There are four
distinct sorts of things involved in normal cases of Reidian original perception: (i) a
material impression, (ii) a sensation, (iii) a conception of the object that is perceived, and
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(iv) a belief in the present existence of that object. In what follows, I present the basics of
Reid’s accounts of each of these four things.
The material impression is a bodily state. When one perceives an object via the
senses, the perceived object causes or occasions a change in one’s sense organs, nerves,
and brain. The material impression, here, just is a bodily state that results from that
change. To clarify, consider some simple examples of original perceptions: I touch a
coffee cup with my hand, and the cup contacts my skin, thereby occasioning a change in
my skin, nerves, and brain; I look at a coffee cup, and light reflecting off the surface of
the perceived object strikes my retina, and thereby occasions some change in my retina,
nerves and brain. In both these examples, the material impression is just a bodily state
that results from the noted changes.
The material impression occasions a sensation. The sensation is an operation of
the mind; it is, moreover, a non-intentional operation, in the sense that it is not about any
object that is distinct from itself. The mind is conscious of all its sensations, and the
intrinsic nature of each sensation is exhaustively determined by that sensation’s
phenomenal character - each sensation, that is, is nothing more than what it is felt to be.
The fact that material impressions of particular sorts happen to occasion sensations of
particular sorts is contingent and grounded in hardwired facts about the mind’s
constitution: the material impression that a coffee cup makes, e.g., is followed by a
sensation of a particular sort rather than any other, solely in virtue of the fact that God
“wired up” the human mind in the way that God did.
The sensation signifies the object perceived. If one recalls Reid’s taxonomy of
natural signs discussed in section (3.2), one recalls that the sensations involved in acts of
original perception are third class natural signs - i.e., signs that signify objects by what
Reid calls “a natural kind of magic”. Different types of sensations signify individuals
with different sorts of features; once again, the fact that sensations of one particular sort
happen to signify features of objects of another particular sort is wholly contingent and
grounded in facts about the mind’s constitution. A heat sensation signifies a particular
sort of state of a material body, e.g., but it could have signified a different sort of state, or,
indeed, it could have signified nothing at all.
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The conception is a thought of the object that is signified by the sensation.8 Note,
however, that different types of conceptions follow different types of sensations. In some
cases, e.g., the sensation prompts what Reid calls a “direct conception” of the perceived
object’s features; in other cases, the sensation prompts what Reid calls a “relative
conception” of that object’s features. The key difference is this: with relative conceptions,
a feature is conceived merely as it relates to something else; whereas with direct
conceptions, a feature is conceived as it is in itself. In the case of the relative conceptions
involved in original perception, the feature of the object perceived is conceived relative to
the sensation that signifies it. To clarify, let’s consider examples. Suppose you touch a
hot stove element and thereby perceive it to be hot. Here, the heat is conceived relative to
that sensation, and is not itself made known; the heat is conceived, rather, as something
like “that unknown feature of the object that is the cause or occasion of this sensation in
me”. Although scientific investigation may lead us to discover that heat is molecular
kinetic energy, the nature of heat is not conceived or otherwise made known when we
originally perceive it. Next, let’s consider an example of a direct conception: suppose I
touch the surface of a table with my hand and thereby perceive it to be flat. On Reid’s
account, I conceive the flatness as it is, and not merely as something like “that unknown
feature of the table that occasions this sensation in me”. To clarify, it might help some
readers to note that, on Reid’s account, in acts of original perception, we have direct
conceptions of features that philosophers commonly call “primary qualities”, whereas we
have relative conceptions of features that they commonly call “secondary qualities”.9
Shape, hardness, and size, e.g., are typically counted as primary qualities, whereas
temperature, colour, and sound, are typically counted as secondary qualities.
To sum up: on Reid’s account, original perceptions involve a material impression,
a sensation, and a conception. Now, note that they involve a fourth thing: the conception
is accompanied by a belief in the present existence of the object as conceived. One not
8

One qualification: in normal cases of original perception, Reid holds that the sensation signifies the object
conceived, there is, however, one non-normal case. Reid holds that in original perceptions via the sense of
sight of the location and figure of objects, no sensation is involved, but instead only a material impression,
a conception, and a belief. In that one case, the conception and belief is not triggered by a sensation, but
instead by the occurrence of the material impression.
9

See McKitrick (2002) for a good discussion of Reid’s account of the primary/secondary quality
distinction as well as of various exegetical issues on that topic debated in the literature.
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only conceives the stove element to be hot, but also believes it to exist and to be hot;
likewise, one not only conceives the surface of the table to be flat, but also believes it to
exist and to be flat. The conception and belief are distinct: it is one thing to conceive an
object as having a feature, but another to believe that object exists and has that conceived
feature. One cannot have a belief without a conception, as one cannot believe that
something exists and has some feature unless one conceives it as having that feature, but
one can nevertheless conceive an individual as having some feature without also having
any belief about its existence. In original perception, however, on Reid’s account, the
conception is accompanied by a belief. The fact that a belief is involved in original
perception is a contingent fact grounded in the mind’s hardwired constitution: God just
“wired us up” such that, when originally perceiving, we believe in the existence of what
we conceive. These beliefs are not conclusions of any chain of reasoning; they are, rather,
results of some hardwired mental reflex being triggered by the occurrence of the material
impression, sensation, and conception.
We now have a rough understanding of Reidian original perception. Now, note
that Reid distinguishes original perception from acquired perception. The difference is
roughly this: Reidian original perceptions are not results of prior experiences, whereas
acquired perceptions are results of prior experiences. To clarify: recall that in original
perception, the move from sensation to conception of and belief in the existence of the
object is grounded in facts about the mind’s innate constitution; and now note that, in
acquired perception, in contrast, the move from sign to conception of and belief in the
existence of the thing signified, is grounded in the fact that one has had certain prior
experiences. In acquired perception, the sign is an object of original perception - or,
perhaps in some cases, a sensation involved in such an act - and it signifies “whatever has
always been found connected with it” in one’s past experience (EIP 236). To clarify, let’s
consider one of our previous examples. When one sees - i.e., perceives via the sense of
sight - a hot red stove element, one originally perceives the element only as red, but not
also as hot. That original perception, however, might well prompt one to conceive and
believe the element to be not only red but also hot, in virtue of one’s past experience of
the repeated conjunction of red stove elements and felt sensations of heat. In the past, the
story goes, one repeatedly saw red stove elements and felt them to be hot at the same
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time. In virtue of those past experiences, one acquired a habit in virtue of which one now
conceives as hot the red stove elements that one merely sees, and believes said elements
to be hot. In such cases, on Reid’s account, one has an acquired perception of the heat of
the red stove element via the sense of sight.
Next, let’s consider the basics of Reid’s account of memory. There are two things
involved in Reidian memories: a conception and a belief. The conception is of an object
that the mind previously perceived - or, of course, of something of which the mind was
previously conscious, if the thing is remembered is a past modification of one’s own
mind. The belief, however, is a belief in the past existence of the thing conceived, rather
than its present existence. As in original perception, the belief in memory is not a
conclusion of reasoning, but is instead an act triggered by a mental reflex built into the
mind’s innate constitution: we just are wired up such that we immediately believe in the
past existence of the things we remember.
Last, let’s consider Reid’s account of imagination. There is one thing involved in
cases of Reidian imagination: a conception of the imagined object. The conception, here,
is not accompanied by any sensation or any belief in the existence of the object
conceived. It is important to note, however, Reid holds that imagination is just one
species of conception: a conception in general is an act that is, broadly put, a thought
about an object that is distinct from the act itself, whereas an act of imagination is more
specifically a conception of such an object, as that object would appear to the senses if it
were perceived - and, even more specifically, as it would appear if perceived by the sense
of sight. An imagined object, of course, need not be an object that one has previously
perceived: one might, e.g., imagine an object such as a gold mountain or a centaur.
However, recall that Reid is a concept empiricist: on his account, all the things we can
but conceive or imagine are either simples, or objects composed of simples, that were
first conceived via the exercise of a faculty distinct from that of conception or
imagination. Consider an example: if I have seen something that is gold, and if I have
seen something that is a mountain, then I have in my conceptual repertoire, as it were, the
conceptions gold and mountain, and can now conceive and imagine a gold mountain.
Consider another: if I have seen one person’s head, and if I have seen another person’s
body, then I can conceive and imagine the one person’s head as attached to the other
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person’s body. In both of these examples, the simpler parts of which the more complex
imagined object is composed, are parts of things previously conceived via some earlier
act of perception. There is, of course, a question to ask here about the nature of these
simples out of which conceived or imagined objects are composed: are they universals,
abstract particulars, or merely substantial parts of objects that one previously perceived? I
address this question in the next section.
To close this section, it is worth asking a clarificatory question: is there any
qualitative difference, on Reid’s account, between what it’s like to perceive an object,
what it’s like to remember that object, and what it’s like to imagine an object with
features identical to those of that object? On Reid’s account, there are differences. The
experience of perceiving, on his account, is different than that of remembering, and this
is, at least in part, because the memory does not involve a sensation of the sort involved
in perception. A further difference between the phenomenology of perception and
memory on the one hand and imagination on the other, moreover, is grounded in the fact
that imagination does not involve a belief in the past or present existence of the object.
To get clear on what exactly Reidian sensations, conceptions, and beliefs are, it helps to
take a little bit of time to do the following introspective experiment, in which one attends
to the phenomenological differences between one’s perceptions, memories, and
imaginings. First, look at an object sitting on a table in front of you, such as a coffee cup.
Next, close your eyes and remember that same cup. Last, remove the cup from the table,
open your eyes, and imagine a cup with the very same features as that object. When I do
this, I can note clear differences between the phenomenology of these experiences. On
Reid’s account, these differences are partly explained by the presence or absence of the
sensations and beliefs. If one attends to these phenomenological differences, one can presuming that Reid’s views are not incoherent - get clear on what Reid is referring to
when he speaks of conceptions, sensations, and beliefs that are involved in perception,
memory, and imagination.
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4.2 Reid on Distinct Conceptual Content
In this section, I ask: does Reid hold that perception, memory, and imagination
essentially involve distinct conceptual content? In what follows, I argue that the answer is
“no”. To begin, let’s get clear on the question.
First, what is meant by “essentially involves”? I say a type of operation essentially
involves distinct conceptual content if and only if every token of that type of operation
involves distinct conceptual content.
Second, what is meant by “distinct conceptual content”? I follow Folescu (2018)
in using this phrase. It is not used by Reid himself, so work needs to be done to clarify a
genuinely Reidian sense of that phrase - if, that is, we are to succeed in using it to ask a
genuine exegetical issue. Folescu explains her use it this way: operations essentially
involve distinct conceptual content if and only if they “essentially involve conceptual
descriptions in order to present [their] objects to the [subject]” (Folescu 2018, 222). But
what does that mean? And how can we make sense of this notion within Reid’s
conceptual framework? There is literature on Reid’s accounts of the conceptions involved
in acts of perception, memory, and imagination. One strategy pursued by some of Reid’s
commentators is to import analogous contemporary distinctions back into Reid, such as,
e.g., Bertrand Russell’s distinction between conception by acquaintance and conception
by description. On Russell’s version of that distinction, what distinguishes a conception
by acquaintance from a conception by description is that the former, unlike the later, is a
non-conceptual thought about the object - i.e., one does not think the object as falling
under some general concept - but involves the object being directly presented, in some
sense or another, to the mind. If this distinction were imported back in Reid, the claim
would be that Reidian conceptions that possess distinct conceptual content just are
Russellian conceptions by description, whereas Reidian conceptions with indistinct
content are conceptions by acquaintance. It is understandable for one to choose to pursue
that strategy when trying to make sense of Reid’s views. If, however, we are to get clear
on Reid’s own views, we need to avoid anachronistically importing such distinctions
back into Reid, and instead work to get clear on this notion of distinct conceptual content
by way of working from Reid’s own technical distinctions. In what follows, I present an
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interpretation of what it means, for a Reidian, to say a perception, memory, or imagining
involves distinct conceptual content.
First, note that, on Reid’s account, things that are perceived, remembered, and
imagined are individual substances. On Reid’s account, moreover, such substances are
conceived relative to their conceived features. A substance is, that is, is conceived as
something like “that otherwise unknown thing that is the metaphysical subject of these
conceived features”. On Reid’s account, e.g., your coffee cup is conceived by you
roughly as that unknown thing that is the metaphysical subject of its various conceived
features, such as its shape, colour, and weight. What the substance of the cup is in itself,
on this view, is wholly unknown to you. The features of the cup, on Reid’s view, may be
conceived via direct conceptions or relative conceptions: but, in either case, the substance
is conceived relative to its conceived features. So we need to get clear on, first, what it
means, on Reid’s account, to say that we conceive features of individuals more or less
distinctly, and, then, we can proceed to get clear on what it means to say that we conceive
individuals more or less distinctly relative to said features.
First, let’s get clear on the degrees to which Reid holds that one can conceive a
feature of an individual more or less distinctly. To conceive something distinctly, on his
account, is just to conceive it as not confused with anything else: i.e., one conceives the
one thing as different from the other, instead of conceiving both as a single confused and
undifferentiated whole. On Reid’s account, moreover, all things we conceive are either
individual substances or the features of such substances.10 There are, then, on Reid’s
account, two types of things one might conceive a feature of an individual as confused
with: its metaphysical subject or other features. Consequently, the most confused
conception of a feature is one in which that feature is conceived as confused with not
only the individual substance of which it is a feature but also with that individual’s other
features. I’m not clear on whether, on Reid’s account, it is possible to conceive a feature
as distinct from one of those things while at the same time not also the other. But that is a
bit beside the point: insofar as a feature is conceived as confused with its metaphysical
subject, that subject’s other features, or both, we will say the conception of that feature
10

There are exceptions: space and time. Reid writes that he does not quite know what to make of space and
time, as they are neither things nor features of things. See EIP 217-225.

105

involves indistinct conceptual content. A more distinct conception of a feature, then, is
one in which one conceives it not only as distinct from the individual substance of which
it is a feature but also as distinct from that individual’s other features. However, there is
an important distinction to draw here. One may conceive the feature as a token of some
distinctly conceived universal type: i.e., one may conceive the feature as an instantiation
of a distinctly conceived universal, or one may fail to do so. It is one thing to conceive
the colour of an object as distinct from that object’s other features, but it is another thing
to conceive that colour as an instantiation of some distinctly conceived universal. The
distinction, here, is the distinction I drew in part two: it is one thing to conceive a feature
as an abstract particular, but another thing to conceive that feature as a token instantiation
of a distinctly conceived universal.
The point to note going forward is this: different cases involve conceptual content
of different degrees of distinctness. Those cases that involve a conception of a feature as
a token instantiation of a conceived universal are said to involve fully distinct conceptual
content, whereas those cases that involve conceptions of features as abstract particulars
are said to involve partly distinct conceptual content, whereas the other cases are said to
involve indistinct conceptual content.
Next, let’s get clear on the ways in which individual substances can be conceived
more or less distinctly relative to their various conceived features. The suggested view,
here, is that, on Reid’s account, individuals are conceived more or less distinctly,
depending on the degree to which their conceived features are conceived more or less
distinctly. A point of clarification: on this reading, it is not all or nothing. One might, that
is, conceive an individual substance, and, in doing so, conceive some of its features fully
distinctly, some partly distinctly, some indistinctly, and, of course, one might simply fail
to conceive some of its features at all. It is not always possible to say, then, on my
reading, that one conception of an individual is, on the whole, more or less distinct than
another conception of that same individual: one conception of an individual, that is,
might be more distinct in some one respect, but also less distinct in another. Nevertheless,
it is quite possible for us to lay down some clear distinctions between the different ways
in which individuals can be conceived more or less distinctly. In what follows, I present
and explain each of these cases.
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First, there are those cases in which an individual is conceived as confused not
only with its features, but also as confused with another individual or individuals. In this
case, one does not distinguish the individual and those other conceived individuals, but
instead conceives both or all of them - and, of course, their various indistinctly conceived
features - as one undifferentiated whole. Second, there are those cases in which an
individual is conceived as distinct from other individuals, but nevertheless as confused
with all of its conceived features. Here, the individual is conceived as an undifferentiated
whole, with no difference conceived between the metaphysical subject and the features.
Conceptions of individuals in either of these two cases are ones that, on this terminology,
involve indistinct conceptual content.
Second, there are those cases in which an individual is conceived as distinct from
not only other individuals but also from some of its own features. In this sort of case,
however, all features conceived as distinct from their subject are conceived as abstract
particulars, rather than as token instantiations of distinctly conceived universals. The
conceptions of individuals in this second type of case are, on my terminology, said to
involve partly distinct conceptual content.
Third, there are those cases that involve distinct conceptual content. Simply put,
these cases are those that involve conceptions of at least some features as instantiated
universals. There are, however, two different types of cases that involve distinct
conceptual content. First, there are those cases in which an individual is conceived not
only as distinct from all other individuals and as distinct from some of its conceived
features, but also in which at least some but not all of its conceived features are
conceived as instantiated universals. Second, there are those cases in which an individual
is conceived not only as distinct from all other individuals and as distinct from its
conceived features, but also in which all of its conceived features - which is not to say all
of its features, as some of its features may simply be unconceived - are conceived as
instantiated universals, rather than as indistinct features or abstract particulars. This last
sort of case, uniquely, does not involve any indistinct content at all. This last sort of case
is perhaps most analogous to what Bertrand Russell called “conception by description”;
whereas all of the other cases involve, at least in part, conceptions that are perhaps more
analogous to what Russell called “conception by acquaintance”. It is important, however,
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that we do not follow that analogy so far as to think that our Reidian distinctions just are
Russellian distinctions - they are, after all, only analogous - and that we remain working
within our Reidian framework.
We are now clear on the meaning of “essentially involve” and “distinct
conceptual content”. So we now understand my claim: on Reid’s account, perception,
memory, and imagination do not essentially involve distinct conceptual content. In what
follows here in chapter four, I present several arguments for that claim. After doing so, I
offer two qualifications to the claim, which are, I suggest, required for it to be consistent
with all of Reid’s texts. Third, I respond to an important objection. Fourth, I survey the
literature, to contrast my views with the analogous views of Reid’s other commentators,
and thereby to make clear the novelty of my conclusions. Fifth, I discuss an exegetical
issue discussed in the literature on Reid’s account of acquired perception.
What is my main argument? First, recall I argued in part two that Reid holds that
we possess a set of mental abilities that are either innate or acquired without any
exposure to the culture of society, and that it is in virtue of the fact that we have said
abilities that it is possible for us to engage with the culture of society such that we acquire
the ability to understand artificial language, which in turn makes it possible for us to
conceive and to recall universals, to judge, to reason, and to possess epistemic rationality
and moral agency. My main argument goes quite simply as follows: (i) Reid holds that
we can perceive, remember and imagine prior to learning artificial language, and (ii) Reid
holds that conceptions of universals are possible only after learning artificial language;
therefore, (iii) Reid is committed to the claim that perception, memory, and imagination
do not essentially involve distinct conceptual content. The basic idea here is that, if one
cannot as yet conceive universals, then one cannot yet distinctly conceive the features of
the individuals that one perceives, remembers, and imagines.
The argument has a premise for which I have not yet argued: Reid thinks that we
perceive, remember, and imagine prior to learning artificial language. There are reasons
to accept this premise. I give three such reasons in what follows. The third is perhaps the
strongest: it is, quite simply, that there are passages in Reid’s texts in which he claims
that these acts are performed by infants and other creatures - such as, e.g., animals - who
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have not yet learnt artificial language. Before presenting those passages, however, I first
offer two additional reasons.
Now, the first reason is not directly for the claim that Reid thinks that perception,
memory, and imagination are possible before artificial language, but rather more directly
for the claim that they are possible before we can exercise the power of abstraction. This
reason, however, serves my argumentative aims just as well. Note the order in which
Reid presents his essays in EIP as well as Reid’s stated reason for ordering them in that
way. The order is as follows: after (i) a preliminary essay in which Reid defines his terms
and characterizes his project and methodology, Reid includes (ii) an essay on perception,
(iii) an essay on memory, (iv) an essay on conception and imagination, (v) an essay on
abstraction, (vi) an essay on judgment, and (vii) an essay on reasoning. What are Reid’s
reasons for sequencing the essays in this way? At the start of essay two, Reid writes:
“Of all the operations of our minds, the perception of external objects is the most
familiar. The senses come to maturity even in infancy, when other powers have
not yet sprung up. They are common to us with brute animals, and furnish us with
the objects about which our other powers are most frequently employed” (EIP 71)
Then, at the start of essay three, Reid writes:
“In the gradual progress of man, from infancy to maturity, there is a certain order
in which his faculties are unfolded, and this seems to be the best order we can
follow in treating of them… The external senses appear first; memory soon
follows, which we are now to consider” (EIP 253)
Reid says he sequences the essays in EIP as he does, because he discusses the powers of
the mind in the order in which they first arise in that process through which the mind
grows from infancy to maturity. The senses come first and are common to us and other
animals, memory comes a bit later, and then the rest of the operations follow sometime
after that. These passages make sense only if Reid’s view is that acts of perception and
memory - if not also imagination - are powers that the mind exercises before it acquires
the powers of abstraction, judgment, and reasoning.
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The second reason concerns Reid’s account of the process through which children
first learn artificial language. Recall that, on that account, certain powers are required for
us to be able to acquire the ability to conceive universals, and, consequently, cannot
themselves essentially involve distinct conceptual content. I do not argue, here, that
imagination - or even, for that matter, memory - are involved in that process, as Reid’s
explanation of that account is too incomplete for me to argue for such claims effectively.
But Reid clearly holds that we perceive things - such as, e.g., signs of natural language prior to learning artificial language, just because he holds that the ability to understand
natural linguistic signs is part of what makes it possible for us to learn artificial language.
Reid’s account, moreover, is one on which children observe the use that members of their
community make of artificial linguistic signs, and are thereby trained to habitually
associate types of features with types of artificial signs. It would appear, then, on his
account, that a child could not learn to understand artificial linguistic signs - and, thus,
cannot come to conceive universals - unless the child can already perceive features of
individuals and signs. Reid’s account of the process through which children first learn
artificial language, then, is one on which children can perceive before they learn artificial
language. It appears clear, then, that Reid holds that acts of perception do not essentially
involve distinct conceptual content.
Third, there is the direct textual evidence. Reid asserts in MS 2131/4/I/31, MS
2131/4/I/29, MS 2131/4/I/20, EIP, and EAP, that perception, memory and imagination
are possible before learning artificial language. I cite and discuss just two passages here.
One passage that concerns memory and imagination is:
“It may be doubted, whether children, when their imagination first begins to
work, can distinguish what they barely conceive from what they remember. I have
been told by a man of knowledge and observation, that one of his sons, very often
told lies with great assurance, without any intention, as far as appeared, or any
consciousness of guilt. From which the father concluded, that it is natural to some
children to lie. I am rather inclined to think, that the child had no intention to
deceive, but mistook the rovings of his own fancy, for things which he
remembered. This, however, I take to be very uncommon, after children can
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communicate their sentiments by language, though perhaps not so in a more early
period” (EIP 298-299)
In this passage, Reid notes that young children often confuse what they merely imagine
with what they remember. He says, moreover, that this is probably uncommon after
children learn to communicate by means of language, but not so before they learn to
communicate by means of language. This implies that Reid thinks children likely - or at
least possibly - remember and imagine before learning artificial language. If he believes
that such acts essentially involve distinct conceptual content, he would not think it
possible, much less likely, that children perform such acts before learning such language.
Another passage that concerns to imagination is:
“We have not means of knowing how the fancy is employed in infants. Their time
is divided between the employment of their senses and sound sleep: So that there
is little time left for imagination, and the materials it has to work upon are
probably very scanty. A few days after they are born, sometimes a few hours, we
see them smile in their sleep. But what they smile at is not easy to guess; for they
do not smile at anything they see, when awake, for some months after they are
born. It is likewise common to see them move their lips in sleep, as if they were
sucking.
These things seem to discover some working of the imagination, but there
is no reason to think that there is any regular train of thought in the mind.
By a regular train of thought, I mean that which has a beginning, a middle,
and an end, an arrangement of parts, according to some rule, or with some
intention. Thus, the conception of a design, and of the means of executing it; the
conception of a whole, and the number and order of the parts. These are instances
of the most simple trains of thought that can be called regular…
Such trains of thought discover themselves in children about two years of
age. They can give attention to the operations of older children in making their
little houses, and ships, and other such things, in imitation in the works of men.
They are then capable of understanding a little of language, which shows both a
regular train of thinking, and some degree of abstraction. I think we may perceive
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a distinction between those faculties of children of two or three years of age, and
those of the more sagacious brutes. They can then perceive design and regularity
in the works of others” (EIP 340-341)
In this passage, Reid claims it is likely infants imagine objects before they learn artificial
language. If Reid thought that acts of imagination essentially involve distinct content,
then he would likely argue that such children are not capable of acts of imagination at
that early stage of their cognitive development. But Reid does not argue that. This
passage makes it quite clear, then, Reid holds that acts of imagination do not essentially
involve distinct conceptual content.
To clarify, note that, given Reid’s concept empiricism discussed in part three, it is
presumably his view that an infant cannot imagine an object, unless they are capable of
analyzing the individuals presented to them via perception into their component parts,
and then subsequently recombining those parts into some new object. Someone might
argue, moreover, that those parts must be distinct conceptions of the features of the
objects that the infant previously perceived, because the infant could conceive those
features as features of a different individual only if they could conceive them as
universals. If this reasoning is correct, there would be a clear problem with my reading.
But there is no such problem. To understand why, we need only distinguish two senses in
which one can talk about the parts of an individual. First, we can talk about conceptual
parts. The conceptual parts of an individual include the universals instantiated in that
individual as features. Second, we can talk about substantial parts. The substantial parts,
in contrast, include the simpler individual substances of which the complex individual is
composed. A brick, e.g., is a substantial part of a brick wall, whereas the shape of the
wall is but a conceptual part of that wall. It is true, on my reading, that Reid holds that
one can distinctly conceive the conceptual parts of individuals only if one understands
artificial language. But it is not true, on my reading, that Reid holds that one cannot
distinctly conceive the substantial parts of individuals - in the sense of conceiving each
substantial part as distinct from the other substantial parts - without artificial language.
To clarify, consider the examples discussed earlier: (i) if I have seen something that is
gold, and if I have seen something that is a mountain, then I have in my conceptual
repertoire, as it were, the conceptions gold and mountain, and, therefore, can now
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conceive and imagine a gold mountain; (ii) if I have seen one person’s head, and if I have
seen another person’s body, then I can conceive and imagine the one head attached to the
other person’s body. In both examples, the simpler parts of which the imagined object is
composed were parts of other individuals. But the two examples involve different kinds
of parts. In the first, the parts are conceptual parts; in the second, the parts are substantial
parts. On my reading, Reidian pre-linguistic acts of imagination are conceptions of
individuals that are composed of the substantial parts of previously perceived individuals,
whereas post-linguistic acts of imagination are conceptions of individuals composed of
either substantial parts, conceptual parts, or even of both substantial and conceptual parts
of previously perceived individuals.
Last, I will complete my argument by pointing out that although the last quoted
passage concerns only the act of imagination, it provides evidence for my claim that Reid
holds that acts of perception and memory are possible prior to learning artificial
language. Recall that Reid says, in the passages I quoted when giving the first reason, that
perception and memory are the first powers that are exerted by the mind. On his account,
then, those powers are exerted before the power of imagination. It follows, then, from the
fact Reid says that infants can imagine prior to learning artificial language, that Reid
holds that infants can perceive and remember prior to learning artificial language. The
last quoted passage, then, supports my claim that Reid thinks that infants also perceive
and remember prior to learning artificial language.
The textual evidence, then, supports my claim that Reid thinks acts of perception,
memory, and imagination occur before learning artificial language and, consequently,
supports my claim that Reid holds that they do not essentially involve distinct conceptual
content. Before going on, let’s review what that means. I claim Reid holds that these
three acts do not essentially involve conceptions of individual objects in which either: (a)
the individual is conceived not only as distinct from all other individuals and as distinct
from at least some of its conceived features, but also in which at least some but not all of
its features are conceived as token instantiations of conceived universals; or (ii) the
individual is conceived not only as distinct from all other individuals and from its own
conceived features, but also in which all of its conceived features are conceived as token
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instantiations of conceived universals. With that made clear, let’s discuss clarifications to
that claim. In what follows, I make three clarifications.
First, on my reading, Reid holds that the noted operations do not essentially
involve distinct conceptual content, but also holds that said operations can and most often
do - in mature people - involve some distinct conceptual content. Reid only holds that
pre-linguistic perceptions, memories, and imagings - i.e., acts performed prior to learning
artificial language - involve only indistinct (and perhaps partly distinct) content, but also
holds that people who have learnt artificial language and thereby acquired the ability to
conceive universals can, and most often if not always do, conceive at least some of the
features of the individuals that they perceive, remember, and imagine as instantiated
universals. On my reading, however, Reid does not hold that post-linguistic acts of
perception, memory, and imagination involve only distinct conceptual content. Quite the
contrary: on my reading, Reid holds that the post-linguistic acts most often - if not even
always - involve at least some indistinct or partly distinct conceptual content. Consider,
e.g., the following passage:
“I believe indeed we may have an indistinct perception of resemblance, without
knowing wherein it lies. I may see a resemblance between one face and another,
where I cannot distinctly say in what feature they resemble: But by analysing the
two faces, and comparing feature with feature, I may form a distinct notion of that
which is common to both…
There is therefore an indistinct notion of resemblance when we compare
the objects only in gross; and this I believe brute animals may have” (EIP 403)
By attending to this passage - as well as the others like it - we can see Reid holds that
perceptions - in mature people such as himself - can often involve a mix of distinct and
indistinct content. Reid holds, of course, that mature humans such as himself can analyze
the individuals presented to them via perception, and thereby come to distinctly conceive
their features as token instantiations of universals. But he does not hold that we always
conceive all of their conceived features as such. Reidian individuals are complex sets of
universals instantiated in a metaphysical subject, and he thinks we distinctly conceive
features as instantiated universals, but only if we understand general terms that signify
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them. It is a bit unlikely, I suggest, that my linguistically acquired conceptual repertoire is
richly varied enough for me to distinctly conceive every single aspect of the individual
substances that I have ever conceived.
Why does this first clarification make my reading consistent with Reid’s texts?
There are many passages in which Reid appears to straightforwardly say of some
perception, memory, or imagination, that it involves distinct conceptual content. Without
this clarification, then, any number of those might be thought to speak against my
reading. But they do not. There are also many passages in which Reid appears to
straightforwardly say of some perception, memory, or imagination that it involves at least
some indistinct conceptual content. On my reading, Reid thinks perception, memory, and
imagination can each involve a mix of distinct and indistinct conceptual content. Such
passages, then, are all consistent with my reading.
Second, on my reading, Reid holds that we can conceive individuals in ways that
involve only distinct conceptual content. This is to say that there are cases in which we
conceive an individual, and in which all the individual’s conceived features are distinctly
conceived. Of course, these are not cases in which all of an individual’s features are
conceived distinctly - we rarely, if indeed ever, conceive every single aspect of an
individual - but rather cases in which all of the individual’s features that are conceived
are conceived distinctly. To clarify, consider an example: a person describes an
individual using artificial linguistic signs, and does so in enough detail for their
description to apply to that one single individual only; you understand what that person
said, and you thereby distinctly conceive that one individual that they described. The only
features of the individual that you conceive, here, are features signified to you by general
words the person used to describe that individual. This is, then, a case in which one
conceives an individual and conceives all that object’s conceived features as instantiated
universals. There are many passages in which Reid says that we have conceptions of this
sort. It is important, then, that I do not deny Reid thinks such cases occur. The only claim
that I mean to deny is that Reid holds that perception, memory, and imagination
essentially involve such fully distinct conceptions. On his account, rather, individuals
perceived, remembered, and imagined, are first presented to us as indistinct wholes, and
the mind can then go to work on said objects so as to analyze and thereby come to
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distinctly conceive any number of their various features, and it is able to do that
analytical work only insofar as it possesses a repertoire of distinct conceptions of
universals it acquired by coming to understand general words. Reid holds, moreover, that
this analysis of objects of perception, memory, and imagination is rarely complete in
humans, and, consequently, that said acts usually - if not in fact always - involve some
amount of indistinct or at least partly distinct conceptual content.
Third, I need to clarify Reid’s account of the beliefs included in acts of perception
and memory. Why do I need to clarify this? Even if one accepts my claim that the
conceptions involved in perception and memory do not essentially involve distinct
conceptual content, one might nevertheless argue that the beliefs must involve such
content. One might claim Reid holds that the conception supplies a sort of imagistic
acquaintance with the object, but the belief is an act in which the object thus conceived is
then subsumed under some general concept or category. In response, I note, first, that the
evidence that I gave in this section concerned not only the conceptions that are involved
in perception and memory, but rather concerned those operations as wholes. I argued, that
is, that Reid holds that acts of perception and memory do not essentially involve distinct
conceptual content; I did not merely argue that the conceptions involved in those acts do
not essentially involve such content. Insofar as Reid is clear that beliefs are essentially
involved in acts of perception and memory, then I have argued that such beliefs do not
essentially involve distinct conceptual content.
However, a few things stand in need of further clarification. If, e.g., Reid holds
that beliefs essentially involved in perception and memory are de re judgments, there is
an apparent conflict between Reid’s account of judgment and his claim that perception
and memory are possible before learning artificial language. However, the conflict is only
apparent. To see why, consider the following passage from EIP:
“In persons come to years of understanding, judgment necessarily accompanies
all sensation, perception by the senses, consciousness, and memory, but not
conception.
I restrict this to persons come to years of understanding, because it may be
a question, whether infants, in the first period of life, have any judgment or belief
at all. The same question may be put with regard to brutes and some idiots. This
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question is foreign to the present subject; and I say nothing here about it, but
speak only of persons who have the exercise of judgment.
In them it is evident, that a man who feels pain, judges and believes that
he is really pained. The man who perceives an object, believes that it exists, and is
what he distinctly perceives it to be; nor is it in his power to avoid such judgment.
And the like may be said of memory, and of consciousness. Whether judgment
ought to be called a necessary concomitant of these operations, or rather a part or
ingredient of them, I do not dispute; but it is certain, that all of them are
accompanied with a determination that something is true or false, and a
consequent belief. If this determination be not judgment, it is an operation that has
got no name, for it is not simple apprehension nor negation; it may be expressed
by a proposition affirmative or negative, and it is accompanied by the firmest
belief” (EIP 409)
Reid explicitly says that infants likely do not have judgments at all - which is to say they
do not perform acts of assenting to the truth of propositions - when they perceive. Reid
would not need to restrict his claim that perception usually involves judgment to those
cases involving mature people, if he did not believe infants perceive. It appears, then, we
have reason to think Reid holds that judgments are not essentially involved in perception
(or memory, for that matter).
Further, note that Reid indicates at the end of the passage that the determination
of the mind that might be judgment is accompanied by a belief. This indicates that Reid
does not believe that the belief essentially involved in perception is an act of judgment,
but instead something else - such as, say, a practical commitment of some sort or another.
Further, Reid indicates that he is even open to the possibility that the determination of the
mind that is essentially involved in acts of perception and memory in mature people
might not be judgment, but might instead be something else. Whatever that something is,
he claims, it is akin to judgment, as it is a “determination that something is true or false”
and “can be expressed by a proposition”. What else could this something else be? I am
not clear. Reid indicates that he is not clear on this either. However, Reid could say that
this something is a mental act in which one assents to particular things being a particular
way, in much the same way that an act of judgment is a mental act of assenting to the
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truth of an abstract proposition. To clarify, recall that, on Reid’s view, a judgment is an
act of assenting to the truth of a proposition, where that proposition is partly composed of
universals. When judging a de re proposition to be true, on his view, a universal is judged
to be instantiated in an individual. On the suggestion being offered here, the act
essentially involved in mature perception and memory is similar, only it does not involve
assenting to the claim that an individual has a feature that is conceived as a token of a
universal type, but is instead as a mere abstract particular. This judgment-like act, as Reid
himself might plausibly be read as explaining in the passage, might be called “a
determination of the mind concerning what is true or false” (Ibid.) and might be
something that can, in some relevant sense, be expressed by a sentence.
My clarifications are now complete. Before going on to discuss the literature, I
will first briefly consider one important objection. The objection goes as follows: the
claim that acts of memory and imagination involve conceptions with indistinct
conceptual content is absurd when attributed to Reid. Why? Recall that Reid rejects the
claim that the immediate objects of acts of memory and imagination are presently
existing mental representations, and instead holds that they are external objects that do
not presently exist. If one thinks that the only alternative to a conception that involves
purely distinct conceptual content is an imagistic conception roughly of the sort that
Berkeley and Hume think we have when perceiving, and if one thinks that one can
conceive an object via such an imagistic conception only if the object conceived
presently exists, it might well follow that Reid’s rejection of the theory of ideas demands
that he holds that the conceptual content involved in acts of memory and imagination is
wholly distinct. In what follows, I explain why the objector might simply misunderstand
the view I mean to attribute to Reid.
Consider the following introspective experiment. Attend to an object on the table
in front of you, such as a coffee cup. First, close your eyes, grasp the coffee cup with
your hand, and thereby perceive both its size and shape. Second, distinguish the cup and
its conceived features from the sensations that signify them to you. The sensations can, I
suggest, be best described as “the feelings of pressure in your hand”.11 It helps one to
11

The description of it as the “feelings of pressure in your hand” might be misleading. One
might, e.g., upon hearing that phrase, be prompted to conceive of a confused object of thought
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distinguish these sensations from the cup and its features, I suggest, if one squeezes the
cup more firmly and then less firmly. When one does this, the sensations change so as to
become more and subsequently less intense, whereas the features of the cup itself do not
also change. Next, stop touching the cup, but continue to conceive it and to believe that it
existed when you previously touched it - i.e., remember it. Note that the tactile sensations
are now gone from your experience, but a conception of the cup’s features and a belief in
its existence remains. Or so says Reid.
Suppose Reid is right about that much. Now ask: is the conception involved in the
act of remembering different from the conception involved in the act of perceiving? I
suggest that Reid plausibly holds they are not different. Of course, the absence of tactile
sensations makes the experience of remembering very different from that of perceiving.
When you perceived the cup, you were presented with things in a way that was possible
only if those things presently existed. But those, I suggest, were merely the sensations. If
you distinguish the sensations involved in the perception from the object, and consider
the manner in which the features of the perceived object are presented to the mind, it is
not clear, I suggest, that one’s conceptions of those features are acts that, like a Berkelean
perception, a reflexive sensation, or a Russellian act of conception by acquaintance,
might require the current existence of their objects. The difference between the way in
which the features of the cup one conceives and one’s sensations are present to the mind,
I suggest, is like the difference between remembering a pain that you had yesterday and
being in pain right now. In the latter case, the pain is present to the mind in a sense in
which it is not present in the former case. On Reid’s view, as I interpret it, the shape of
the cup, likewise, is not present to the mind when I perceive it, remember, or imagine it,
at least not in some way that current sensations are present - i.e., in a way that appears to
require their current existence.

that consists of not only the sensation but also some part of the material impression. Isolating the
sensation, then, may require a further act of abstraction. The material impression, on Reid’s view,
is located in space as well as spatially extended, whereas the sensation, as an operation of the
mind, is neither of those things. In any case, the exercise described above should be sufficient for
distinguishing the object of conception on the one hand from the other things involved in the act
of perception.
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There is of course a sense in which the features of the cup, when either perceived,
remembered, or imagined, are presented to the mind, insofar as they are conceived in a
manner quite distinct from the manner in which features of objects might be said to be
conceived via some Russellian conception by description - i.e., a conception that, on our
Reidian terminology, involves all and only distinct conceptual content. Nevertheless, the
features of the individuals perceived, remembered, or imagined are not, on Reid’s
account, therefore present to the mind in the way in which a current sensation is present
to the mind. Or so says Reid, on my reading.
Note that I do not claim that Reid’s views, as I interpret them, are either true or
plausible. I only claim that the views are not so implausible that they ought not to be
attributed to Reid. If the available evidence supports an interpretation of a philosopher’s
views, we should adopt that interpretation, even if we believe or suspect the philosopher
is wrong in holding the views that we thereby attribute to him. Reid is clear that we do
not remember or imagine by conceiving a presently existing mental representation of an
object. There is good evidence, moreover, that Reid thinks perception, memory, and
imagination are possible before we ever learn language, and, thus, possible before we
ever acquire the ability to conceive objects via anything that might reasonably be called a
“conceptual description”. Reid might be wrong, but that does not provide us good reason
to interpret him differently.

4.3 Reid’s Other Commentators
How do my claims about Reidian perception, memory, and imagination compare and
contrast with analogous claims made by Reid’s other commentators? Some of my claims
in the preceding section are wholly novel, but others are not. My main argument, though,
is novel: i.e., the argument that Reid holds perception, memory, and imagination are
possible prior to learning artificial language, and, therefore, that those acts do not
essentially involve any distinct conceptual content. In what follows, I briefly summarize
the various claims made by Reid’s other commentators, just so as to contrast them with
my own. At the end of the section, I offer general remarks meant to diagnose the cause of
the disagreements in the literature.
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First, consider original perception. There are three readings in the literature. The
first is endorsed in Wolterstorff (2001) and Buras (2008). On this first reading, Reid
holds that the conception involved in original perception is a conception of a complex set
of universals and the act of belief is an act of assenting to an abstract proposition which
asserts that an individual exists that has particular features that are instantiations of said
universals. I should note that Wolterstorff’s reading is a bit more nuanced: he believes
that all of our original perceptions involve only distinct conceptual content, with the one
exception of our original perceptions of the shape of objects via the sense of sight, which
instead involve an acquaintance-like or non-conceptual presentation of that feature. The
second reading is endorsed in Copenhaver (2010). Copenhaver claims that the act of
conception involved in original perception does not involve distinct conceptual content,
but that the act of belief does. Copenhaver writes, e.g., that “the conception provides a
non‐conceptual presentation of an object; the belief predicates features of the object
conceived by way of concept‐application” (Copenhaver 2010, 285-286). The third
reading is endorsed in Alston (1989), Van Cleve (2015), and Folescu (2015). These
commentators all claim that the conception involved in original perception does not
involve distinct conceptual content, and that Reid does not have a settled position on
whether the belief essentially involves distinct conceptual content.
My reading contrasts with these other readings in different ways. I hold that the
conceptions involved in Reidian original perceptions can involve indistinct, partly
distinct, and distinct conceptual content, rather than only one sort of content. In contrast
to Copenhaver’s reading, moreover, I argued that judgments are not essentially involved
in Reidian acts of original perception, although I agree with her on the more narrow claim
that Reid holds that, in mature minds, perception is always - or usually- accompanied by
at least some de re judgments. I disagree with the third reading, moreover, insofar as I
take a clear stand on the question of whether Reid thinks that the beliefs in perception and
memory essentially involve distinct conceptual content.
Second, consider Reidian memory. There are three other readings in the literature.
The first is endorsed in Copenhaver (2006) and Hamilton (2003). These commentators
argue that, in contrast to original perception, Reidian memory and imagination do not
involve a nonconceptual presentation of the object, but instead involve conceptual
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descriptions. Hamilton argues for this sort of reading, roughly put, by claiming that Reid
cannot hold that memory involve a purely non-conceptual acquaintance with an object
that existed in the past, on the grounds that that view is just absurd. Second, Van Cleve
(2015) argues Reidian memories do not essentially involve distinct conceptual content,
but takes no stand on whether they can involve such content. I disagree with Copenhaver
and Hamilton for reasons that I need not recap here. My view is similar to Van Cleve’s,
as I do not claim Reidian memories essentially involve distinct conceptual content, but it
is distinct from that view too, as I claim that Reidian memories can and often do involve
distinct conceptual content.
A third interpretation of Reidian memory is endorsed in Folescu (2015). Folescu’s
reading is intertwined with the details of her reading of Reidian imagination, and so I will
discuss Folescu’s readings of both memory and imagination together, after I first discuss
the other readings in the literature on Reidian imagination. There are two other readings.
The first is mentioned - albeit not endorsed - in Van Cleve (2015). On this proposed
reading, objects of Reidian imagination are non-existent individuals conceived relative to
distinctly conceived sets of universals. The second reading is endorsed in Lehrer (1989)
and Wolterstorff (2001). On this second reading, objects of Reidian imagination simply
are complex bundles of universals. On both of these readings, then, acts of imagination
only ever involve distinct conceptual content.
My reading differs from the reading mentioned in Van Cleve. On my reading,
objects of imagination are non-existent individuals conceived relative to their conceived
features, but such features can be conceived as either indistinct features, abstract
particulars, or instantiated universals. Both our readings, moreover, differ from the
reading offered by Lehrer and Wolterstorff, in that Van Cleve and I hold that Reidian
objects of imagination are not merely complex free floating bundles of universals: the
objects of Reidian imagination are in fact individuals that do not exist and are conceived
relative to their conceived features.
Last, there is Folescu on memory and imagination. Recall Folescu holds that
Reidian perceptions essentially involve a non-conceptual presentation of the object
perceived. She claims that Reidian memories, in contrast, essentially involve what she
calls “proto-distinct content” and that Reidian imaginings essentially involve distinct
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content. What is this proto-distinct content? Her claim is that the content involved in
memory is not yet fully distinct, but that it is in some sense - which I explain in the next
paragraph - not yet fully indistinct either. Folescu’s view, moreover, is similar to the view
that is proposed by Lehrer and Wolterstorff, but also slightly different, in that she holds
that objects of imagination are not mere complex bundles of universals, but are instead
complex bundles of tropes. This is to say that they are not complex bundles of things that
are both abstract and universal, but instead complex bundles of things that are both
abstract and particular. The idea, roughly put, is that Reidian objects of imagination are
complex bundles of particular properties.
Interestingly, Folescu attributes to Reid a particular account of how memory and
imagination come to involve progressively more distinct forms of conceptual content.
She claims, quite rightly, Reid thinks the mind acquires powers to perceive, remember,
and imagine in successive developmental steps, but also claims that with each step, the
newly possible operation involves a more distinct form of conceptual content. The view
she proposes is roughly this: Reid holds that, when we remember an object we formerly
perceived, the conception of that object has less content than the conception involved in
the earlier perception, just due to the imperfection of our faculty of memory. We might
not remember, e.g., which precise shade of red that the object we formerly perceived was,
but instead just remember that it was some shade of red. The incompleteness of the
memory, on this reading, is the first step that the mind takes on the road towards fully
abstracting and thus towards having conceptions that involve distinct content. Folescu
laudably notes that the developmental account she attributes to Reid here is drawn from
contemporary psychology, rather than Reid’s texts and manuscripts, but she nonetheless
suggests it is a view Reid would have appreciated.
My view is distinct from Folescu’s in several ways. First, our readings differ on
the type of content essentially involved in memory and imagination. I do not deny that
Reidian acts of imagination can involve conceptions of things like Folescu’s tropes: on
my reading, afterall, Reid holds we can conceive features of imagined objects as abstract
particulars, which are at least analogous to whatever one might mean by “tropes”. There
are many disputes in contemporary metaphysics concerning what exactly it is to be a
trope. It is an open debate, then, whether or not Reidian abstract particulars of the sort
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I’ve described are aptly called tropes. But the basic idea, here, is that tropes are particular
properties. On my reading, Reid holds that one can conceive features as particular
properties, without conceiving them as token instantiations of universals, which is to say,
more or less, that one can conceive them as tropes. But we do not need to wade into the
details of any such contemporary debates about what is or is not a trope, as Folescu does
not attribute any particular contemporary trope theory to Reid. It is nevertheless clear
that, on my reading, in contrast Folescu’s, Reidian memory and imagination can involve
conceptions of features not only as abstract particulars, but also as indistinct features and
as instantiated universals.
Second, Folescu and I have different readings of Reid’s account of the processes
through which conceptions, including those conceptions involved in perception, memory,
and imagination, come to involve distinct conceptual content. On my reading, Reid holds
that the process of learning to understand artificial language plays the essential role in the
process through which the mind comes to have conceptions that involve distinct
conceptual content. Reid’s account is not one on which acts of perception, memory, and
imagination each become possible at successive developmental stages, where each of
those stages involves an increasingly distinct form of conceptual content. His account,
rather, on my reading, is one on which these operations become possible in successive
developmental stages, but on which the operations are all possible before a child learns
artificial language, and, consequently, before a child can have conceptions that involve
distinct conceptual content.
To sum up: my readings of Reid’s account of the conceptual content essentially
involved in acts of perception, memory, and imagination are novel in a number of ways,
but also akin to a number of the readings of Reid’s other commentators. The key point to
note, however, is that, with respect to all of my readings, my main argument for them is
quite novel: Reid holds that acts of perception, memory, and imagination can be
performed before one learns artificial language, and, further, that conceptions of
universals are possible only after we learn artificial language; consequently, Reid also
holds that perception, memory, and imagination do not essentially involve distinct
conceptual content. I suggest that we are obligated, as Reid’s interpreters, to defend
readings of Reid’s account of perception, memory, and imagination that are compatible
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with that key point, as well, ideally, with the rest of the textual evidence. I have attempted
to do so in the preceding sections.
What accounts for the variety of readings in the literature? The passages in which
Reid talks about the conceptions involved in perception, memory, and imagination, are, I
suggest, rather mixed: some passages show Reid thinks that an operation involves distinct
conceptual content, whereas others show the opposite. It is understandable, then, there are
a wide variety of readings. I suggest that some interpreters latch onto passages that point
in one way and take them to express his view, whereas others latch onto passages that
point the other way and take them to express his view. On my reading, however, we can
make coherent sense of the entirety of this mixed or muddled body of textual evidence:
on my reading, all the passages express a part of Reid’s complete view, as he holds that
the conceptions involved in perception, memory and imagination can involve conceptual
content of varying degrees of distinctness.

4.4 Reid on Acquired Perception and Habitual
Judgment
I have not discussed Reid’s account of acquired perception in any detail. In this section, I
clarify the details of my reading of Reid’s account of acquired perception and contrast it
with readings in the literature. I do so, moreover, by addressing an exegetical issue that is
discussed in the recent literature.
First, recall the explanation of Reidian acquired perception that I gave in (4.1).
Acquired perceptions are products of past experience. In acquired perception, just like in
original perception, a sign signifies an object. In acquired perception, however, the sign is
an object of an original perception and the thing signified is something that has always
been found connected with the sign in past experience. To clarify, consider our earlier
example. On Reid’s account, when one sees a hot red stove element, one originally
perceives the element only as red. An original perception of a stove element as red,
however, might prompt one to conceive that red element not only as red but also as hot,
in virtue of one’s past experiences of the repeated conjunction of seen red stove elements
and felt sensations of heat. In the past, that is, one repeatedly saw red stove elements and
at the same time also felt them as hot. In virtue of those experiences, one acquired a habit

125

in virtue of which one now conceives as hot the red stove elements one sees and believes
that said elements are also hot. Of situations such as this, Reid says one has an acquired
perception via sight of the heat of the stove element.
In light of that explanation, it is not unreasonable to think that a Reidian acquired
perception is an original perception plus an additional conception and judgment/belief
that is the product of an acquired habit. Our question here concerns whether Reid draws a
distinction between acquired perceptions and other sorts of judgments/beliefs we
habitually make on the occasion of our original perceptions. Why suppose that Reid
draws any such a distinction? Part of the reason is that the discussion in the literature on
this issue concerns a related issue of whether or not acquired perceptions are genuine
perceptions in the very same sense as original perceptions. To grasp this issue a bit better:
note we are inclined to say of some instances that involve an original perception plus an
additional habitual conception and belief that they involve an additional perception, but
we are not so inclined for other such cases. Van Cleve (2004), e.g., gives a good example
of a case of which we are not inclined to say it involves an additional genuine perception.
He presents the example as follows:
“I return home and see my wife’s car keys on the counter, whereupon I
automatically conceive of her and believe that she is home.” (Van Cleve 2004,
127)
Commenting on this example, he writes:
“Since she is upstairs, I do not perceive her, but it seems that I fulfill all the
conditions for [acquired] perception” (Ibid.)
The situation described appears to be one in which an object of original perception is a
sign that prompts one to some additional conception and belief. Of course, if the situation
here is one in which the belief is not automatic, but is instead a conclusion of some chain
of reasoning that began with a de re judgment about the keys being on the counter, then
we could simply say that that judgment is not properly speaking an acquired perception.
The beliefs in Reidian acquired perceptions are, like the beliefs in original perception,
immediate and not conclusions of any chain of propositional reasoning. The example,
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then, is supposed to be one in which the judgment is not the conclusion of any rational
inference, but is instead the product of some sort of acquired habit. This is what Van
Cleve indicates when he says “I automatically conceive of her and believe that she is
home” (Ibid.) Since the belief is stipulated to be automatic, the example does appear to
satisfy the conditions of what it is to be a Reidian acquired perception. Van Cleve points
out, moreover, it is odd to say of the man in this example that he perceived his wife. And
Van Cleve is surely right, no? We are not inclined to say that he perceived his partner to
be at home after seeing her keys. This case, then, appears to be a mere habitual judgment
rather than an acquired perception. The question in front of us, then, is just this: is there a
mark that serves to distinguish genuine Reidian acquired perceptions - such as, e.g., our
example of a perception via sight of the heat of a red stove element - from mere habitual
judgments - such as, e.g., Van Cleve’s key example?
Van Cleve thinks the mark that genuine perceptions involve an acquaintance-like
presentation of the perceived object and its features; and he thinks, furthermore, that most
Reidian acquired perceptions do not involve conceptions of that sort. It follows, on his
reading, that most Reidian acquired perceptions are not genuine perceptions, but are
instead mere habitual judgments that we happen to call “perceptions”. Van Cleve gives a
number of arguments for the claim that acquired perceptions are not genuine perceptions.
We need not survey those arguments here, as the claim I mean to argue for is not that
Reid holds that acquired perceptions are genuine perceptions, but instead the claim that
there is a real distinction to draw between Reidian acquired perceptions and mere
habitual judgments. The phrase ‘genuine perception’ is not a term of art that Reid himself
uses, but is instead one that his commentators have used and imposed onto his views.
There may of course be any number of differences, on Reid’s account, between original
and acquired perceptions, and if one wishes to say that, therefore, Reidian acquired
perceptions are not genuine perceptions in the sense that Reidian original perceptions are,
one will not receive any protest from me. The issue I am concerned with is whether a
clear distinction can be drawn between Reidian acquired perceptions and mere habitual
judgments. Van Cleve holds that it cannot.
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Copenhaver (2010) argues that such a distinction can be drawn. She responds to
Van Cleve’s keys example, and, in doing so, explains why it does not involve a Reidian
acquired perception. Copenhaver writes:
“Van Cleve does not perceive the presence of his wife upon seeing the keys on
the counter. This is not a case of perception. Van Cleve is right that the reason it
is not a case of perception is that the visual experience does not acquaint him with
the presence of his wife. He concludes from this that just as this acquired
perception does not count as genuine perception, most cases of acquired
perception are not cases of genuine perception, for Reid. They are perceptual in a
merely metaphorical sense.
However, this conclusion follows only if the car key example is an
example of acquired perception. But it is unlike Reid's examples of acquired
perception in an important way: in Reid's cases, original perception of qualities of
objects equips perceivers with the ability to acquire a perceptual sensitivity to
additional features of those objects, features not presented in original perception”
(Copenhaver 2010, 304-305)
Copenhaver suggests, then, that the mark that distinguishes acquired perceptions from
habitual judgments of the sort that Van Cleve describes in his example is this: if the
individual object that the habitual judgment is about is the same individual object that the
original perception that prompted it is about, then the additional conception and belief is
in fact a genuine acquired perception rather than a habitual judgment; but, moreover, if
the two individuals are not the same, then it is but a mere habitual judgment. On
Copenhaver’s suggested reading, then, acquired perception is quite specifically a way in
which we become perceptually acquainted with additional features of those objects that
we originally perceive. Van Cleve’s keys example is not a case of that sort; therefore, it is
not a case of Reidian acquired perception.
Has Copenhaver’s reply just hit the nail right on the head? Van Cleve presents the
following counter-example:
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“A color-blind motorist can see that a traffic light is red by seeing that the
illuminated light is the one in the top position. Here the signifying quality (place)
and the signified quality (color) are qualities of the same object, so our motorist
satisfies our latest condition for having an acquired perception of the color of the
light. But does he perceive the redness of the light? No, for he is colour blind”
(Van Cleve 2015, 135)
This example satisfies Copenhaver’s criterion: the additional conception and belief are
about the same individual object. If Copenhaver’s reading is correct, then the colorblind
motorist really does perceive the colour of the traffic light. But Van Cleve appears to be
correct in saying that the motorist does not.
What is my alternate reading? I agree with Copenhaver there is a real distinction
between acquired perceptions and habitual judgments, but I give a modified account of
that distinction. I argue that one mark that - in addition to Copenhaver’s suggested mark can serve to fully distinguish Reidian acquired perceptions from habitual judgments. Her
criterion may not be sufficient to mark the distinction by itself, but our two can together.
To begin, note the following passages:
“This power which we acquire of perceiving things by our senses, which
originally we should not have perceived, is not the effect of any reasoning on our
part: It is the result of our constitution, and of the situations in which we happen
to be placed.
We are so made, that when two things are found to be conjoined in certain
circumstances, we are prone to believe that they are connected by nature, and will
always be found together in like circumstances. The belief which we are led to in
such cases is not the effect of reasoning, nor does it arise from the intuitive
evidence of the thing believed. It is, as I apprehend, the immediate effect of our
constitution: Accordingly, it is strongest in infancy, before our reasoning power
appears, before we are capable of drawing a conclusion from premises” (EIP 238)
“Acquired perception is not properly the testimony of our senses which God hath
given us, but a conclusion drawn from what the senses testify. In our past
experience, we have found certain things conjoined with what our senses testify.
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We are led by our constitution to expect this continuation in time to come; and
when we have often found it in our experience, we acquire a firm belief, that the
things which we have found thus conjoined are connected by nature, and that the
one is the sign of the other. The appearance of the sign immediately produces the
belief of its usual attendant, and we think we perceive the one as well as the other.
That such conclusions are formed even in infancy, no man can doubt; nor
is it less certain that they are confounded with the natural and immediate
perceptions of sense, and in all languages called by the same name. We are
therefore authorized by language to call them perception, and must often do so, or
speak unintelligibly. But philosophy teaches us in this, as in many other instances,
to distinguish things which the vulgar confound. I have therefore given the name
of acquired perception to such conclusions, to distinguish them from what is
naturally, originally, and immediately testified by our senses. Whether this
acquired perception is to be resolved into some process of reasoning, of which we
have lost the remembrance, as some philosophers think, or whether it results from
some part of our constitution distinct from reason, as I rather believe, does not
concern the present subject” (EIP 247)
There are two key points to make about these passages. First, Reid says that acquired
perceptions are formed by people even in infancy, before they can reason. This gives us
reason to conclude that Reid holds that the conceptions and beliefs that are involved in
acquired perceptions do not essentially involve distinct conceptual content. On my
reading, Reidian acquired perceptions are just like original perceptions, memories, and
imaginings, in the sense that they can involve indistinct content, partly distinct content,
distinct content, or a mixture of all three. The additional conception involved in acquired
perception is more or less an act of Reidian imagination - i.e., a conception of an
individual as it would appear to the senses if it were perceived - plus an immediate belief
that the object exists and is what it is conceived to be.
Second, and most importantly, Reid says at the end of the second passage that he
believes - in contrast to other philosophers - that reasoning is not involved in the process
through which we acquire the habits involved in acquired perception. That process is not,
Reid says, to be “resolved into some process of reasoning, of which we have lost the
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remembrance” (Ibid.) Reid says, rather, that the habits are acquired by the exercise of
some part of our constitution that is “distinct from reason” (Ibid.) To clarify this claim,
first recall that reasoning, on Reid’s account, is an act in which one infers the truth of a
proposition from that of another, by recognizing that the truth of the one makes the truth
of the other evident. Reid’s claim in the passage, I suggest, is that reasoning, in that
precise sense, is not involved in the process through which one acquires the habits that
are involved in acquired perceptions. It makes good sense, of course, for Reid to deny
that reasoning of that sort is involved in that process: Reid holds, afterall, that infants can
have acquired perceptions, presumably before they ever learn an artificial language, from
which it directly follows that the relevant processes cannot essentially involve the
exercise of those abilities artificial language makes possible. But my interpretive claim
here is a bit stronger than just that: I claim, that is, that Reid holds that such reasoning is
never involved in the process, and that this is what serves to distinguish Reidian acquired
perceptions from mere habitual judgments.
To clarify, we need to get clear on the “part of our constitution distinct from
reason” Reid mentions in the quoted passage. I suggest we need only attend to the
passages quoted, as Reid himself describes the type of process involved. To clarify,
however, note there are two types of process we might call “induction”. In the first, one
perceives the conjunction of tokens of distinct types so often that one acquires a habit of
conceiving and believing in the existence of tokens of the one type on occasions in which
one happens to perceive tokens of the other. In the second, the probable truth of one
abstract proposition is inferred from that of another such proposition. In the quoted
passage, I argue, Reid is properly read as denying that the second type of inductive
process is ever involved in the process through which we acquire the habits involved in
acquired perceptions, and that the first type is essentially involved. The developmental
process involved is one in which one repeatedly perceives individuals with a certain set
of features as having an additional feature, and one thereby comes to acquire - without
engaging in any propositional reasoning - a habit in virtue of which one conceives the
individual one perceives with the first set of features as having said additional feature. In
a habitual judgment, in contrast, the process is one in which one previously perceived an
individual with certain features, judged a proposition about that particular individual to
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be true, then reasoned from the truth of that proposition to the truth of another proposition
about that same or another individual, and did this so often that, now, when one perceives
an individual like that again, one habitually judges a proposition of the latter sort is true
without any of the previously explicit reasoning.
Together, Copenhaver and my own criteria can distinguish acquired perceptions
from cases of mere habitual judgments. To see why, let’s reconsider Van Cleve’s
example of the colour-blind motorist.
In that example, the sign is the location of the light and the thing signified by that
sign is the colour of the light. These features are features of the same individual object, so
Copenhaver’s criterion does not explain why this is not a case of acquired perception.
Note, however, that the colour-blind driver did not have past experiences in which she
perceived lights in a particular place as being lights of a particular colour. She is, afterall,
colour-blind. The process through which she came to acquire the habit, then, is not like
our example in which one repeatedly perceives stove elements to be red and also hot, and
thereby acquires a habit of conceiving and believing of the red stove elements one merely
sees that they are hot. How could the colour blind driver acquire the habit? I suggest the
example must be one in which the driver was told, at some time in the past, that top lights
on traffic light boxes are red lights rather than green or yellow lights. She consequently
judged some proposition to be true on the basis of that testimony. She then subsequently
repeatedly reasoned to the conclusion that the particular lights that she saw on top of
particular traffic light boxes were in fact red rather than yellow or green. She repeated
that sort of reasoning so often that she now habitually and immediately - that is, without
using any explicit reasoning - judges that traffic lights she sees on the top of light boxes
are red. On my reading, then, this case does not involve acquired perception, but instead
habitual judgment. Copenhaver’s criterion does not account for this case, but my criterion
allows us to do so. Last, consider one further example:
In mid december 1993, I was a small boy who received a Christmas present from
my parents, which was boxed and placed under a Christmas tree in the corner of
my family’s living room. One night, I snuck down to the living room and shook
the present, so as to hear the sound the object made, in hopes of being able discern
what I was getting for Christmas. I heard a sound, and, after a sophisticated bout
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of reasoning, I arrived at the conclusion that I was getting a ninja turtle action
figure as a present for Christmas. This was good: I liked ninja turtles a lot. The
sound was not, of course, all by itself enough for me to reason to my conclusion.
However, the size and weight seemed about right, and, additionally, I was aware
that my parents knew I liked ninja turtles, and I thought I had overheard my sister
say something earlier about a ninja turtle action figure that I knew I did not as yet
possess: from all this, I concluded, the object in the box was a ninja turtle. Every
night thereafter, right up until Christmas, I, ever excited at the prospect of getting
a new ninja turtle action figure, snuck down to see my present again. Each time, I
shook it just as before, heard the sound, and judged that the object I heard was a
ninja turtle action figure, without going through the reasoning I previously used to
come to that conclusion. One night, moreover, I noticed there was a new present
for me under the tree. It was from my grandmother. I shook it and it made the
very same sound. In my excitement, I immediately judged it to be another ninja
turtle, without employing any reasoning at all.
The question is this: did I perceive the present from my grandmother to be a ninja turtle?
Note that on Copenhaver’s reading, the example indeed appears to be an acquired
perception. On my reading, in contrast, it is but a mere habitual judgment. I reasoned to
the conclusion that objects in boxes that are presents for me that make a particular type of
sound are ninja turtle action figures, and came to judge habitually of such objects that
they are ninja turtle action figures. I did not perceive the object to be a ninja turtle until I
opened my present on Christmas morning.
To close, I need to qualify my claims in this section by noting that I only mean to
argue that Reid was thinking of the distinction between acquired perception and habitual
judgment in this precise way when he wrote EIP in the mid 1780s. I suspect, in fact, Reid
simply did not bother to draw a clear distinction between these cases when he wrote IHM
in the 1760s. The textual evidence supports this developmental claim. Note, e.g., Reid
writes the following in IHM:
“When a painter perceives, that this picture is the work of Raphael, that the work
of Titan; a jeweller, that this is a true diamond, that a counterfeit; a sailor, that this
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is a ship of five hundred ton, that of four hundred: these different acquired
perceptions are produced by the same general principles of the human mind”
(IHM 192)
Make note of the examples that he gives in this passage. And then note that, in EIP, in a
chapter titled “Of the fallacy of the senses”, Reid explains why supposed examples of
false original perceptions are not original perceptions at all. Reid argues, there, that such
examples fall into four distinct categories. The first category, he writes, are not errors of
original perception, but instead
“...conclusions rashly drawn from the testimony of the senses”; the second
category, moreover, are not errors of original perception but instead “[errors]
which we are liable to in our acquired perceptions” (EIP 244-251)
The details of the third and fourth types are not particularly relevant to our discussion
here; the point to note concerns the particular examples that Reid includes of the first and
second types. Of the first, Reid writes:
“Many things called deceptions of sense are only conclusions rashly drawn from
the testimony of the senses. In these cases the testimony of the senses is true, but
we rashly draw a conclusion from it, which does not necessarily follow. We are
disposed to impute our errors rather to false information than to inconclusive
reasoning, and to blame our senses for the wrong conclusions we draw from their
testimony.
Thus, when a man has taken a counterfeit guinea for a true one, he says
that his senses deceived him; but he lays the blame were it ought not to be laid…”
(EIP 244)
The example Reid identifies - the example “perceiving” a coin to be a real guinea - as a
conclusion drawn rashly from the senses, is the same type of example that Reid identified
in IHM - that is, the example of “perceiving” a diamond to be genuine - as an acquired
perception. How do we account for this? I suggest that Reid made more precise his notion
of acquired perception in the later works. In IHM, Reid used ‘acquired perception’ to
mean something rather more broad, something roughly like “a conclusion habitually
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drawn from the senses that we are apt to mistake for original perception”, but that he
subsequently went on to refine that notion so as to distinguish acquired perceptions from
our habitual judgments. Recall our very first example of acquired perception: you
repeatedly saw stove elements to be red and at the same time felt them to be hot, and
thereby acquired a habit of conceiving and believing of the stove elements that you
merely see as red that they are also hot. Now contrast that with the example in which one
judges a diamond to be genuine. In the latter, one did not originally perceive rocks in the
past as having a set of features and at the same time originally perceive them as having
the additional feature of being a genuine diamond. Instead, one was likely told at some
point in the past that rocks with certain features are genuine diamonds. One then
remembered that general truth and reasoned from the general to the particular often
enough, such that one now habitually judges of the rocks one sees with that set of
features that they are genuine diamonds. It is clear, on my reading, why Reid notes in EIP
that this sort of case is a conclusion drawn from the testimony of sense rather than an
acquired perception. The fact that he identifies that sort of case, in IHM, as an act of
acquired perception is, I suggest, simply a product of the fact that he is working, there,
with a looser definition ‘acquired perception’, on which the signification of that term
includes cases that he considers in EIP separately as acquired perceptions and judgments
formed habitually on the basis of what we perceive.

4.5 Summary and Conclusions
This dissertation concerns Thomas Reid’s philosophy of language. As noted previously,
that topic has not received much attention in the literature. One aim of the dissertation is
to make some progress towards rectifying this situation in the literature, by carrying out a
detailed study of Reid’s philosophy of language. I hope to have accomplished that aim. I
noted that a second aim of the dissertation, moreover, is to use the results of that study of
Reid’s philosophy of language to contribute to the literature on his philosophy of mind. I
suggested, in the introduction, that Reid’s views on language and mind are so intertwined
such that, by understanding the former, we can hope to better understand the latter. I hope
that I have shown the reader that this is very much the case, not by way of argument, but
by way of showing that progress can be made.
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Throughout the chapters and sections of the dissertation, I argue for a number of
novel exegetical claims. In what follows, I briefly recap those claims.
In chapter two, I discuss Reid’s answer to the question: what does the ability to
understand artificial linguistic signs make possible? Reid’s answer, I argue, is that the
ability to understand artificial linguistic signs makes it possible for us to conceive
universals, to judge, and to reason. I argue, further, that those claims, in conjunction with
Reid’s accounts of moral liberty and efficient causation, commit him to the further claim
that artificial language makes possible moral liberty.
In chapter three, I discussed Reid’s answer to the question: what makes artificial
language possible. That question is really two questions: (i) what makes it possible for
infants to first learn to understand an artificial language that is already spoken by the
members of their linguistic community? and (ii) what made it possible for humans to first
invent artificial languages, at the point way back in history before any such language had
yet been invented. I focus, moreover, on Reid’s claim that learning and inventing
artificial linguistic signs is possible in such cases, only if we have a natural language
faculty by the exercise of which we can perform social operations of the mind. In seeking
to understand Reid’s answers to these questions and his arguments for them, I argue for a
number of novel exegetical claims.
First, I argue for a novel interpretation of Reid’s account of the social operations
of the mind. On that interpretation, Reid holds that social operations are (i) operations of
the mind, (ii) cannot exist unless expressed by signs and thereby made known to another
intelligent being, (iii) are just as simple as and cannot be reduced to or identified with
solitary operations, (iv) presuppose understanding and will, and, in the case of the social
operations of giving testimony and making promising, presuppose moral liberty, and (v)
social operations are remote operations of which the mind is not conscious.
Second, I argue Reid is committed to the view that the natural linguistic signs that
we can use to express the social operations are signs that signify by what Reid calls “a
natural kind of magic”, which is to say they signify their objects even if one has never
before conceived the social operations that they signify, and, consequently, holds that the
natural language faculty is, along with the faculties of perception and consciousness, one
basic source of our empirical concepts.
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Third, I presented detailed reconstructions of Reid’s arguments for his claim that
artificial language is possible only if we possess a natural language with which we can
express social operations. I then went on to critically engage the literature on the first of
those arguments. I point out that Reid’s other interpreters - namely, Turri (2013) and
Powell (2017) - do not fully appreciate the role that Reid’s account of the social
operations plays in his argument. I argue, moreover, that the account of the first invention
of language presupposed by that argument is prima facie incompatible with Reid’s views
on what artificial language makes possible and his account of the social operations. I
consider several suggestions for how we might absolve Reid of these problems, but
conclude that none of those suggestions wholly succeeds.
In chapter four, I show how my results in chapters two and three can help us
better understand Reid’s accounts of perception, memory, and imagination. I argue for
several novel claims. I argue Reid holds that we can perceive, remember, and imagine
before we learn artificial language, and, consequently, that Reid holds that those acts do
not essentially involve distinct conceptual content. I develop readings of Reid’s accounts
of perception, memory and imagination, readings consistent with that first point. I point
out some of the errors of contrasting readings. Last, I argue for a novel reading of Reid’s
distinction between acquired perceptions and judgments made habitually on the occasion
of our original and acquired perceptions.
I have, then, made some progress towards better understanding Reid’s accounts of
language and mind. There is more progress to be made. In particular, I think that the
results achieved on better understanding Reid’s philosophy of language can help us to
better understand some aspects of Reid’s epistemology. To explain: recall, e.g., Reid
holds that some propositions are self-evident to us; Reid often calls these propositions
“first principles of common sense”. Reid lists a number of such principles in his essay on
judgment in EIP. There is a question to ask here concerning why these propositions rather than others - have the privileged epistemic status that they do. Reid is clear that it
is by exercising our faculty of common sense that we can recognize such principles as
self-evident. On one plain reading, first principles simply are those propositions that,
when understood, immediately command assent from any normally functioning mature
human mind, and they do so simply because God “wired” up the mind in the way he did.
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But I think it important to note that Reid has a little bit more to say about common sense
principles. He writes:
“There is a certain degree of [judgment] which is necessary to our being subjects
of law and government, capable of managing our own affairs, and answerable for
our conduct towards others: This is common sense, because it is common to all
men with whom we can transact business, or call to account for their conduct…
The same degree of understanding which makes a man capable of acting
with common prudence in the conduct of life, makes him capable of discovering
what is true and what is false in matters that are self-evident, and which he
distinctly apprehends” (EIP 426)
The part of the quote passage I want to emphasize is: “[common sense is that degree of
judgment that] is common to all men with whom we can transact business, or call to
account for their conduct” (Ibid.) I want, moreover, to read “transact business” as
meaning roughly “communicate with each other so as to perform the social operations”.
Recall Reid holds that the ability to understand artificial language capable of expressing
social operations is part of what is required for epistemic rationality and moral liberty.
Whatever commitments are necessarily involved, then, on Reid’s account, in our using
and understanding such artificial language, are also required for epistemic rationality and
moral liberty. What I want to suggest, moreover, is that Reid holds those commitments
just are our common sense commitments, and, further, that this fact might serve to
account for why Reid thinks that the first principles have the privileged epistemic status
that they do. Reid holds that the first principles are those propositions one must assume to
be true - if only in practice - if one is to possess epistemic rationality, and, thus, to know
anything at all. I will not argue for - or even explain any further - that suggestion, but will
leave the task of doing so for future work.
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